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Abstract 
Name: Ali Ahmed Hamood Alghenaimi 
Thesis title: Collaborative Arrangements and the State of Trust between SMEs 
and Large Companies in Mandated Business Interactions. 
Keywords: Trust, Entrepreneurship, Government contracts, SMEs, large 
companies, Interorganizational relationships, Case studies.  
The focus of this study is to explore trust between small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and large companies in interorganizational relationships 
(IORs) that are mandated by government policy. Due to the important 
contribution made by SMEs to national economies and to the fact that their 
growth is pivotal for entrepreneurial activities, many governments have made 
significant efforts to enhance their performance. However, SMEs are 
constrained by their lack of resources and experience. Some countries have 
required large companies to collaborate with SMEs to overcome these 
constraints. Whilst much attention has been devoted to trust in relationships 
of choice between SMEs and large companies, scant attention has been paid 
to the state of trust in mandated business interactions. This study explores the 
state of trust between large companies and SMEs companies in mandated 
business interactions, identifying those factors that influence trust between 
them. Qualitative semi-structured interviews with 25 key managers from large 
companies and SMEs were conducted in Oman which has a policy of 
mandated IORs. The interview data were analyzed thematically. The key 
findings resulted in a new contextual concept of trust, a refinement of classical 
trust indicators by which the presence of trust in IORs can be more 
appropriately detected and the development of a model embracing factors 
which were found to influence trust. Several new factors not previously 
commented on in the literature were identified in this study. The findings 
provide theoretical and practical contributions with recommendations for 
policy, practice and further research.  
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Over the past two decades, there has been significant interest in collaborative 
arrangements between Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and large 
companies which are largely seen as important mechanisms of growth for 
SMEs (Sambasivan et al. 2013). This is because SMEs are considered to be 
vital for the promotion of entrepreneurship and the economic development of 
most countries (Beck et al. 2005). Many countries have considered 
collaborative arrangements as options for enhancing the growth of SMEs and 
encouraging entrepreneurial activities (Gourlay and Cravo 2012). Alvarez and 
Barney (2001) note that the interaction between SMEs and large companies 
creates economic value. The relationship is considered to yield substantial 
cost saving to large companies while delivering expansion and growth 
opportunities for SMEs (Blomqvist et al. 2005; Rothkegel et al. 2006; Yang et 
al. 2014). Thus, policy makers have devoted considerable attention to 
collaborative arrangements between the two types of companies.  
Despite the remarkable attention devoted by policy makers, and the extensive 
arguments of researchers about the benefits that SMEs can derive from 
forming relationships with large companies, the literature reveals multifaceted 
findings; (e.g. Pretorius et al. 2008; Auko et al. 2011; Vandaie and Zaheer 
2014; Yang et al. 2014). Many of such collaborative arrangements between 
SMEs and large companies have experienced high failure rates (Rothkegel et 
al. 2006; Costa e Silva et al. 2012). Recent estimates indicate that 60% to 70% 
of business interactions end in failure (Munyon et al. 2011). There may be 
many reasons why such ventures fail but one of the principal reasons 
frequently cited by authors is the failure for both partners to establish a 
relationship based on trust (Seppänen et al. 2007; Ojasalo 2008; Ybarra and 
Turk 2009; Sung and Kang 2012).  
Consequently, trust has become an important element of the success of Inter-
Organisational Relationship (IOR) (Ybarra and Turk 2009; Cerri 2012). There 
is a consensus in the literature that trust facilitates cooperation and 
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coordination between SMEs and large companies (Nguyen et al. 2005). Trust 
allows business partners to work in constructive interpretations of partners’ 
behaviour and actions (Zaheer et al. 1998). Hence, recent IOR literature has 
been concerned with investigating and exploring issues associated with the 
success of collaborative arrangements, with particular attention to the issue of 
trust (Nguyen and Liem 2013). An extensive body of literature reveals the 
importance of trust for successful business relationships (e.g. Johnson and 
Cullen 2000; Francis and Mukherji 2009; Abosag and Lee 2013). It is argued 
that it is difficult to promote and encourage partners to involve themselves in 
collaborative agreements and structural integration without building a strong 
sense of trust (Michalski et al. 2014).  
Trust is particularly important for SMEs which often have insufficient resources 
and limited knowledge of dealing with contracts and with the rapidly changing 
business environment (Schoonjans et al. 2013). In addition, SMEs are more 
frequently confronted with the decision of whether to trust in a high risk 
situation or to forgo entering into such a relationship than are large companies 
(Welter et al. 2004).  
Due to the importance of the SME sector for most national economies, a 
number of countries have attempted to encourage their growth and promote 
entrepreneurial activities through the development of collaborative 
arrangements between SMEs and large companies.  
This study focuses on collaborative arrangements between SMEs and large 
companies in the context of a developing economy. The particular setting for 
the current study is the Sultanate of Oman which is of interest because, not 
only did the government encourage the growth of SMEs through collaborative 
arrangements with large companies, it actually mandated such arrangements 
as a matter of policy by making it a condition for awarding public projects. 
Accordingly, the originality of this study lies in its investigation of trust between 
SMEs and large companies in mandated business interactions.  
However, it is important to first present some background information relevant 
to collaborative business interactions. 
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1.2 Study background 
Over the past two decades, there have been significant interests in using 
different types of collaborative arrangements such as joint ventures, alliance 
formations and other forms of interactions with large companies as 
mechanisms for the growth of SMEs (Sambasivan et al. 2013). Among various 
forms of interactions, the subcontracting arrangement represents the most 
conventional form of relationship between SMEs and large companies 
because the connected parties often articulate their mutual goals during the 
signing of the contract (Blomqvist et al. 2005). A subcontracting relationship is 
defined as a contractual arrangement in which large companies entrust certain 
commissioned work to other companies (Kimura 2002). In this form of 
interaction, both parties articulate the objectives of the interactions, which may 
include various elements such as price and quality of the products and delivery 
time schedule (Hancké 1998). Thus, the commissioning processes of large 
companies over SMEs during the execution of subcontracting work is 
considered as a transactional process where both SMEs and large companies 
utilise opportunities to exchange knowledge and experience (Miller et al. 
2002). 
The assistance received by SMEs from large companies through 
subcontracting interactions is beneficial and encourages technological 
innovations on the part of SMEs; the greater the degree of assistance by the 
large partner, the greater the level of innovations expected from the 
subcontracted SMEs (Sudhir Kumar and Bala Subrahmanya 2010). There is 
a consensus in the literature that interactions with large companies provide 
SMEs with valuable assets that may facilitate acquisition of the resources, 
experiences, and knowledge essential for their survival and growth (Van 
Cauwenberge and Schoonjans 2013). Hence, finding ways to establish, 
develop and maintain the relationship between SMEs and large companies is 
an essential step for achieving the intended aim of the interactions (Nguyen 
and Liem 2013). 
Subrahmanya (2008) contended that subcontracting relationships with SMEs 
increased the flexibility of large companies by hiving off the production of parts 
which were more cost effectively produced by SMEs. This allowed large 
4 
 
companies to reduce their costs while enhancing and increasing the flexibility 
and specialisations of SMEs (Auko et al. 2011). Auko et al. (2011) also 
revealed that around 80% of subcontracting SMEs in Kenya had 
independently developed new technologies under the supervision and 
guidance of their larger partners. 
Subcontracting with large companies was the core function of SMEs’ 
prosperity in Japan which evolved after World War II (Subrahmanya 2008). 
The Inter-Organizational Relationship (IOR) models in Europe and Japan are 
usually assumed to have the enhancement of the productivity and efficiency 
of the SMEs as their principal goal (Auko et al. 2011). In some developing 
countries (e.g. the Sultanate of Oman), subcontracting relationships have also 
been considered as an opportunity for SMEs, not only to overcome their 
vulnerability and various constraints, but also to grow and contribute to the 
national economy (Varghese 2011). In fact, the government policy in Oman is 
to embark on major projects in various sectors that aim to create downstream 
opportunities and activities for SMEs and entrepreneurs (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et 
al. 2013).   
However important the form that the interaction may take, many researchers 
and policy makers have drawn attention to important issues relevant to the 
success of the interactions, and significant among these issues is the 
importance of trust between business partners (Bönte 2008; Jørgensen and 
Ulhøi 2010; Cerri 2012). This is because the relationships and the business 
interactions of independent companies are developed for different reasons 
(Abosag and Lee 2013), and the relationship between interacted companies 
are often characterised by hidden goals and objectives (Costa e Silva et al. 
2012).  
Trust is one of the essential components of business relationships (Dyer and 
Chu 2003; Adobor 2005; Blomqvist et al. 2005; Seppänen et al. 2007; Xavier 
Molina-Morales et al. 2011; Cerri 2012; Costa e Silva et al. 2012; Guo et al. 
2013; Nguyen and Liem 2013), and conversely, the breakdown of trust is often 
cited as a failure factor in these relationships (Mukherjee et al. 2013). Trust 
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was also found to encourage both large companies and SMEs to boost their 
productivity by exchanging knowledge and resources (Blomqvist et al. 2005).  
Many studies have devoted significant attention to the issue of trust between 
SMEs and large companies. However, most of these studies were confined to 
relationships of choice (e.g. Bönte 2008; Dickson and Weaver 2011; Michalski 
et al. 2014). According to Dickson and Weaver (2011) relationships of choice 
are either governed by rigorously and strictly negotiated agreements or simply 
by a handshake. Such business interactions between SMEs and large 
companies are found in forms of different patterns of relationships such as 
joint ventures, alliance formation and other forms of business relationships 
(Sambasivan et al. 2013). Such business relationships are characterized by 
the willingness of interacted companies to achieve their own interests based 
on their own available independent assets (Sudhir Kumar and Bala 
Subrahmanya 2010).  
The relationship of choice on the part of large companies often exists in the 
form of utilising the expertise of SMEs to develop products or to innovate new 
products for large companies (Pretorius et al. 2008). These relationships may 
exist in the form of short term collaborations to cover a specific project or to 
overcome long-standing problems. Essentially, they tend to meet the 
requirements of the large companies by the smaller companies supplying 
certain goods or services in ways which represent value for the larger 
companies (Lunati 2002). Nevertheless, in such choice relationships, the 
smaller companies benefit by gaining access to the new knowledge and 
technology that large companies have (Rothkegel et al. 2006), or by entering 
new markets for obtaining additional funds (Dickson and Weaver 2011), or, 
yet again, by improving management skills (Pretorius et al. 2008). However, 
in many relationship between SMEs and large companies, most of the values 
and benefits of the collaborative arrangements are appropriated by the large 
business partner (Alvarez and Barney 2001). In such business interactions, 
the efficiency and even the survival of the SMEs is at risk (Varghese 2011).  
In order to minimise the risks to SMEs, many countries have devoted a sizable 
amount of public resources to enhancing the growth and participation of micro, 
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small, and medium enterprises (Aterido et al. 2011), and various strategies 
existed to enhance SMEs such as providing special financial schemes, 
training, consultancy and advice. For instance, the Kenyan government has 
attempted to enhance the position of SMEs and encourage entrepreneurial 
activities through policies aimed at promoting SMEs and large companies 
subcontracting in business relationships (Auko et al. 2011). SMEs in some 
countries were provided with maximum practical entrepreneurial opportunities, 
as, for instance, in Chile, where the Government initiated optimal procurement 
policies in the form of dividing public acquisitions of service and supplies into 
reasonable opportunities between companies to favour the growth of a larger 
number of SMEs (Morand 2003). In the United Kingdom, SMEs are supported 
through public procurements in which several objectives can be achieved such 
as reducing the demand of SMEs for finance resources and, at the same time, 
to improve public services (Loader 2007). At the European Union level, public 
demand was considered and used as an engine for enhancing the SME sector 
and encouraging entrepreneurship (Edler and Georghiou 2007). The Swedish 
government tried to enhance SMEs by initiating multi-partner alliances 
between them and large companies. This was for the purpose of encouraging 
the innovativeness of SMEs and the development of products (Thorgren and 
Wincent 2011).  
Among the different forms of government intervention is the imposition of 
mandated subcontracting relationships between SMEs and large companies, 
especially in public projects (Kidalov 2013). A mandated relationship can be 
described as a type of relationship that is governed by regulation, legislation, 
and guidelines (Stuart 2010; Kidalov 2013).  
In Oman, interactions between SMEs and large companies in public projects 
were seen by the government as one of the best opportunities for enhancing 
the  growth of SMEs (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013). This policy was state-
funded in Oman (Ennis 2015). In some countries, such as the USA, supporting 
SMEs and enhancing their position by accessing procurement opportunities of 
large firms was an effective strategy not only for the SMEs but also for 
developing productive business relationships with their large partners 
(Woldesenbet and Ram 2012). However, before discussing the structure of 
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mandated business interactions in Oman, some contextual information 
relevant to the Sultanate of Oman is provided in the following section.  
1.3 Context of the study 
The Sultanate of Oman is located on the south-eastern coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula with a total area of 309,500 sq. km and with a total population of 
4.7m. Approximately 40% of the population are migrants. In contrast to many 
developed countries which have ageing populations, of the 3 million 
indigenous population, 45% are in the 15-29 age range (AlMaimani and Johari 
2015). Additionally, in contrast to many Middle-Eastern countries, Oman has 
a stable political environment, a well-established legal system and promotes 
enterprise and investment through its international banking regulations (Khan 
and Almoharby 2007). Thus, Oman is one of the most progressive countries 
in the Middle East (ibid).  
Oman is a middle-income economy with significant oil and gas resources. 
Petroleum accounts for 64% of total export earnings and represents 80% of 
government revenues. Due to the decline in global oil prices in 2015, Oman’s 
budget deficit reached $ 6.5 billion, or nearly 11% of GDP. Oman has been 
trying to diversify its economy and early steps were taken towards 
industrialisation and privatisation which were aimed at reducing dependency 
on oil revenue. Tourism and industries such as metal manufacturing, gas 
resources, petrochemicals and international transhipment ports were the key 
components of the government's diversification strategy. 
Over the last two decades, Oman has undertaken efforts to reduce its 
dependency on hydrocarbons by enhancing the SME sector (AlMaimani and 
Johari 2015). This focus on entrepreneurship, innovation and SMEs has been 
considered the landscape of economic reform in Oman (Ennis 2015).  
Previous studies revealed that the SME sector in Oman is plagued by a 
number of constraints. Besides the commonly known characteristics of SMEs 
such as lack of human and financial resources (Sherry and Hans Anton 2013), 
the SME sector in Oman is confronted by the intense domination and 
competition of large companies over most industries in the market (Al-Shanfari 
Dhafir et al. 2013). Table 1 compares the percentage of SMEs and large 
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companies in Oman with that of the five largest economies in Europe in terms 
of number of enterprises, percentage of employment and percentage share of 
value added to the economy. (* Oman is added in the final row for purposes 
of comparison).  
Table 1: Share of large companies and SMEs 
 
Country 
% share of all 
enterprises 
% Share of 
employment  
% Share of value added 
SMEs Large comp SMEs Large comp SMEs Large comp 
Germany 99.508 0.492 60.935  39.065 53.808 46.192 
France 99.812 0.188 60.383 39.617 55.910 44.09 
UK 99.641 0.359 53.941 46.059 50.220 49.68 
Italy 99.923 0.077 81.395 18.605 71.319 28.681 
Spain 99.880 0.012 76.313 23.687 67.895 32.105 
*Oman 90 10 36.6 63.4 16 84 
 
* The table is a summary of (Fotache et al. 2011) conclusion. The data relating to Oman is 
extracted from (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013).  
Table 1 shows that in the five European countries, there is a higher percentage 
share of SMEs among registered organisations than is the case of Oman. 
Large companies account for a higher percentage of all enterprises in Oman 
in comparison to the five major European economies. There is a significant 
difference in the percentage share of employment between the European 
countries and Oman in terms of SMEs and large companies. The share of 
employment accounted for by large companies is significantly higher 
compared to the European countries. Additionally, large companies in Oman 
account for a significantly higher percentage of value added to GNP than in 
any of the five European countries.  
Table 1 shows the domination of most large companies over the business 
opportunities in Oman which, not only affects existing SMEs but also hinders 
9 
 
the entrance of new businesses (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013), while an open 
market would provide opportunities for competent SMEs. The International 
Financial Institutions (IFI) recommended that the government of Oman needed 
to intervene to control the market to enhance the participation of SMEs and 
protect their survival (Ennis 2015). Bilal and Nawal Said Al (2015) conducted 
research into Omani owners of SMEs to investigate any constraints which 
prevented Omani SMEs from attaining growth. The study concluded that 
domination of large companies over the market opportunities was one of the 
main obstacles which was also accompanied by limited financial capacities 
and limited managerial experiences of owners of SMEs. The study also found 
that legislation and regulations were not strengthening the positions of SMEs 
to compete in the market.  
Although SMEs constitute more than 90% of registered companies in Oman 
(Bilal and Nawal Said Al 2015), they have not yet lived up to the expectation 
of the government in terms of their contribution to the national economy and 
the provision of employment (AlMaimani and Johari 2015). One of the main 
reasons for SMEs failing to meet government expectations lies in the fact that 
although 90% of SMEs are owned by Omanis, they are managed and operated 
by expatriates and most large companies prefer to deal with SMEs which are 
also managed by expatriates (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013). For this reason, 
many Omani owners of SMEs facilitated business start-ups for expatriates in 
return for a monthly payment (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013). The SMEs 
managed by expatriates were attractive to large companies because they were 
seen to be more cost effective especially by employing non-Omani workers for 
smaller wages than would be expected by an Omani worker. Such a practice 
undermined the intention of the government to encourage the growth of SMEs 
owned by Omanis because it created a loophole through which expatriates 
could exploit the majority of business opportunities in the market to the 
detriment of the 10% bona fide SMEs managed by Omanis. There is no 
obligation on the Omani owner to officially notify a change in ownership or 
directorship of the company. As a consequence, these expatriate managed 
SMEs had always been highly contentious to Omani owners of SMEs who 
handled their own businesses, as large companies had been favouring SMEs 
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managed by expatriates because they were offering lower prices (Al-Shanfari 
Dhafir et al. 2013). This caused frustration to SMEs owned and managed by 
Omani youth as they failed to attract large companies (Ennis 2015). In 
summary, the preponderance of Omani SMEs managed by expatriates 
resulted in a failure to meet government expectations in terms of contribution 
to the national economy and also to employability as many of these SMEs 
employed cheaper foreign labour.  
The Government’s intention in its mandated business interactions policy is to 
preserve SMEs and to provide them with opportunities to improve their 
business activities (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013). The hope in Oman is that 
entrepreneurship and growth of SMEs will stimulate not just a new segment of 
the economy, but also create employment opportunities for Omani nationals 
(Ennis 2015). Varghese (2011) suggests that the Government of Oman, 
through developmental public projects, is in the best position to not only 
promote the growth of the SME sector but also to ensure that the targeted 
SMEs which are managed by indigenous Omanis are distinctive and receiving 
the support which they require. The mandated business interaction policy 
came into existence to alleviate the problems for Omani owners of SMEs to 
find alternatives and economically rewarding business opportunities in the 
market (Al-Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013). The following section describes the 
structure of the mandated business interaction in Oman.  
1.3.1 Structure of the mandated business interaction 
The Omani Government in 2013 devised a policy which made it obligatory for 
large companies seeking the procurement of public projects to enter into 
mandated business interactions with SMEs by allocating at least 10% of the 
value of the contracts to SMEs. The structure of mandated business 
interactions policy in Oman was in form of instructions which were also 
combined by either sanctions or rewards to large companies which fulfilled 
their obligations. The following points present the content of the Omani 
Government mandated business interaction (www.tenderboard.gov.om). 
These points are based on government instructions which are presented in 
detail in Appendix 1. 
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 Large companies are obliged to assign to SMEs specific work worth not 
less than 10% of total tender value  
 Only SMEs fully owned by Omanis are eligible to receive the work. 
 SMEs must be registered with the Tender Board of Oman. 
 SMEs must not be an arm of large companies, either directly or 
indirectly. 
 Owners of SMEs must be dedicated to the management of the 
enterprise and have full authorization to manage. 
 Large companies are obliged to reveal the scope of works intended to 
be assigned to SMEs and those companies exceeding the 10% rule will 
have greater opportunities for future public projects.  
 Large contracting companies must release payments of SMEs within 28 
days from the date of the submitted invoice. 
 Priority is given to SMEs which are from or close to the locations where 
the large companies are commencing public projects.  
The Tender Board of Oman (TBO) circulated a memo instructing ministries 
which were supposed to be the end user of the project to supervise the 
interaction between large companies and SMEs and to submit reports every 
three months to TBO which must contain performance and satisfaction ratings 
of large companies and SMEs (see Appendix 2). Additionally, SMEs were 
provided with financial assistance schemes at 0% interest (AlMaimani and 
Johari 2015). However, it is argued that the success of such mandated 
business arrangements depended on the development of trust between the 
partners (Michalski et al. 2014). The importance of trust in mandated business 
interactions is considered in the following section.  
1.3.2 Relevance of trust in mandated business interactions 
Despite the attention devoted by policy makers to enhancing the growth of 
SMEs, it is argued that any element of enforcement of a relationship such as 
is inherent in mandated business interactions might hinder the smooth 
exchange of business relationships rather than enabling them. A number of 
authors have pointed to the difficulties involved in the establishment of 
mandated business interactions. For example, Michalski et al. (2014) have 
argued that it is difficult for business parties to enter into such mandated 
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arrangements without the establishment of a firm basis of trust. This raises a 
question about the very nature of trust and whether it is something which can 
be enforced by a third party. 
While there have been several studies of SMEs and large companies business 
relationships (Nguyen et al. 2005) and while many authors have analysed and 
found trust to be critical for strengthening relationships between interacting 
companies (Welter 2012), the phenomenon of trust in the specific context of 
mandated business interactions has received scant attention. Höhmann and 
Welter (2002) have noted that even though much attention has been given to 
the concept of trust, few empirical studies had been conducted into its role in 
promoting economic activities. Kidalov (2013) focused on subcontracting 
policies and practices between large companies and SMEs in the USA and 
the EU and discussed how European Union member states had moved away 
from voluntary business interactions of choice towards binding the interactions 
with laws and regulations in order to create efficient and productive business 
interactions. However, this study, while examining instructions and rules which 
required large companies to subcontract with SMEs, did not consider trust as 
a distinctive feature of successful business relationships. Additionally, Kidalov 
(2013) noted that there were no definitive means to check upon the success 
of such business interactions between large companies and SMEs. 
Nevertheless, despite the acknowledged role of trust and its importance in 
facilitating cooperation and coordination between SMEs and large companies 
(Nguyen et al. 2005), efforts to develop criteria by which levels of trust between 
business partners could be assessed have received scant attention (Lewicki 
et al. 2006; Svensson 2006; Seppänen et al. 2007; Laeequddin et al. 2010). 
Thus, the current research addresses this gap in the literature by investigating 
how trust can be conceptualised and assessed in mandated business 
interactions. Additionally, the current research considers the various factors 
which might influence trust levels between SMEs and large companies in 
mandated business interactions.  
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1.4 Aim of the study 
This research aims to explore the conceptualisation of trust in mandated 
business interactions and to develop a means of assessing its presence and 
level within mandated business interactions. Additionally, the current research 
considers the various factors which could influence trust levels between SMEs 
and large companies when they are obliged to work together in a public 
project, as in the policy context of the Sultanate of Oman. 
1.4.1 Objectives of the study: 
I. To explore how trust can be conceptualised and assessed in mandated 
business interactions.  
II. To explore the various factors which could influence trust levels between 
SMEs and large companies in mandated business interactions.  
III. The above research objectives lead to the following research question:  
1.4.2 The research questions: 
I. How can trust be conceptualised and assessed in mandated business 
interactions? 
II. How do various factors influence trust levels between SMEs and large 
companies in mandated business interactions?  
1.5 Research methodology 
Since scant attention has been paid to exploring trust in mandated business 
interactions, this study addresses this research gap by investigating trust 
within the context of mandated business interactions. Trust is a phenomenon 
which is not directly amenable to objective measurement (Welter and 
Smallbone 2006). Consequently, it can be more appropriately investigated by 
means of a qualitative approach aimed at exploring how trust is conceptualised 
in certain relationships as well as identifying those circumstances which lead 
to a diminution of trust (ibid). For this reason, a qualitative research method 
was adopted as more appropriate for exploring trust as a phenomenon.  
An understating of the rationale and implementation of the mandated business 
interactions was first obtained by interviews with four government officials. 
This was followed by conducting three pilot studies with key managers of both 
SMEs and large companies. Then, data was collected by means of semi-
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structured interviews with 25 key managers from large companies and SMEs 
involved in mandated business interactions.This data provided rich insights 
into experiences and perceptions of trust on the part of the participants through 
a process of thematic analysis. This analysis provided the key issues related 
to trust within mandated business interactions.  
1.6 Contributions of the study 
This study makes both theoretical and practical contributions to the study of 
trust. The principal contribution of this study to trust theory is the development 
of a new contextual concept of trust which has key implications for both theory 
and practice. This new conceptualisation moves beyond the current dyadic 
understanding of trust towards a tripartite conceptualisation where institutions 
are perceived as playing a crucial role in ensuring the success of the 
relationship. 
It was necessary to explore the presence and levels of trust between 
organisations by using certain trust indicators gleaned from the literature 
review. However, these indicators required significant refinements so that the 
levels of trust could be more appropriately assessed. Additionally, an 
exploration of factors influencing levels of trust led to the identification of new 
factors not previously commented on in the literature. This resulted in the 
development of a model which schematised the factors and demonstrated 
their respective roles in influencing high and low levels of trust.  
The derived model also makes an important contribution to practice. The 
model informs practitioners and policy makers of the important issues that 
have to be taken into account for the purpose of ensuring the success of the 
mandated business interactions in which trust plays a crucial role. The model 
clearly indicates the important factors contributing to the development of high 
trust levels as well as highlighting those issues which resulted in low levels of 
trust. The respective roles of large companies, SMEs and the government in 
the development of trust are clearly highlighted.  
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter two of the thesis is divided into the following sections. The first section 
covers the definitions of SMEs and large companies and the nature of SMEs’ 
and large companies’ business relationships. This is followed by presenting 
the literature on definitions of trust, its role in inter-organisational relationship 
(IOR) and the distinction made between interpersonal and inter-organisational 
trust in IOR.  
In order to provide a theoretical grounding for answering the research 
questions, previous studies which had investigated the phenomenon of trust 
and identified certain criteria for assessing trust between organizations are 
presented. This is followed by identifying the various indicators which were 
used to signal the presence of trust within a business relationship and to 
manifest whether the level of trust was high or low. This literature review 
chapter also presents various factors that influence trust between business 
partners.   
Chapter three presents the methodology of the study. It outlines the 
philosophical assumptions underlying the study, research methodology, 
research design the sample population and size, method of data collection, 
data analysis, ethical considerations, issues of validity and reliability and, 
finally, a brief summary of the chapter. 
Chapter four presents the findings related to the first research question which 
was to explore the conceptualisation of trust and to assess its levels between 
SMEs and large companies in mandated business interactions using trust 
indicators derived from the literature review. 
Chapter five presents the findings of the interview data which was aimed at 
answering the second research question by exploring the perceived factors 
which influenced the levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in 
mandated business interactions.  
In chapter six, the findings from chapters four and five are discussed in the 
light of the literature and emerging factors from this research are identified. 
16 
 
Finally, chapter seven presents the main conclusions of this research and their 
implications for theory and practice and makes recommendations. Limitations 
of the study provide opportunities for further study and practice 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
2. Introduction 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework for the research. This includes 
an explanation of the key terms of the study and definitions of SMEs and large 
companies as in section 2.1 and 2.2.  
The literature on the nature of SMEs and large companies’ business 
relationships is presented in section 2.3.  
Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 respectively present definitions of trust, a critical 
review of the differences between trust at interpersonal and at inter-
organisational levels followed by a detailed presentation of trust at inter-
organisational levels in section three. 
Sections 2.7 and 2.8 present the criteria by which trust between business 
organisations/ companies can be investigated and assessed.  
Section 2.9 of this chapter presents the literature on factors influencing levels 
of trust between SMEs and large companies.  
The final section is the summary of the literature review chapter.  
2.1 Definitions of SMEs 
Differences between large companies and SMEs can be viewed with reference 
to statistical and procedural approaches. While statistical differences may 
include capitalisation, number of employees and sales turnover, the 
procedural differences can be related to operations and management 
functions (Zitek 2011).  
SMEs, compared with large companies, provide greater economic benefits in 
term of job creation, and account for the majority of firms in many countries 
(Morand 2003). In some Asian countries such as Japan, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, SME employees account for approximately 81% of the workforce 
(Fotache et al., 2011). SMEs in European economies represent 99% of the 
total business stock and account for more than 50% of total employment 
(Deakins and Freel 2006). For example, in the UK, over 4.3 million SMEs exist; 
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they represent 99% of the total enterprises and generate over 51% of the 
country’s turnover (Walker and Preuss 2008). In the United States, 75% of the 
net jobs are provided by SMEs, accounting for approximately 50% of the 
private workforce and representing 99.7% of all employers (Altman and 
Sabato 2007). 
Even though SMEs represent more than 90% of all companies in most 
countries, constituting a major source of employment, there is no commonly 
accepted definition of SMEs and there are no commonly agreed criteria for 
distinguishing micro enterprise from small and medium enterprises. According 
to Storey (1994), small enterprises that are engaged in the petrochemical 
industry may have a higher level of capitalisation, sales turnover and number 
of employees compared with similar sized enterprises that are engaged in the 
car repair trade. The difficulty of reaching a general definition of SMEs is not 
only related to the level of capitalisation, number of employees, and sales 
turnover, but also to the fact that differences in market sectors make it difficult 
to reach agreement on these criteria. An additional difficulty in arriving at a 
definition lies in the fact that many SMEs deliberately do not register with the 
state authorities (Storey 1994).  
The variance of definitions can also be related to different issues such as 
levels of economic development, population and divergence in demographic 
locations, cultural and institutional characteristics (Staber and Bogenhold 
1993). The statistical definition, which is largely based on the number of 
employees, represents the predominant discriminating characteristics 
between enterprises (Li Xue 2011). For instance, the traditional German 
definition limits SMEs  to 250 employees, while, in Belgium, 100 employees is 
the benchmark (Christodoulou 2009). The number of employees in SMEs is 
much higher in China; for instance, and definitions of industrial SMEs in China 
generally accept 2000 as the maximum number of employees (Li Xue 2011).  
Given the absence of commonly accepted criteria, this research relies on a 
definition which sets numerical values to measures such as employee 
numbers while insisting on independence as the main defining characteristic 
(Russo and Tencati 2009). This research accepts independence as the 
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principal determining characteristic of a SME. It is useful to also include some 
numerical values in defining SMEs. Accordingly, the statistical definition of Al-
Shanfari Dhafir et al (2013) is adopted in this study where the number of 
employees of SMEs in the Sultanate of Oman is limited to 5 employees for 
micro enterprise, 5-9 employees for small and 10 – 100 employees for medium 
sized enterprises.  
2.2 Definition of large companies 
Statistical factors are the predominant means of distinguishing large 
companies from small and medium sized enterprises. The statistical definition 
relies on taking into account numerical data related to number of employees, 
annual turnover, and total capital of the company. Due to the variance of the 
annual turnover from one industry to another and the difficulty of obtaining the 
annual turnover of some large companies which might result from the diversity 
of their business activities, number of employees becomes the most common 
discriminating characteristic between enterprises (Li Xue 2011). The 
definitions of large companies differ from industry to industry and from one 
country to another. For instance, large companies in Germany are defined as 
businesses with more than 250 employees. By contrast, 100 employees is the 
defining threshold in Belgium (Christodoulou 2009). Large companies in the 
Sultanate of Oman are defined as those having 100 or more employees (Al-
Shanfari Dhafir et al. 2013).  
Large companies often adopt different forms of practice and operate with 
different management styles from those of SMEs (Scheyvens and Russell 
2012). They often prefer to operate in stable environments (Dickson and 
Weaver 2011). They are considered large in size because the nature of their 
business environment requires extensive procedures of decision (Scheyvens 
and Russell 2012).  
Due to their professional management approach and financial capability, the 
opportunities for large companies to access local and international markets 
are both greater and easier than for SMEs (Yang and Chen 2009). Hence, it 
is argued that competition in the national and international markets is the realm 
of large companies whereas SMEs remain at local or regional level (Etemad 
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et al. 2001). Large companies have strong bargaining power in their dealings 
(Yang et al. 2014), and greater options in term of resources and some degree 
of legitimacy in virtue of their established processes in the market place 
(Pretorius et al. 2008). Most large companies operate in similar ways, have 
large numbers of employees, financial capital, and annual turnover 
(Scheyvens and Russell 2012).  
For the purposes of this study, the number of employees is adopted as the 
most common discriminating characteristic between enterprises (Li Xue 2011). 
Large companies operating in public projects in Oman are, joint ventures, 
subsidiaries, and local large companies, and due to the variance in 
consideration between their countries of origin and Oman, the number of 
employees is accepted as discriminating between large companies and SMEs. 
2.3 SMEs and large companies’ business relationships 
Inter-organisational relationships (IOR) between SMEs and large companies 
exist in different forms such as strategic alliances, cooperation for research 
and development, joint ventures, coalitions, and subcontracting (Kale and 
Singh 2009). One of the main ways for the growth and development of SMEs 
is through the establishment of inter-organisational relationships (IOR) with 
large companies (Okatch et al. 2011). 
Due to their structure and size, SMEs face many constraints when operating 
in the market (Knight 2000; Hollenstein 2005). SMEs may have inadequate 
resources, insufficient knowledge and inefficient experience and capabilities 
to manage the rapidly changing environment (Parker and Hessels 2013; 
Schoonjans et al. 2013). Due to these constraints, SMEs are not only limited 
in terms of growth but also in acquiring the facilities to produce quality products 
and services (Bilal and Al Muqbali, 2015). Bilal and Al Muqbali (2015) also 
suggest that SMEs may not be able to attract and retain competent staff 
because many employees look elsewhere for jobs with better salaries and 
conditions. 
Despite the challenges SMEs face, an increasing corpus of literature is 
focused on the many benefits that SMEs can derive from inter-organisational 
relationships (IORs) with large companies. Most of these studies argue that 
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SMEs are more likely to survive, achieve growth, and even thrive in business 
environments if relationships with large companies are established and 
developed (Etemad et al. 2001; Lee et al. 2010a; Dickson and Weaver 2011; 
Fotache et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2014). Thus, by entering into business 
relationships with larger companies, SMEs enhance their flexibility and 
specialisations (Kidalov 2013). The prevailing view is that inter-firm 
relationship arrangements with larger counterparts are promising ways for 
SMEs to achieve growth and to increase their global competitiveness and 
economies of scale (e.g. Etemad et al. 2001; Lee et al. 2010; Tregear and 
Lamprinopoulou 2011). 
On the other hand, authors such as Fotache et al (2011) have noted that large 
companies also benefit from entering into business relationships with SMEs 
and considered SMEs as engines for large companies and generators of 
applicable technical innovations. It has been argued that large companies are 
more concerned with formal research and development as well as 
accumulated technology, while SMEs are concerned with innovations (Sudhir 
Kumar and Bala Subrahmanya 2010). Similarly, Auko et al. (2011) revealed 
that most large companies tried to cut down their expenses by subcontracting 
with SMEs. The economic optimum of large companies is achieved at a certain 
degree of vertical supply integration that is between 50% - 80% depending on 
the structure of production (Fotache et al. 2011). 
SMEs and large companies can often complement each other; the market for 
the larger companies’ products is often the small-scale manufacturing sector 
and vice versa (Subrahmanya 2008). The relationship is considered to yield 
substantial cost saving to large companies while delivering expansion and 
growth opportunities for SMEs. Hence, both SMEs and large companies may 
share the same need for relationships with each other (Nguyen, 2005). 
Few may disagree that a relationship with a large company is an important 
means of survival, growth and  productivity for a SME (Cameron and Street 
2007). However, forming enduring relationships between SMEs and large 
companies is a critical task (Nguyen et al. 2005). Large companies have 
greater flexibility in term of resources and also greater legitimacy in terms of 
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their established presence in the market place (Pretorius et al. 2008), whilst 
most SMEs suffer from scarcity of resources and relative anonymity in the 
market (Nguyen et al. 2005). SMEs are often constrained in terms of 
infrastructural resources such as finance, technology, human resource and 
limited access to information (Auko et al. 2011). It is also difficult for SMEs to 
negotiate with large companies; large companies often have stronger 
bargaining power and more options (Yang et al. 2014). Large companies are 
more interested in replicating their networks, while SMEs invest more on 
developing their capacity and efficiency in order to gain the legitimacy of large 
companies (Christopherson and Clark 2007). Considerable debate exists on 
how SMEs, with their limited capabilities, can complement their larger partners’ 
expectations as well as creating productive and efficient business 
relationships with them (Thorgren et al. 2011).  
It is obvious that the larger companies are in an advantageous position relative 
to SMEs. Nevertheless, the relationship is not solely dependent on the power 
of large companies but also depends on the abilities and intentions of 
entrepreneurs or owners of SMEs to correspond with objectives competitively 
(Morrison et al. 2003). The specific potential of SMEs such as specialisation 
and flexibility are their major competitive advantages over large companies 
(Narula 2004; Hamburg et al. 2014). Such characteristics attract large 
companies to establish relationships with SMEs. Thus, large companies are 
frequently seen to capture the advantages offered by SMEs through various 
types of relationships such as alliances, subcontracting, and collaborative 
arrangements (Lunati 2002).  
Indeed, small entrepreneurial firms and SMEs with specific potential often 
explain in detail what their potential interest is to large companies in order to 
attract their attention and to gain their interests for forming business 
relationships (Alvarez and Barney 2001). This practice may lead large 
companies to acquire the knowledge of SMEs by integrating them in their 
business chain; thus, large companies can make SMEs increasingly reliant on 
them (Vandaie and Zaheer 2014). One of the cited reasons for the low level of 
successful business relationships with large companies lies in the danger of 
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unintended flow of knowledge or expertise from SMEs to large companies 
(Pretorius et al. 2008).  
SMEs adopt various strategies to secure specific competitive advantages 
when forming relationships with large companies. Alvarez and Barney, (2001) 
suggested five strategies to protect the interest of SMEs while forming 
relationships with large companies. First, is the strategy of “do it alone” and 
avoid exposing their specific potential to large companies. This strategy is 
supported by other scholars (e.g. Cameron and Street 2007; Pretorius et al. 
2008). They argue that SMEs with specific potential and experience need to 
ensure that the resources that are attracting large companies to form 
relationships with them are protected by “doing it alone”. According to 
Cameron and Street (2007), large companies should not simply take the 
specific advantage that SMEs possess, but rather should allow SMEs to 
leverage their own resources more efficiently. The second strategy is to slow 
the learning rate of large companies about the specific advantage that SMEs 
may have. This means that the SME only gradually reveals its strengths to the 
larger partner. The third strategy is to use a detailed contract in order to protect 
the ownership of specific advantages that SMEs have. The fourth strategy is 
to bring other resources into the chain of business relationships to gain the 
interest of the large partner. The fifth and final strategy is building trustworthy 
business relationships between SMEs and large companies.  
The first four strategies are in contrast to the last one; the last strategy is seen 
as the ideal option in business relationships. If both SMEs and large 
companies are more willing to enter into trusting relationships with each other, 
then both are more likely to derive the full benefits from such relationships. 
There is a consensus that the possibility of attaining mutual benefits for both 
SMEs and large companies is through understanding the needs of each other 
and exchanging trust (Davey et al. 2001). Moreover, managers of both SMEs 
and large companies acknowledge the important role that trust plays in 
attaining productive business relationships (Zaefarian et al. 2011). Even in the 
mandated business interactions, some scholars, including Michalski et al 
(2014), have argued that it is difficult for business partners to enter into such 
mandated collaborative arrangements without the establishment of a firm 
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basis of trust. Trust is seen by many as a key dimension for the success of 
business interactions (Huang and Wilkinson 2013). 
In the following section, the merits and demerits of various definitions of trust 
will be explored and a rationale will be presented for the adoption of one 
particular definition in the current study. 
2.4 Definition of trust 
The term “trust” has been extensively discussed by many scholars in most of 
the social sciences (Simpson 2012) and, so far, there is no agreed definition 
for the term (Ezezika and Oh 2012). Economists view trust as a calculation of 
risk faced by a partner to a transaction; trust is extended when a partner 
considers that the other partner will not act opportunistically and, 
consequently, trust reduces the transaction costs. Hence, the economic 
approach to trust is mostly calculative (Seppänen et al. 2007). In contrast to 
the views of economists, sociologists and behaviourally oriented researchers 
view trust from individual and social perspectives (Barney and Hansen 1994).  
Thus, definitions of trust are usually influenced by the context of the research 
(Adobor 2005); researchers view trust from different social, psychological, and 
economic perspectives and use definitions that fit those perspectives. Some 
researchers describe trust as the prior experience that the one party holds 
about the reliability and ability of the other potential party to fulfil specific 
requirements (Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki 2012). This supports the earlier 
definition offered by Adler (2001: P.217) who viewed trust as “the subjective 
probability with which an actor or group of actors will perform a particular action 
both before he/she can monitor such action...and in a context which affects his 
or her own action”. Mayer et al (1995) saw trust as implying a certain 
vulnerability incurred by one party as a consequence of the expectation that 
the other party would honour and fulfil its promises regardless of whether or 
not the other party could be monitored or controlled. 
Most researchers introduce trust as the confidence that an individual or a party 
has about the other party (Ybarra and Turk 2009). The most useful definition 
of trust in the context of the current study is provided by Nguyen et al. (2005) 
who defined trust in terms of a psychological state which was characterised by 
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an affirmative disposition towards certain qualities of a partner and the 
confidence that that partner would fulfil certain expectations. Thus, trust is 
understood in terms of the perceptions which each partner has of the other. 
Nevertheless, not only is there a lack of agreement on definitions of trust, there 
is a considerable debate in the conceptualisation of trust, particularly when its 
role is extended to include inter-organisational levels (Lei-Yu et al. 2008). 
Although trust is primarily a characteristic of persons, one might think of an 
organisation or a company acting as if it was showing trust towards another 
organisation (Tomkins 2001). 
However, the logic is that a company which is a wholly constituted institution 
is, in reality, run by individuals and collective human actions and decisions. 
Therefore, trust can also be discussed at organisational level (Lau and 
Rowlinson 2009). 
The following section presents the literature relevant to interpersonal and inter-
organisational trust in IOR. 
2.5 The difference between interpersonal trust and inter organisational 
trust 
It is difficult to find any rationale in the literature for the attribution of trust to 
inter-organisational relationships. This has led to confusion about who trusts 
whom in inter-organisational relationships, where the logic states that it is a 
member or members of one organisation rather than the company which can 
be trusted (Lau and Rowlinson 2009). The introduction of trust into IORs was 
initially seen in the discussion of transaction cost economy (i.e. Williamson 
1975), and specifically the transaction cost theory. It is that personal 
relationship which was seen as generating trust and which encouraged 
business parties to be trustworthy rather than behaving opportunistically 
(Zaheer et al. 1998). It can also be argued that business organisations are 
often surrounded by different social systems such as norms and litigation 
where regulations have to be followed. These systems and norms help trust 
to appear at inter-organisational level by limiting the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour occurring (Lau and Rowlinson 2009).  
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The distinction between interpersonal and inter-organisational trust is 
discussed by many scholars (e.g. Zaheer et al. 1998; Lewis 2008). Zaheer et 
al (1998) described organisational trust as the extent of a collective perception 
in one company about the trustworthiness of other companies. Other 
researchers such as Tejpal et al (2013) have described trust in inter-
organisational relationship (IOR) contexts as the reliability of an organisation 
in fulfilling obligations when there are potential risks and vulnerability in the 
relationships.  
Personal trust is described as a discursively constructed form of social 
relations that arise when interactions between people are governed by the 
norm of reciprocity (Lewis 2008). Therefore, it is defined as the confidence that 
an individual has in relying on another person and this is assessed by the 
degree of confidence he/she has that the other, be it a person or group of 
persons, would do what they were expected to do (Rus and Igli 2005). Trust, 
in this regard, is defined as a positive expectation on the part of a person about 
behaviour of particular others. 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of trust, such as reliability and interests in 
integrating into business relationships, make trust applicable even at inter-
organisational relationship level (Tomkins 2001). The characteristics and 
attitudes of groups of people who are representing organisations often inspire 
confidence between companies involved in the interaction to trust each other 
(Jiang et al. 2013), and, once these aspects are maintained, for the benefit of 
involved parties, trust can be reported.  
Interpersonal trust and inter-organisational trust are distinctive concepts but 
they are interrelated (Weck and Ivanova 2013) and they share similar 
dimensions (Robson et al. 2008). The nature of trust in both types involves 
confidence that either party will act in such a way that is of mutual benefit and 
that neither will act opportunistically (Mayer et al. 1995). 
The preferred definition in the context of the current research is the one 
provided by Nguyen et al. (2005) who saw trust as a psychological state which 
found its expression in a positive affinity towards certain characteristics of a 
partner and the presumption that the partner would fulfil certain promises.  
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2.6 Trust at inter-organisational level 
Currently, due to rapidly changing market conditions, organisations seek 
greater flexibility while interacting with other business organisations (Rus and 
Igli 2005). Trust between business organisations leads to greater flexibility and 
adaptability, enabling them to deal quickly and efficiently with rapid changes 
in the business environment (Sung and Kang 2012). Since the early 1990s, 
many researchers in IORs devoted considerable attention to the issue of trust 
(e.g. Das and Teng 2001; Hoang and Antoncic 2003; Seppänen et al. 2007; 
Nguyen and Liem 2013; Iwai 2016). It is argued that trust is essential and seen 
as a threshold condition for business partners to attain competitive advantages 
(Blomqvist et al. 2005; Seppänen et al. 2007). 
Trust at inter-organisational levels facilitates cooperation, lowers transaction 
costs such as acquisitions and governance costs (Zaheer et al. 1998); it also 
encourages interacting partners to engage in implicit and explicit exchange of 
physical resources, knowledge, experience, future business opportunities, etc. 
(Welter et al. 2004; Gaur et al. 2011; Pattinson and Sood 2012). It enhances 
the efficiency and productivity of exchange partners (Lau and Rowlinson 
2009), reduces the likelihood of negative interpretations of the intentions of the 
other party (Krishnan et al. 2006), leads to smooth exchange of information 
and paves the way for comfortable and informal cooperation (Adobor 2005; 
Iwai 2016). Trust also reduces hazards and enhances the efficiency and 
productivity of the interacting companies (Faems et al. 2008), and improves 
the abilities of interacting companies to adapt themselves to changes in the 
market and in the complexity of business interactions (Rus and Igli 2005). 
Trust, particularly for SMEs, can strengthen their ability to compete (Malhotra 
and Lumineau 2011), innovate and eventually generate greater value in the 
market which is usually difficult for SMEs to attain independently (Jones et al. 
2014).  
Thus, when the term “trust” is used in IOR literature, it is assumed that the 
relationship is one which generates values which are of mutual benefit 
(Simpson 2012). Nevertheless, some authors make the point that over-
reliance on trust has little value for a company and can lead to misallocation 
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of precious resources or experience (Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández 
2011).  
Being in a trustworthy and committed business relationship with a large 
company may obstruct the potential growth of the SME and may shift the focus 
of the SME away from the available resources for a competitive market by 
making the SME increasingly reliant on their larger partner (Vandaie and 
Zaheer 2014).  
Trust in IORs can occur in a number of different ways and these are discussed 
in the following section.  
2.7 How trust occurs at inter-organisational level 
Several researchers have discussed how trust occurs at inter-organisational 
levels. For instance, Mouzas et al. (2007) described three levels at which trust 
can occur between business organisations: firstly, at inter-personal level, 
where inter-organisational trust occurs between one individual in each of the 
interacting companies. The second level refers to situations where an 
individual in one company develops a trusting relationship with the entire 
partner company. The third level refers to the collective expectation of one 
party of the other party. In other words, the occurrence of inter-organisational 
trust takes place either between person to person, person to organisation or 
organisation to organisation.  
A similar schema is presented by Nguyen and Liem (2013) who conducted 
an extensive review of inter-organisational trust literature in order to provide 
a basis for researchers to investigate trust in IOR and this is presented in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 levels of trust in IORs as proposed by Nguyen 
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At the upper level, inter-organisational trust refers to the trust that exists 
between two independent organisations. At the middle level, It refers to the 
trust which exists between departments or groups of one organisation and the 
other entire partner organisation. The lower level refers to the trust of a person 
or a representative of one interacting party with a person or representative of 
the other partner.  
Trust in the lower organisational level is based on the individual manager 
instead of trusting the entire organisation. It is the opposite of the upper 
organisational level where trust exists only at organisational level. This is 
because trust at interpersonal level in IOR is viewed as indicating a low level 
of trust, whereas trust at inter-organisational level indicates a high state of trust 
(Mouzas et al. 2007).  
Section 2.8 presents the literature relevant to the methods by which the 
presence and levels of trust can be assessed in IOR.  
2.8 A review of approaches to the assessment of the presence of trust 
in inter-organisational relationships 
An increasing corpus of literature is focused on the significance and influence 
of trust on decisions of business actors as well as the performance of their 
companies in IORs (Glaeser et al. 2000). Fukuyama (1995) noted that the level 
of trust in any business environment strongly predicted its level of economic 
activity. Hence, assessing the presence of trust between interacting 
companies through various trust indicators can be a useful approach for 
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practitioners, decision and policy makers (Ayadi et al. 2016). Because 
assessing trust level is viewed to be one of the most critical tasks, it therefore 
should receive considerable attention (McEvily and Tortoriello 2011).  
Two predominant approaches to trust measurement exist in the literature; 
these are the behavioural measurement approach and the attitudinal 
measurement approach. While the former approach gives prominence to 
observable decisions and actions of business partners which have financial 
consequences, the latter approach relies on collecting data through surveys 
which capture the perceptions of people involved in the trusting interactions 
(McEvily 2011). Using a dialectal approach, McEvily (2011) reaches a hybrid 
synthesis by drawing on the “trust matters” thesis and the “trust is irrelevant” 
antithesis. The two approaches of behavioural and attitudinal measurement 
approaches belong to the antithesis as the validity of either approach is 
questioned by McEvily. The crux of the matter revolves around the concept of 
trust itself. His critique calls into question approaches based on a discrete view 
of trust as a singular entity and proposes a more complex understanding of 
trust and criteria for assessing trust. McEvily also draws attention to a 
conceptual confusion where trust becomes interchangeable with the concept 
of risk and makes a plea for further research “integrating disparate types of 
evidence” (McEvily 2011: p 1274).  
However, due to the elastic and complex nature of trust  (Seppänen et al. 
2007), researchers found the behavioural measurement approach was more 
reliable and realistic than the attitudinal measurement approach (Glaeser et 
al. 2000). In fact, Glaeser et al. (2000) was critical of the validity of using the 
attitudinal approach and argued that the questions used in the survey 
measured trustworthiness rather than trusting behaviour. 
The literature relevant to the behavioural measurement approach is not 
extensive, while without taking an initiative to develop a tool to assess trust 
can hinder advancing our understanding of the meaning of trust (McEvily and 
Tortoriello 2011). Researchers have tended to focus mainly on the 
characteristics of the interacting parties such as their integrity, benevolence, 
credibility, honesty and transparency in order to measure trust in IOR. 
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However, this approach relied on identifying antecedents and consequences 
of trust in different contexts and assumed that trust was a one-dimensional 
phenomenon (Laeequddin et al. 2010). In contrast, the current research 
considers trust as an existential phenomenon to be measured within a 
particular context and this calls for a more qualitative research method. For 
the current research, trust assessment approaches represent the value of 
using trust criteria which researchers can refer to in order to assess levels of 
trust between interacting companies. This approach was proposed by Msanjila 
and Afsarmanesh (2009). In other words, researchers can use certain 
indicators as reference points, for example, recurrence of business 
interactions, degree of formalities, interdependency and reciprocity of 
information exchange and accordingly make judgments as to whether certain 
interactions between business partner meet these respective criteria or not in 
order to assess levels of trust exist between the partners. 
Previous studies referred to different indicators which could be used to assess 
the presence and level of trust that exists between business partners 
depending on the context of the research and type of business relationships 
(Nadelson et al. 2014). The reference to different trust indicators basically 
depended on the context of the study (McEvily and Tortoriello 2011). For 
instance, Laeequddin et al. (2010) assessed trust level based on degree of 
formality, dependability of business partners and institutional securities that 
partners referred to during their business interactions. Ayadi et al. (2013) 
assessed trust in supply chain management from the perspective of the 
confidence of a partner in the accuracy, accessibility, validity and quality of 
information exchanged between business partners. Nguyen et al (2005) 
preferred recurrence of the interaction, opportunistic behaviour that may 
surround the transactions and the transactions specific investment in order to 
investigate the level of trust between SMEs and their large counterparts. 
Hamida et al (2011) assessed the level of trust between business partners 
based on preference for partners which have proved to be trustworthy in the 
relationship, limited formalities during the interaction and the offer of 
assistance in fulfilling the terms of the deal. 
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From the range of indicators provided in the literature, four are selected which 
are particularly relevant for assessing the level of trust in the sub-contractual 
business interactions between large companies and SMEs. The four trust 
indicators used in this study are: recurrence of business interactions, degree 
of formalities in contracts, level of interdependency and the level of reciprocity 
of information exchange. The reason for selecting four from the wider range is 
that many of the indicators are not clearly defined (McEvily and Tortoriello 
2011), and also some of them appear to be more causal in nature rather than 
being signals. Plank et al. (1999) suggested that trust could be measured from 
components or outcomes of business interactions. This was strongly 
supported by Laeequddin et al. (2010) who asserted that trust between 
business partners could be assessed from rational facts related to economic 
choices. Such economic choices included recurrence of contractual 
arrangements, degree of formalities, inter-dependency and information 
exchange in which such these economic choices became the sign of integrity, 
reliability and credibility that often impel partners to work together with 
confidence. Nevertheless, there is still a need for further development of trust 
measurement indicators (Svensson 2006; Seppänen et al. 2007; Hamida et 
al. 2011). The selected four trust indicators are not complex and they can be 
used with limited mathematical and statistical knowledge. Although some 
researchers such as Ayadi et al. (2016) argued that assessing trust level in 
IOR literature is one of the most critical and essential aspects of determining 
success and failure of business relationships, this study contributes to the 
development of these indicators by investigating the meanings that they hold 
for the individuals involved in the interactions. 
The following sections present the literature on the selected trust indicators 
and their roles in business relationships.  
2.8.1 Recurrence of business interactions 
It is asserted in the literature that companies often have no intention of 
maintaining constant and repeated business relationships with other partners 
in the absence of trust (Ming and Song-zheng 2008; Ojasalo 2008; Sung and 
Kang 2012). In contrast, when there is a high level of trust between business 
partners, they are found to be more inclined to continue to enter into future 
33 
 
business (Cerri 2012). Bouncken (2011) and Steffel and Ellis (2009) have also 
described long term relationships and most commitments in business 
relationships as consequences of trustworthy interactions. Cerri (2012) noted 
that business parties engaged in repeated business interaction for many 
reasons such as reduced perceived risk associated with a known partner, 
better planning of business operations, increased efficiency, cost reduction 
and reduced uncertainty about the future. Hence, recurrence of contractual 
arrangements can be defined as a situation where business partners have 
repeated projects (Ojasalo 2008). In terms of repeated business interactions 
between large companies and SMEs, it is the repeated use of the SME 
company as a sub-contractor by the larger partner and the SME’s repeated 
willingness to accept these contracts, and the longevity of these business 
interactions that could indicate a high state of trust (Kundu and Datta 2015). 
The longevity of business interactions in most of the cases discussed in the 
literature revealed that it signified a state of mutual trust (Guo et al. 2013).  
Several studies were conducted to examine the association between the 
repeated interactions of partners and state of trust between them. For 
instance, Guo et al, (2013) examined whether the repeated interaction of 
business partners was associated with trust. The study concluded that working 
relationships in which both partners repeated their interactions were strongly 
and positively associated with trust. Dyer and Chu, (2011) have argued that 
repeated business interactions provided an insight into the morale and 
behaviour of the partner, allowing the parties to screen more accurately for 
those partners with whom interactions could be repeated with confidence. 
Repeated business interactions was an indicator of trust which was based on 
the success of each partner in fulfilling their respective roles and the readiness 
of these partners to enter into further business interactions (Connelly and 
Miller, 2012). Hence, the recurrence of interaction is a sign of high trust levels, 
whereas discontinued business interactions indicated low levels of trust. 
2.8.2 Degree of formality 
The degree of formality is defined as the extent of reliance on formal 
contractual agreements in the relationship between the large company and the 
SME. This includes, for example, the extent to which the contracted company 
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has autonomy to make purchases of required materials without having formal 
approval, the use of each other’s resources without the need for formal 
approval, the release of payments in advance of the due dates and the 
strictness of monitoring arrangements.  
However, the presence of trust in business interactions does not reduce the 
necessity for contracts, but it can result in lowering the level of formalities 
(Aalbers 2010). Conversely, high degrees of formalities can signify that a 
business partner remains suspicious about the other partner and that trust is 
low (Hamida et al. 2011). Thus, a low degree of formalities in business 
relationships can signify high levels of trust. 
Hence, the degree of formalities in agreements that take place between 
business partners can indicate the level of trust that exists between them 
(Hamida et al. 2011). Formal agreements and full control mechanisms could 
signal the attitudes of ill-will, scepticism and suspicion which are 
characteristics of low level of trust (McEvily et al. 2003). This may include 
copious and detailed clauses including many conditions in ‘small print’ in a 
written contract. This could even be followed up by detailed checking. Such 
formalities can often signal a low level of trust. By contrast, informal contractual 
arrangement through cooperation and coordination can signal a high level of 
trust (Iwai 2016).  
Two common types of contractual arrangements are used by independent 
parties in business interactions. The first type comprises formal detailed 
contracts which often act as safeguards to mitigate the risk of any potential 
losses (Hamida et al. 2011). However, highly formalised contracts can lead to 
a ‘letter of the law’ approach in which compliance with the contract results in 
minimalism and rules out ‘going the extra mile’.  
The second type of contractual arrangements is informal or less detailed and 
is often in the form of verbal instructions in which trust operates as the basis 
of the relationship. Thus, informal or less detailed contracts between partners 
often indicate a high level of trust (Iwai 2016). The informal or less detailed 
contract has proven its effectiveness both in theory and in practice (Goto 
2013).   
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An extensive body of literature exists on the significance of informal 
contractual arrangements and trust. In the context of the construction sector 
in China, Guo et al. (2013) conducted an empirical study of trust and the 
structure of governance mechanisms and found that informal working 
relationships were positively associated with high levels of trust. This 
resonates with the earlier assertion of Adler, (2001) that trust could reduce 
formalities through shaking hands instead of signing detailed contracts. 
Blomqvist et al (2005) stressed the significance of trust for determining the 
contractual mechanism in asymmetric collaborations. They concluded that 
contracts did not ensure the success of the collaboration, and when contracts 
were less detailed and merely used to increase understanding, that this 
signalled a high level of trust. Malhotra and Lumineau (2011), in the context of 
contractual disputes involving 102 inter-organisational relationships, found a 
high negative association between rigidity of contracts and levels of trust 
indicated by the likelihood of continuing business interactions.  
Overall, in order to ascertain the state of trust with the degree of formality 
indicator, high formalities between SMEs and large companies indicate low 
levels of trust. On the other hand, low levels of formality are found in situations 
where there is greater openness by both parties and consequently a high state 
of trust (Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández 2011).  
2.8.3 Level of interdependency 
Interdependence in IOR is a situation where business partners bring shared 
interests to the relationship (Sako and Helper 1998). Interdependence is one 
of the central characteristics of trust theory (Lawler 2001). Business partners 
maximise economic return from the relationship by facilitating their mutual 
interdependence (Altinay et al. 2014). 
The partners, in high trust situations, rely on each other for the business 
purpose. When interacting companies are interdependent, both companies 
often enhance their asset specificity by complementing each other’s needs 
(Sung and Kang, 2012). This is because each business partner makes a 
credible commitment to the interdependent relationship (Iwai 2016).   
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Despite the limitations of size and capacities of SMEs, many large companies 
have entered into interdependent relationships with SMEs due to their greater 
flexibility in working as mediators for production processes (Fotache et al. 
2011). This does not imply that there is automatically a relationship of trust 
inherent in such relationships. There may be a mixture of trust and distrust 
(Wicks et al. 1999). But, what is important about interdependency, is the 
willingness of both companies to invest in their relationships and bind 
themselves to be interdependent. For one or even both partners, the potential 
for opportunism may be great but despite this, they are prepared to accept the 
costs and risks, as the shared resources in the interdependent relationship 
may be of high value. Thus, both partners are prepared to enter into a trusting 
relationship and therefore, the existence of interdependency is often an 
indicator of trust (Wicks et al. 1999).  
2.8.4 Reciprocity in information exchange 
Reciprocity in information exchange can be expressed as a situation where 
business partners share information about business opportunities, share 
experiences and strategies and sometimes disclose useful information about 
business partners to a third party (Sung and Kang 2012). Several studies 
associated reciprocity in information exchange in business relationships with 
trust, and most of these studies revealed positive correlations between 
information exchange and trust (Wei et al. 2012). For instance, Thorgren et 
al., (2011) surveyed a sample of 141 SMEs engaged in alliances with large 
companies and concluded that the exchange of ideas and resources was 
positively associated with high trust levels. In contrast, low or limited 
information exchange was associated not simply with low levels of trust but 
with its complete absence. It is not simply the exchange of information which 
is viewed as a sign of trust but the quality of the information. Xiaorong et al., 
(2013) have argued that trust is present only when the information exchanged 
between partners is deemed to be valuable. The quality of information 
exchange is testified by openness and transparency about the disclosure of 
strategies and policies, business opportunities and advices (Sako and Helper 
1998). Bonte (2008) asserted that the higher the exchange of knowledge, 
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resources and experiences, the higher is the level of trust indicated between 
business partners. 
Thus, two-way flow of information and experiences between large companies 
and SMEs indicated the higher level of trust, whereas the negative and one 
sided flow of information took place simply to please a third party (e.g. the 
government) was regarded as indicating low levels of trust.  
Table 2 summarises these trust indicators with their scope and associated 
trust levels. 
Table 2: Summary of Trust Indicators 
 
Having identified the various trust indicators, the literature review continues by 
discussing the various factors put forward by the authors as determinants of 
trust in SMEs and large companies’ business interactions. 
  
 
Trust Indicators 
Levels of trust indicated 
High Low 
Recurrence of contractual 
arrangements 
Repeated business 
interaction 
Single and discontinued business 
interaction 
 
Degree of formalities 
Less formalities and control 
in the business interactions 
More formalised, frequent and 
systematic control 
 
Level of Interdependency  
Relationships where both 
partner rely on each other 
for mutual benefits 
Relationships based solely on the self-
interest of one party 
 
Reciprocity in information 
exchange 
Positive and two-way flow 
of information and 
experiences which are 
valuable 
Negative and one sided flow of 
information 
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2.9 Factors influencing the levels of trust in SMEs and large companies’ 
business interactions 
In this section, the constituent factors which are presented in the literature as 
influencing trust in business interactions are presented and discussed. In 
contrast with the indicators which signalled the presence and levels of trust, 
factors refer to certain conditions which affect the levels of trust that exist 
between SMEs and large companies. 
Trust is a cumulative development over time that is derived from many factors 
(Abosag and Lee 2013). As many factors are discussed in the literature, it is 
useful to have a conceptual framework to categorise them. Several studies 
have attempted to categorise the types of trust factors in IOR. Lewicki & 
Bunker (1996) introduced knowledge based trust, calculus based trust and 
identification based trust. Knowledge trust is based on the history of the 
relationship that one party has with the other. Calculus based trust is described 
as a commercial-oriented type in which every process and value of the 
interaction is calculated (Guemara-ElFatmi et al. 2004). Identification based 
trust relies on a strong reciprocal understanding of the desires, intentions and 
expectations of the other partner, as for example, where one party become 
fully aware of the other party’s preferences (Nguyen, 2013).  
Sako (1992) introduced three other categories of trust, namely, contractual 
trust, competence trust and goodwill trust. Contractual trust is based on oral 
or written agreed promises emphasising that trust is developed by written 
contractual legally-protected arrangements. Competence trust is based on 
partner’s efficiency and competency, where one business partner predicts that 
the other partner is capable and will fulfil what is expected from him/her. The 
third type is goodwill trust which is based on mutual commitment and 
expectations. This type is characterised by no explicit or detailed promises and 
partners in this type take an initiative and efforts towards each other.  
Rousseau et al. (1998) introduced rational based trust which is built up through 
repeated business interactions.  
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Although the above scholars have presented different classifications of trust 
factors, they all seem to have similarities in term of tracing the underlying 
factors affecting trust (Nguyen and Liem 2013). Seppänen et al. (2007) 
reviewed the empirical studies on inter-organisational trust conducted from 
1990 to 2003. This included all the studies mentioned above. These studies 
were categorised in terms of various forms of trust by two dimensions; the first 
dimension consisted of economic aspects of trust such as competency and 
calculative; the second dimension consisted of sociological and psychological 
aspects such as benevolence, goodwill, affective, cognitive, and included 
institutional based trust. 
Although Seppänen et al. (2007) present a very comprehensive two 
dimensional framework for the different studies focused on trust, the authors 
did not propose a framework for categorising the factors. A useful systematic 
approach, in the context of this study, to categorising the trust factors has been 
presented by Zucker (1986) who classified them into three main categories, 
namely: characteristics based factors, process based factors, and institutional 
based factors. Shi et al. (2015) noted that Zucker’s categorisation of sources 
of trust which included the important role that institutions played in the 
formation of trust was most convincing; they also acknowledged Zucker’s 
emphasis on traditional sources of trust including the common characteristics 
of partners and their reputations and prior experiences. For that reason, 
Zucker’s (1986) classification remains a very clear and comprehensive 
schema for understanding the various factors which could influence trust in 
IORs. 
Each of these categories is presented in the following sections with their 
related discussion in the literature.  
2.9.1 Characteristic based trust factors 
Characteristic based trust refers to the confidence which the trustor has in the 
trustee based on known cultural similarities and expectation (Schilke et al. 
2016). This category includes the following trust factors: social similarity of 
partners which embraces shared values of business partners. Shared values, 
in the context of IORs, refer to the extent that the partners have common 
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beliefs about the underlying motives for entering into business relationships in 
addition to having similar aims and objectives in the relationship (Ybarra and 
Turk 2009). 
Social similarity refers to the shared similarities between the stakeholders of 
partnering companies. Where people in companies share similar beliefs and 
values and are like-minded in their world views and ways of thinking, it is 
expected that the perceptions the trustor has of the trustee will be positive and 
conducive to the development of trust (Schilke et al. 2016). Actually, in recent 
IOR literature, proximity has received significant attention as a factor 
influencing trust between interacting companies. Several types of proximity 
have been introduced such as geographical, social, and institutional. 
Nevertheless, authors still tend to view proximity as a form of homogeneity 
which was found to be a very influential factor (Wuyts et al. 2005).  
In the literature, social similarity is sometimes referred to as social proximity 
(e.g. Ben Letaifa and Rabeau 2013). There is some confusion among the 
authors regarding the terminology to be used. However, it is possible to argue 
for a subtle distinction to be made between both terms on the grounds that 
social similarity implies the sharing of identical beliefs and values, whereas 
social proximity refers to sharing some values and beliefs but which may not 
be exactly identical. In this literature review it is argued that a distinction 
between both terms should be made as it was intended to demonstrate this 
subtle difference when examining the different cases of relationships which 
arose in this study. According to Molina-Morales et al. (2014) the best 
approach to resolving such confusion is through the reconsideration of the 
concept of proximity. However, in this study, the distinction between both 
terms is strongly argued and maintained throughout the study. 
Partners with social similarity were found to be confident and willing to pursue 
further business interactions (Johnson and Grayson 2005). Schilke et al. 
(2016) noted that this type of trust pertained to the trustee’s characteristics 
which often led the trustor to categorise the trustee as trustworthy based on 
shared values and beliefs. If the trustor considers the group to which the 
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trustee belongs to be trustworthy, he or she will regard the trustee to be 
trustworthy too.  
Thus, local and social similarity are sub-factors underlying the characteristics 
based trust (Abosag and Lee 2013). Wang et al. (2015) noted that 
demographic characteristics of a party involved in the exchange were what 
actually shaped trust; they further argued that love and caring between friends, 
family members or any other social similarity created social situations which 
allowed trust to arise without any condition or need for influential institutional 
actions to legitimise the interaction. Sung and Kang (2012) also concluded that 
trust between business partners was enhanced and developed by social 
similarity rather than the physical similarity.  
Social similarity, from Sung and Kang’s (2012) perspective, included 
demographic characteristics such as language, age, occupation and the social 
values which allowed interacting companies to form trust based on a sense of 
community which strengthened their mutual interests. Andersen and Kumar 
(2006) found that trusting partners were driven by emotions and benevolence 
when unexpected problems were occurring for any of the partners. However, 
Ren et al (2016) concluded that only sincere partners within social or cultural 
similarity were what were actually associated with trust in IOR.  
Some researchers, including Nguyen and Liem (2013), noted that social 
similarity and shared values helped to create trust between business partners 
at the initial stage of the interaction only, particularly when the partners did not 
have any previous experience of each other. An empirical study conducted by 
Abosag and Lee (2013) have confirmed this in a study conducted in the 
context of an emerging economy aiming at determining the factors that 
influenced trust. Their investigation was based on four developmental stages 
of trust starting from the pre-relationship stage followed by the early interaction 
stage, the growth stage, and finally the maintenance stage. The study found 
that professional and social reputations and third party advice were the main 
factors that generated trust in the pre-relationship stage. However, Welter and 
Smallbone (2006) had previously noted that partners in the category of 
characteristic based trust already knew each other, and hence, one party was 
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more likely to know that the other partner would not behave in a way that could 
have been detrimental to the relationship.  
In summary, considerable debate exists about the characteristic based trust 
factors, and how these factors shape the structure and the ways companies 
behave in IOR (e.g. Souiden and Choi 2012). Although there is general 
agreement that all the trust production in this form of trust pertains to 
characteristics of a partner, these studies have revealed other relevant factors. 
For example, Nguyen and Liem (2013) argued that the source of this type of 
trust was more likely related to the geographical proximity of the partners 
involved. From this perspective, it is argued that representatives of interacting 
companies always found it easier and more convenient to manage the 
relationships with partners of the same geographical proximity than those at a 
greater geographical distance (Bönte 2008). Similarly, Cerri (2012) concluded 
that the social bonds did not only enhance the notion of trust but actually 
created an informal environment where close interpersonal relationships 
between business partners were developed and a better understanding of 
mutual needs was expressed and quickly achieved. For this reason, some 
researchers, including Nguyen and Liem (2013), argued that when trust in 
IORs was based on geographical and social similarity, both the vertical and 
horizontal integrations between business partners became faster and easier.    
Chang and Gotcher (2007) found that shared values were more important than 
geographical or social similarity in having positive effects on trust. Shared 
values refer to interacting partners’ beliefs in common including what goals, 
behaviours, and policies were appropriate or inappropriate for developing 
productive and trusting business relationships (Ojasalo 2008). However, 
Michalski et al (2014) found that what reflected the notion of trust in 
asymmetrical business relationships was not only the social similarity and 
closeness, but the belief of both companies that both were interested in the 
successful collaborative effort.  
Subrahmanya (2008) investigated the reason behind developing trusting and 
productive business relationships between large companies and SMEs in 
Japan. The researcher found that SMEs and large companies were 
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complementing each other. The market for SMEs was the large scale 
manufacturing companies and these large companies were constantly relying 
on SMEs. Hence, based on national and cultural proximity of the partners, the 
intention by both partners was also shared and both trusted the shared 
intention to be committed to the success of the partnership.  
2.9.2 Process based trust factors 
This section explores the factors which influence process based trust. The 
factors underlying this type of trust are based on reputation or direct 
experiences (Schilke et al. 2016). Reputation, in this context, refers to the 
perceptions that one company has of the trustworthiness of the other company 
based on third party sharing of information. On the other hand, experience 
refers to factors arising from the direct business interactions which have taken 
place between the two companies in the past. 
Both reputation and experience are connected with perceptions of the 
reliability and capability of the partner in fulfilling their roles (Woolthuis et al. 
2005). It refers to conscious choice and decision to trust based upon 
evidenced competency of the other business partner (Ren et al. 2016).  
Reputation is one of the factors on which the trustor bases their expectation of 
the trustee, relying on the reported experiences of others (Guennif and Revest 
2005). According to Huang and Wilkinson (2013), reputation is based on 
enquiry about the behaviour of potential partners as to their fairness and 
credibility and essentially relies on information about how the companies have 
behaved in other business relationships.  
The most frequently cited factor in process based trust is reputation which can 
either be encouraging or discouraging for business partners (Munyon et al. 
2011). It is very critical at an early stage of a business relationship where a 
satisfactory history becomes one of the major trust determinants (Hamida et 
al. 2011). Lui et al. (2006) reported the strong effect of partner reputation on 
inter-organisational trust rather than that of direct experience (Yang and 
Wikinson, 2013). Reputation comprises evidence that other company has 
behaved in a way that was consistent with norms of reciprocity and fairness. 
Thus, process based trust in asymmetrical business relationships is attributed 
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to the perceptions of either party of the trustworthiness of the other party based 
on reputation. Typically, a SME will likely have learned from other SMEs that 
a particular large company has been perceived by them to have acted in a fair 
and equitable manner. Alternatively, a large company may have heard from 
other large companies that a certain SME had always fulfilled their contracts 
and were perceived to be trustworthy. 
A series of sub-factors, based on experience, have been found to be essential 
for the development of process based trust between SMEs and large 
companies’ business relationships (MacKenzie 2008). These experiential 
factors included keeping promises (Ojasalo 2008), relationship equity (Ybarra, 
2009), communication (Das and Bing-Sheng 1998), commitment (Lewicka 
2014), motives and intentions of business partners in entering into the 
relationship (Chipangura and Kaseke 2012), goal congrence (Ojasalo, 2008). 
SMEs appeared to maintain their relationships with previous large partners on 
the basis of perceived experiences (Hamida et al. 2011). The perceived 
experiences included most of the above factors.  
Keeping or fulfilling promises is a key factor in process based trust as they 
lead to repeated interactions based on trust (Ojasalo, 2008). However, past 
experiences can also have negative effects on trust. An example of negative 
perception based on previous experience was cited by Davey et al (2001) who 
found that SMEs were not keen to enter into any further business interactions 
with the main contractors due to their failure to keep their promises in releasing 
their payments. 
Relationship equity refers to the extent to which one company is seen to have 
acted fairly towards the other in past relationships. It is based on experience 
of equal sharing of risks and benefits involved in the relationship (Ybarra, 
2009). Where a company has, in the past, acted in an equitable manner with 
their partner, future interactions are entered into with confidence based on the 
experience, even when partners are not equal in size or investment, and this 
occurs only when the benefits from the exchange are proportional and 
appropriate. In the context of franchisor-franchisee relationship, Shaikh (2015) 
viewed the issue of relationship equity as based on perceptions and beliefs 
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that the contract was either equitable or inequitable. Shaikh identified four 
dimensions of relationship equity: distributive, procedural, interpersonal and 
informational. 
Distributive fairness referred to the experiences that companies had of sharing 
benefits and risk in an equitable manner (Laczniak and Murphy, 2008). 
Procedural fairness referred to perceptions that contracts had been fair in 
regards to prices and promotional support. Interpersonal fairness was based 
on representatives being perceived to have acted in a just and equitable way 
towards each other. Finally, informational fairness was based on experiences 
of having shared relevant and useful information in a timely manner. Thus, 
trust can develop when both SMEs and large companies have experience of 
relationship equity in their previous relationship, whether that equity took the 
form of distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational. 
Power balance is another aspect of relationship equity which can affect 
process based trust in business relationships. Hancke (1998) provided 
evidence that confirmed the outcomes of the balance of power in the trust 
relationship between SMEs and large companies in the automotive industry in 
France. This practice was found to have enhanced the performance and 
productivity of both companies and resulted in high trusting relationships.  
Communication has been described as experience based on informational 
equity either through formal or informal exchanges of necessary and 
meaningful information (Francis and Mukherji 2009). Cerri (2012) emphasised 
the importance of communication for trustworthy business relationships, and 
described communication as the glue connecting the interacting parties. Trust 
is influenced by the previous experience of the communication that existed 
between SMEs and large companies. Palmatier et al (2006) noted that 
communication can only be of significance when the number and frequency of 
quality information exchanged is valuable for the exchange of relationships. 
Similarly, Rai et al (2012) argued that interacting companies could only plan 
on how to increase their responsiveness and reduce inefficiencies in the 
exchange of logistic processes through communication. Thus, it is contended 
that past experience of sharing of relevant and useful information in a timely 
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manner is a factor leading to a high level of trust (Francis and Mukherji 2009). 
An empirical study conducted by Grosse (2007) examined how 
communication between managers of interacting companies enhanced the 
development of trust in business relationships. The study found that 
communication facilitated the exchange of knowledge and experience and 
strengthened the degree of trust between business partners. Grosse (2007) 
also found that personal interest; sincerity and honesty during the 
communication played significant roles in strengthening trust. 
Commitment is also a widely cited factor that affects developments of process 
based trust in IOR. It is a constant engagement in developing and maintaining 
the exchange relationship characterised by a longer term approach to the 
relationship and the sacrifices that this entails (Kwon 2011). Commitment is 
defined as the willingness of interacting companies to cooperate and 
effectively work towards their mutual benefits. It has been posited that 
commitment in a relationship is necessary for understanding the vision of the 
other partner and constantly paying attention to achieving their potential 
mutual interests (Munyon et al. 2011). However, conceptualisations of 
commitment in IORs are only valid if they consider the market structure where 
companies of different sizes in one market are supposed to share similar 
feelings of commitments (Frow 2007). This is because there is a significant 
distinction between calculative and affective commitments in IOR (Lewicka 
2014) and each organisation in a relationship will continue to have their own 
visions and commitment.  
Calculative commitment is grounded on financial calculation and economic 
bases of rationality of business relationship, while the affective commitment 
reflects positive social and psychological feelings towards the exchange 
partner (Ganesan et al. 2010). Sudhir Kumar and Bala Subrahmanya (2010) 
have noted the assistance that large companies (principal contractors) 
provided to small innovative subcontracting enterprises; the study found that 
the commitments and constant support of the principal contractors increased 
the performance and productivities of their smaller partner and the 
development of trust. Additionally, Souiden and Choi (2012), in a Japanese 
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context, found that commitments to a partner through relationship specific 
actions or investments functioned as a facilitator for their trust in investors. 
Motives and intentions refer to a situation where business partners expect 
benefits to be derived from the business relationship (Nguyen, 2009) and is 
another sub-factor of process based trust. Motivations and intentions of a 
partner seemed to have an indirect effect on trust of the other business 
partner. Chipangura and Kaseke (2012) noted that characteristics of actors 
such as intentions and motivations of managers or owners of a company, such 
as the intention to be committed to the relationship or the intention to 
manipulate the relationship to their own advantage, were what actually 
influenced the level of trust in IOR. This was from both sides, owners of SMEs 
as well as managers of large companies. Several empirical studies support 
this argument. For instance, Jones et al. (2014) concluded that when owners 
or managers of SMEs promise their large partners some orders, they in fact 
signal to their large partners, their intention to be reliable partners. Similarly, 
when large companies, for example invest in the assets of their smaller 
partners, they signal to SMEs that their intention is benevolent. Conversely, 
opportunistic behaviour, defined by Williamson (1975) “as self-interest with 
guile’’, singled the bad intention of a partner and resulted in low levels of trust 
(Ojasalo, 2008). Berg et al. (1995) noted that behaviour based on self-interest 
on the part of either party in the exchange often led to the diminution of trust 
within the relationship. 
Auko et al. (2011) conducted a study to determine the internal and external 
constraints on subcontracting relationships between SMEs and large 
companies in the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in Kenya. The sector 
was intentionally chosen because of the government’s position of promoting 
SMEs and large companies subcontracting arrangements. The study revealed 
that the majority of SMEs did not trust their large partners; instead, only small 
numbers of subcontracting arrangements were taking place between SMEs 
and large companies. The study revealed that the motive of the large partner 
in keeping a small number of contractual arrangements with SMEs was only 
due to their desire to maintain a good reputation with the government. 
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However, the primary driver of these business relationships was the self-
interest of the large companies which prevented the development of trust.  
Goal congruence is another process based trust factor and refers to a situation 
where business partners acknowledge that in the past the goal of other partner 
was congruent with their own goals (Ojasalo, 2008). Goal congruence does 
not imply that the goals of either company perfectly match each other. Ojasalo, 
(2008) has suggested that disagreement over goals was only to be expected 
where two separate business organisations attempted to work collaboratively. 
However, goal congruence implies that, despite differences, both partners 
have been able to find common ground which has allowed them to work 
collaboratively to their mutual benefits. Where such accommodation and 
collaboration has been found to be effective in past experience, a high level of 
trust often existed which could lead to future collaborative business 
interactions.  
Prior experience of the reliability of a partner is another sub-factor in process 
based trust. Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki (2012) conducted research into IORs 
involving SMEs who were representing food producers in Finland and their 
larger partners who were representing retailers. They concluded that it was 
the past experience of the reliability of SMEs in producing quality products that 
was the principal factor underlying the interest in developing trusting business 
relationships. Experience of previous interactions where SMEs had proven to 
be reliable outweighed the negative effects of the power of their larger 
partners. In this regard, Pretorius et al. (2008) noted that the reliability of SMEs 
was directly evidenced by completing any assigned task and by their 
innovative approach in developing technical knowledge. This often resulted in 
trusting relationships with large companies.  
In addition to the factors and sub-factors presented in this section, an 
extensive body of literature exists on factors affecting trust and many 
researchers have revealed a large number of factors. For example, Huang, 
(2013) found cooperativeness; reliability, adaptability, and exchange of 
expertise and knowledge were essential components of developing trust 
based on processes. Steffel and Ellis (2009) revealed a series of antecedents 
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in business relationships which were essential for trust to arise such as the 
limited use of power in resolving disputes, encouraging the habit of give and 
take, enforcing joint planning and decision making and ultimately goal 
determination and goal identification. Nevertheless, these additional factors 
overlap with the earlier ones presented in this section and mostly represent 
nuanced versions of those principal factors and sub-factors. 
A longitudinal survey of antecedents and outcomes of trust formation and 
development in strategic alliance partnerships conducted by Ybarra and Turk 
(2009) found that the development of trust was based on communication, 
relationship quality and shared values. Ojasalo (2008) conducted an extensive 
review of the  literature to determine the factors that influenced trust. The study 
found communication, fulfilling promises, sharing values, power balance, and 
goal congruence represented the key factors that affected process based 
trust. That study, on the other hand, found that opportunistic behaviour and 
the need for monitoring were the most salient factors that negatively affected 
trust. Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki, (2012) have also attempted to explore the 
factors by identifying the antecedents of trust. The study found shared values, 
market spirit; personal competency, power balance and communication were 
the key factors that affected process based trust in asymmetrical relationships. 
Thus, process based trust factors were found to be twofold in nature; either 
they were based on information obtained from a third party about a potential 
partner, or else, they were based on direct previous experience of working with 
a particular partner.  
2.9.3 Factors underlying institutional based trust 
The third distinctive type of trust is an institutional based one. This type of trust 
is grounded in the external world including the surrounding social and political 
institutions (Zucker 1986), which may include professions, traditions, 
certifications, license, and most of the institutional arrangements which exist 
as an independent part of the interacting companies (Fuglsang and Jagd 
2015). This includes formal institutions, sanctions and legal processes and 
other informal codes of practices and values (Welter and Smallbone 2006). It 
is treated as the macro level of trust. Institutional based trust, at the most 
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general level, is a form of personal or collective actions that are constitutive 
rooted in the surrounding institutional environment; in which the trustor often 
builds on positive assumptions about the trustee’s future behaviour 
(Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). 
Institutions create social orders and contain patterns of behaviour which need 
to be followed by the actors. They lend legitimacy and meaning to the 
behaviour of business actors (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011) and, if pre-
established agreements are violated, sanctions against the offending party are 
taken by the relevant institutions or certification bodies (McEvily et al. 2003).  
It was argued by Bachmann and Inkpen (2011) that institutional trust was 
essential when strategies were developed to enhance particular individuals or 
organisations. This included situations where some governments, such as the 
Sultanate of Oman, decided to enforce positions of SMEs by reserving not less 
than 10% of public projects awarded to large companies to be allocated to 
SMEs. It is strongly argued that interpersonal trust in asymmetrical forms of 
business relationships could limit the productiveness of economic actors such 
as SMEs in the country because of the reliance on strong ties within cohesive 
groups instead of relying on strong institutions (Rus and Igli 2005). The 
economic actors, left to their own devices, might not always act in accordance 
with the intention of the government in promoting SMEs. Accordingly, an 
independent regulatory body or institution is often required and this can 
facilitate the development of trusting relationships. According to Dickson et al. 
(2006) the legal and regulatory system may impact on the collaborative 
arrangements in three ways. Firstly, public institutions can govern the financial 
and physical transactions which take place between business partners. 
Secondly, public institutions can safeguard the owner’s right over their 
intellectual property. Thirdly, legal institutions can protect both partners from 
any kind opportunistic behaviour in the place where they operate. Bachmann 
and Inkpen (2011) and Rus and Igli (2005) concluded that institutional trust 
which can be in forms of control or behavioural coordination was essential in 
asymmetrical business relationships. They viewed it as playing a crucial role 
in trust building processes through creating orders and patterns of behaviour 
which ultimately had to be followed by the interacting parties. The fact that 
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both business partners are regulated in their actions by an independent 
institute leads to trust as either partner realises that awards of public projects 
require the compliance of both partners to the rules and expectations of the 
monitoring body.  
Different institutions give rise to different levels of trust (Vlaar et al. 2007). 
According to Welter and Smallbone (2006) institutional environments can 
bring about two levels of trust. If the institution is strong and has legal powers, 
this can lead to a trusting relationship in that both parties are bound by 
regulations and being in breach of these regulations can have serious 
consequences for procuring future projects. This may seem like enforced trust 
which is a contradiction in terms. However, for both companies to trust each 
other, it may well be the better option and lead to a win-win situation. Thus, 
strong institutions can lead to trusting relationships. On the other hand, if the 
institutions or regulatory body are weak, they may be ineffective in influencing 
partners to enter into trusting relationships.  
Institutions or regulatory bodies can bring about different levels of trust, 
ranging from high to low. The levels of institutional trust levels can have 
different impacts on the productivity and efficiency of business relationships. 
A low trust environment discourages market entry, leads to low levels of 
growth and ends up by encouraging unproductive business relationships 
(Welter and Smallbone 2006). An example of low trust environment is 
indicated in the study conducted by Mambula (2002) on constraints on SMEs’ 
growth in Nigeria and found that large companies did not only dominate every 
business opportunity such as securing government procurement, but also 
attracted employees of SMEs by offering better wages and benefits. This was 
due to the absence or weakness of public institutions as the activity of the 
dominating business partner was in no way curtailed by ineffective public 
institutions.  
Another study which aimed at distinguishing between strong or weak 
institutional environments was conducted by Welter et al (2004) who 
investigated the role of trust in IORs between Western and Eastern Europe 
businesses. The researchers found that in stable institutional environments 
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such as Germany, personal trust only played a minor role in IORs, while in 
unstable institutional environments such as that of peripheral regions of 
Russia, personal trust substituted for institutional deficiencies. The 
researchers further concluded that forms of trust often depended on regional 
and sector environments. When strong institutional trust existed, the 
relationships could be developed without even the need for prior experiences 
as the institutions acted as guarantors for the business partners (Bachmann 
and Inkpen 2011). Strong institutional forces which exist in the form of 
regulative and normative rules can influence the behaviour of economic actors 
and force them to avoid acting opportunistically (Kroeger 2012). 
Several studies have attempted to identify the factors underlying institutional 
based trust. Dickson and Weaver (2011) found that regulatory institutional 
intervention mattered in the initial stages of the business arrangements by 
clarifying the duties and responsibilities of both partners and that legal 
sanctions were essential to limit the risk of any opportunistic behaviour. Hagen 
and Soonkyoo (1998), in the context of buyer- supplier relationships in Japan 
included social sanctions, such as exposure in the local media, which in fact 
led interacting partners to carefully consider those sanctions before 
committing any unacceptable action. Thus, social sanctions are constructed 
through social norms which complemented the established formal institutions 
such as legal institutions.  
Nguyen and Liem (2013), by reviewing the literature of trust in IOR, revealed 
three factors by which institutions could enhance the establishment of trust in 
IOR: regulations, laws, and monitoring actions. However, Nguyen and Liem 
did not reveal what roles these factors played in bringing about trust between 
business partners. 
An important contribution to the role that institutions played in controlling the 
behaviour of actors involved in the interaction was made by Bachmann and 
Inkpen (2011). They confirmed that institutions could play four critical roles in 
developing trust in IORs. Firstly, through legal provision, interacting 
companies were compelled to behave in a lawful manner by honouring their 
side of contractual agreements; otherwise partners that violated agreements 
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exposed themselves to considerable punishment. Thus, legal provision is a 
factor of institutional based trust. 
Secondly, are professional codes of conduct. Adherence to professional codes 
was monitored by conducting a survey to investigate and evaluate satisfaction 
of partners with each other. This was in order to encourage them to attain 
productive business relationships, as unsatisfactory feedback could result in 
penalties. Thus, professional codes of conduct based on customer feedback 
are another important factor in institutional based trust.  
Thirdly, is certification; the awarding of certificates to companies for meeting 
standards and satisfying various criteria, is a factor of institutional based trust. 
This is because the company in possession of the certificate is perceived to 
be trustworthy based on the award from a reputable awarding body.  
Fourthly, is the force of community norms which compels companies to act 
ethically in order to protect their reputations in the community. Thus, public 
perceptions based on social norms represent factors of institutional based 
trust.  
In summary, institutions such as regulatory bodies and codes of practice 
frequently carry state legitimacy and are enforceable by law. However, often 
such enforcement is not perfectly applied in practice and certain actors are 
able to behave opportunistically by placing their own self-interest ahead of the 
regulations set by the state (Kroeger 2012). It was also argued that social and 
community norms in developing countries could be even more effective in 
facilitating the development of trust than public rules and regulations (Child 
and Mollering 2003). Furthermore, despite the attention paid to the importance 
of institutions in promoting the development of trust, there is still  a consensus 
among authors that the role of institutions in the development of trust remains 
unclear (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011; Fuglsang and Jagd 2015). The lack of 
clarity in the role of institutions is addressed in the current research.  
2.10 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has presented some approaches to identifying levels of trust 
between SMEs and large companies in mandated business relationships. This 
involved the use of indicators which signalled the levels of trust between 
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business organisations. Additionally, the literature review surveyed the various 
factors which have been found to influence the levels of trust between SMEs 
and large companies. These indicators and factors were important for 
addressing the two research questions at the heart of this research. 
Trust indicators included: recurrence of business interaction, degree of 
formality, level of interdependency and level of reciprocity in information 
exchange. These four indicators were selected to form the conceptual 
framework of the study in order to address the first research question.  
Trust factors were categorised into three main groups, characteristics based 
factors, process based factors and institutional based factors. Each category 
contained a number of factors. These were selected to contribute to the 
conceptual framework of the study in order to address the second research 
question. 
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an outline of the research methodology that underpins 
this research which aims at addressing issues of trust in mandated business 
interaction. 
Based on a critical literature review (Chapter 2) the following research 
questions are formulated: 
I. How can trust be conceptualised and assessed in mandated business 
interactions? 
II. How do various factors influence trust levels between SMEs and large 
companies in mandated business interactions? 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design through which 
these research questions will be addressed.  
3.2 Research design 
The research design can be described as a detailed outline of how an 
investigation of certain phenomena will take place (Punch 2005); it consists of 
a plan for data collection and data analysis. However, an appropriate outline 
of the research design must be taken into consideration in order to ensure that 
the collected data answers the research questions.  
The literature provides various options for research designs and there is no 
common agreement among researchers on which research design to select.  
For instance, Crotty (1998) identifies four elements which represent two 
theoretical and two practical elements to be considered in relation to research 
design. The theoretical elements are epistemology and theoretical 
perspectives; practical elements include methodology and methods: 
 Epistemology: the knowledge claims which inform the research.  
 Theoretical Perspectives: The philosophical assumptions underlying the   
research. 
 Methodology: The research strategies which link the methods to the 
outcomes.  
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 Method: The procedures adopted to address the research questions.  
 
An alternative approach to research design is presented in Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) and consists of five sequential steps. The first step is concerned with 
the field of inquiry which can either be qualitative or quantitative. The second 
step is the selection of an appropriate theoretical research paradigm. Third 
step is concerned with the methodology and, finally, two steps are concerned 
with the instruments for collecting data and the procedures of data analysis. 
Saunders et al. (2007) propose six layers of research design known as the 
‘research onion’. These layers include the philosophical stance of the 
researcher (e.g. realism or positivism), the research logic (inductive or 
deductive), methodologies (e.g. surveys, case study), methods (e.g. single or 
mixed method), time perspective (e.g. longitudinal, cross-sectional), field of 
inquiry (quantitative or qualitative), and finally, the procedures for data 
collection and analysis.  
The differences in approach to research design are mainly that of 
classification; the essential elements of research design are similar in most 
scholars in the field. 
Figure 2 is based on the common features of research design identified in the 
above studies. The chapter is divided into nine different sections, which 
include 1) philosophical assumptions, 2) research logic, 3) strategy of inquiry, 
4) research methodology, 5) method of data collection, 6) sampling and 
sampling size, 7) data analysis technique, 8) ethical considerations, 9) validity 
and reliability. The following figure depicts the above stated sections:  
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Figure 2 Structure of the research design 
Philosophical 
aassumptions 
Research logic
Research 
methodology
Sampling & 
sampling size
Data Analysis Technique Ethical consideration Validity & reliability
Strategy of 
inquiry
Method of Data 
Collection
 
3.2.1 Philosophical assumptions 
Philosophy is an activity and is defined as a method that initially involves 
thinking skills, and is followed by practical skills to search for reality, by 
involving the ideas, experience, and knowledge of others (Greetham 2006). 
Philosophy helps researchers on how research objectives and research 
questions must be formulated and how researchers must seek for information 
that is essential to answer the research questions (Creswell 2013). Philosophy 
analyses the social reality of the world from various paradigms such as realism 
and interpretivism. In this regard, researchers need to give careful 
consideration to the issue of an appropriate paradigm for acquiring knowledge, 
and the various epistemological paradigms are not always straightforward 
(Aliyu et al. 2014). Thus, identifying a philosophical perspective can help a 
researcher to define his/her study objectives and clarify the perspectives and 
research questions that will be posed in the project.  
Epistemology relates to the issue of what constitutes valid sources of 
knowledge. Creswell (2003) has pointed out that epistemology is rooted in 
ontology which is the science of being and involves views of what constitutes 
reality. Two broad ontological positions are possible. The first is realism which 
posits that reality is mind independent, objective and something which is to be 
discovered by the human mind. The second position is that of idealism which 
sees reality as largely mind-constructed or the way in which the human mind 
makes some sense of external reality. It is also sometimes referred to as 
interpretivism. In this study, the ontological stance is that of interpretivism in 
that trust is a phenomenon which is largely mind-constructed.  
The interpretivist paradigm is predicated upon the view that knowledge is 
constructed through the perceptions and experiences of the people involved; 
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therefore, social scientists describe this paradigm as a means to grasp 
subjective meanings from the perceptions and experiences of the individuals 
involved (Bryman and Bell 2011). In contrast to the other paradigms, 
interpretivism embraces a wide range of philosophical and social thought 
(Creswell 2013). The simple and fundamental laws of nature are seen as 
insufficient to understand the complex nature of social phenomena (Blumberg 
et al. 2005) such as trust. Hence, it can be said that this paradigm is concerned 
with understanding the world as it is, and to understanding the fundamental 
nature of social world (the state of trust such as level and factors that influence 
the levels of trust) at the level of subjective experience (Viitaharju and 
Lähdesmäki 2012).  
The interpretivist ontological point of view describes reality as largely mind 
constructed, therefore, it attempts to understand and explain the social world 
primarily from the point of view of the actors directly involved in the interaction 
(Bryman and Bell 2011). This represents the essential function of social 
sciences, and particularly studies that attempt to understand the subjective 
meaning of various actions (Bryman 2012). This is similar to studies that 
attempt to explore and investigate the notion of trust between SMES and large 
companies (e.g. Nguyen et al. 2005; Thorgren et al. 2011).  
Trust is a multi-dimensional construct (Deepak,2011), and elastic in nature and 
can be investigated and explored once individuals involved in the interactions 
give their views and experience about the other partner (Seppanen, 2011). 
Adobor (2005) noted that trust was a soft concept where even betrayal of trust 
by any business partner could not be noticed until the actors involved 
expressed it in some way and this required an explanation from the individuals 
involved. Some studies of trust that were conducted within a realist paradigm 
(e.g. Chong et al. 2009; Steffel and Ellis 2009; Barnes and Yen 2011) revealed 
multifaceted findings and most of these studies concluded that trust should be 
given further attention through deeper investigation perhaps within an 
interpretivist paradigm. James Jr (2002) noted that the phenomenon of trust 
cannot be easily quantified and that this area of research required much 
deeper attention through interpretivist studies in order to generate meaningful 
information. Similarly, Adobor (2005) emphasised that the elasticity and 
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dynamic nature of trust required deeper investigation and views and 
experiences of individuals who were directly involved in the interaction. 
Actually, studies conducted within the interpretivist paradigm were found to 
play a crucial role in obtaining reliable information through which the 
researcher got closer to reality by discussing and investigating the various 
issues that can determine the state of trust such as levels and influential trust 
factors from the perspective of the actors involved (e.g. Nguyen et al. 2005). 
It is argued that actors can explain a broader scenario and possible sets of 
elements or concerns that can influence the relationships (Lee et al. 2012). 
Zaheer et al (2010) also noted that the content of the relationship can clearly 
be understood by interpreting and analysing the meanings that can be 
generated by the questions how, why and what from the individuals involved 
in the relationships. Hence, an interpretivist paradigm provides a holistic 
insight by using the questions of why, how and what, in the experiences, views, 
and perspectives of key managers in such relationships.   
The following points are put forward for justifying an interpretivist paradigm for 
this study:  
a. Its ability to explore and investigate the complex pattern of relationships 
and business interactions that exist between SMEs and large 
companies, which are not usually amenable to researches located 
within positivist paradigms (Welter, 2012). 
 
b. Trust between organisations is, in reality, trust between people, and can 
be constructed through various means such as the intervention of a 
third party who can either endorse or break the relationship (Gaur et al 
(2011). Therefore, it is described as a complicated term to be 
understood, as such a concept can evolve through various means and 
change over time (Nguyen et al. 2005).  
 
c. Trust in IORs is influenced by many issues (Bandeira-de-Mello et al. 
2011). The literature offers a large number of factors (i.e. institutional, 
psychological, social, economic and cultural concerns) that can 
influence the levels of trust in business relationships (Palmatier et al. 
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2006) and it is not clear which ones may influence SMEs and large 
companies in the mandated business interactions in public projects. An 
interpretivist study will provide insights into the perceptions of key 
players as to which factors are of practical importance from their 
perspectives. 
 
d. Finally, trust appears to be a catch all phrase used to explain various 
aspects of personal relationships (Welter, 2012). Therefore, an 
interpretivist study is expected to offer researchers the possibility to 
clarify the phenomenon of trust from the perspectives and experiences 
of actors involved in the interactions.  
The next consideration is called the research logic which is discussed in the 
following section. 
3.2.2 Research logic 
Research is conducted to find answers for questions either posed by 
theoretical considerations or by developing theory after collecting and 
analysing data associated with the research projects (Bryman and Bell 2011). 
In this sense, the literature reveals two common research logics in social 
studies namely, deductive and inductive logics.  
The deductive method represents a quantitative approach which is closely 
linked with positivism (Robson 2011), where theories are developed by the 
testing of hypotheses (Bryman 2012). Creswell (2003) argues that in 
quantitative research, the hypothesis and research questions are based on the 
theory that the researcher seeks to test. Thus, deductive approaches are 
driven by theory. 
Inductive logic, on the other hand, is concerned with the development of theory 
which is associated with the findings of domains of research enquiries (Bryman 
and Bell 2011). Unlike deductive logic, the use of theory in inductive logic is 
much more varied (Creswell 2003), and is usually less straightforward (Punch 
2005). Researchers following an inductive logic use the implications of findings 
for the development of theory by linking research findings with certain domains 
of inquiry. With regards to trust between SMEs and large companies in 
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mandated business interaction as the reality under investigation in the current 
research, this study adopts an inductive approach. 
The following section presents the particular strategy of inquiry based on the 
ontological, epistemological and logical assumptions underlying the current 
research. 
3.2.3 Strategy of inquiry 
The exploratory nature of this study calls for a qualitative approach as most 
appropriate for answering the research questions (Nguyen et al. 2005; Shaw 
2006). Qualitative studies provide researchers an opportunity to gain an in-
depth understanding of the social phenomena under investigation and to 
understand the complexity of the relationships, particularly in researching a 
nascent concept that can be difficult to understand such as trust (Bonte, 2007).  
Most studies relevant to assessment of trust have made use of attitudinal 
surveys which were often based on general expressions such as “most people 
are trustworthy” or “it is prudent to be cautious when entering into deals with 
others”. Responses to such statements, usually using a Likert rating scale, are 
frequently difficult to evaluate either because they are based on attitudes or 
because the statements are often vague and generic (Ermisch et al. 2009). 
The responses to such statements do not refer to incidents or actions and the 
context within which the respondent was applying their particular rating has 
been lost in the instrument by which the data is being collected (Ermisch et al. 
2009).  
Trust is a complex phenomenon which can only be conceptualised and 
understood from individuals’ perspectives (Aliyu et al. 2014). It is a broad and 
multi-dimensional construct and is often related to beliefs of one partner about 
other partners’ intention, behaviour, and to the related risks (Blomqvist, 2005). 
Abosag, (2013) noted that trust between business partners develops over 
time. Hence, a qualitative approach provides a more holistic insight into 
interaction issues and allows researchers to explore different perceptions, 
views and experiences. It also helps to avoid generating oversimplified 
understandings of the context (Nguyen et al. 2005),.  
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Welter et al (2004) argued that trust was too complicated a topic to be 
researched quantitatively because of its nature which is influenced by different 
sociological, cultural and institutional issues. It is clearly noted by Steffel and 
Ellis (2009) that issues concerning competition, coordination and relational 
exchange can be revealed and clearly understood by conducting qualitative 
research. In contrast, quantitative approaches, are argued to be best in 
explaining phenomena that have quantifiable dimensions such as frequency 
and duration of inter-organisational interactions and measuring their 
consequences (Steffel and Ellis 2009).  
Support for the argument of the appropriateness of qualitative rather than 
quantitative approaches can be drawn from previous researchers in IORs (e.g. 
Holmlund 2004; Reisenwitz and Fowler 2013; Scheer and Lund 2013) who 
posit that the elements of relationships and trust favour conducting qualitative 
methods. This can also be explained from the findings of some of IORs 
studies. For instance, Lee et al (2012) conducted research in inter-
organizational collaboration networks using quantitative methods and 
suggested that aspects of relationships could be better discussed, obtained, 
and understood through deeper investigation through qualitative methods. 
Similarly, Thorgren et al (2011) conducted research specifically on trust in IOR, 
and concluded that the findings did not specify the determinant elements that 
could influence trust in the interaction. Thus, a qualitative method is expected 
to generate valuable information in investigating the concept of trust and 
assessing its levels in mandated business interactions. 
3.2.4 Research methodology 
The research methodology is a consideration of the issues involved in the 
adoption of a certain data collection method in terms of the expected outcomes 
of using that method (Bryman and Bell 2011). It can also be described as a 
structure of the logical process that researchers follow to collect reliable and 
fruitful data (Silverman 2011). This structure helps the researcher to ensure 
that the content of the research methodology assists the researcher to obtain 
the required information accurately; the accuracy here can be achieved by 
determining the evidence selected to either evaluate or describe phenomena 
(Punch 2005). Generally, there is no wrong or right method, rather it is a matter 
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of selecting the most appropriate method to research the topic (Silverman 
2011). Most importantly, the boundary selected for the research should be 
appropriate to achieving the purpose of the study (Punch 2005). In this 
research, the context is trust in mandated business interactions in the 
Sultanate of Oman and justification for this context has been presented in 
chapter one (see 1.3).  
However, prior to framing the topics to be covered in interviews, four 
preliminary background interviews were conducted with several public 
institutions in order to obtain relevant information on the institutional context.  
Table 3 shows the name of the public institutions, designation of the 
interviewees and purposes of the interview. These interviews had the function 
of providing the researcher with much background information which aided the 
researcher towards a more in-depth insight into various aspects of the 
mandated business interactions.  
Table 3: Background interviews conducted with public officials 
Public institution   Designation Purpose of the interview 
Tender Board of 
Oman 
General Manager To identify the role and procedures that TBO 
play and follow in the mandated business 
interaction.  
Public Authority for 
SMEs Development 
(PASMED) 
Acting CEO of PASMED To identify the role that PASMED played in 
mandated business interaction and to know 
how PASMED enhanced SMEs in this form of 
business interaction. 
Ministry of Transport 
and Communication 
(MTC) 
 
General Manager 
To identify the role that MTC played and its 
influence on the relationship between SMEs 
and large companies in this form of business 
interaction. 
Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM) 
Head of section inlabour 
administration & inspection 
programme 
To identify the role and influence that 
inspection teams had on SMEs and large 
companies’ business relationship. 
 
The interviewed public officials provided some useful information about 
involvement of their institutions in the mandated business interaction. They 
provided some documents such as decrees and procedures that committees 
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followed in supervising and monitoring the interactions of the companies at 
public sites.  
The interviewees apologised for not being able to have the interviews 
recorded. These interviews were conducted in form of preparation to have 
broader background about the mandated business interactions and roles of 
involved public institutions.  
The specific methods used to generate data for the research are addressed in 
the following section. 
3.3 Method of data collection 
The data was generated in this study by means of semi-structured interviews 
with representatives of key managers of both large companies and SMEs.  
3.3.1 Interviews 
The interview is one of the most frequently used  tools in qualitative studies; it 
is considered as one of the best tools for accessing perceptions of people 
about definitions, meanings, and experience of situations (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005).  
There are three main types of interviews: semi-structured, structured and 
unstructured interviews (Punch 2005). These types of interviews have different 
characteristics based on the degree of structure which is, in turn, decided by 
how deep the interview intends to go. It is also based on the questions and 
objectives of the research. 
According to Nguyen et al (2005) trust requires in depth discussion and the 
researcher may be required to ask several questions in order to understand 
levels of trust that exist between interacting companies. Thus, among the 
various types of interviews, semi-structured interviews seemed to be the most 
effective tool to reveal the levels of trust and to determine the factors that 
influenced the levels of trust. Semi-structured interviews required researchers 
not to develop or adopt highly specific research questions in advance, but 
rather to adopt a flexible approach to eliciting views and opinions on issues 
and topics related to the research questions (Bryman and Bell 2011). Maria, 
(2012) investigated trust using semi structured interviews and concluded that 
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every interview they conducted offered fascinating stories in which 
interviewees expressed their experiences and illustrated the factors that they 
perceived as influential in the development of trust between business partners. 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interview 
A semi-structured interview is a most appropriate tool for exploratory studies 
(Silverman 2011). Exploring trust in business relationships, and particularly at 
asymmetric levels of business interactions, is a complicated issue (Sefiani and 
Bown 2013) due to the unequal power balance and the variation of needs and 
expectations of the partners. Thus, it must be investigated in indirect ways with 
the interviewees. Hence, several questions need to be asked in order to 
determine the levels of trust and identify the factors that influence levels of 
trust in mandated business relationships.  
Several advantages of semi-structured interviews are revealed in the 
literature. One advantage is the great flexibility which they offer to the 
researcher. Although the researcher may have in mind a list of questions on a 
specific topic, this list is considered only as a guide that leads the researcher 
to fairly cover the topic (Bryman and Bell 2011). 
A second advantage is that semi-structured interviews allow interviewees to 
express their views and experiences in their own words (Abosag, 2013). It also 
offers an opportunity to enable respondents to clarify the questions as the 
semi-structured interviews is more like a conversation than a questionnaire 
(Silverman 2011).  
To obtain the required knowledge about the levels of trust between SMEs and 
large companies and to determine the factors that influenced the levels of trust, 
the participants were initially requested to narrate their experiences with their 
partners in the mandated business interactions. At this point, the researcher 
adopted an indirect approach to issues of trust due to its sensitivity in the 
context of mandated business interactions. The interviewer was guided by the 
following list of open questions to prompt the interviewee to express their views 
and opinions. 
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 How the relationship began? How long did it last? 
 Did the relationship develop or decline? How and why?  
 Did you experience any challenges while interacting with your business 
partner?  
 How they were solved and how they affected your relationship with your 
partner?  
 Can you describe the influence of public bodies in this form of business 
interaction? 
 How formal has been the deal between you and your partner? Why? 
 How do you experience the interdependency between you and your 
partner? 
 Did you experience any kind of information exchange?  
 Was the information readily forthcoming or did you have to press the 
other partner for the information?  
 Was the information exchanged between you and your partner 
influenced by the relationship in any way? 
 What are the characteristics of your partner that you experienced 
important for the development of trust? Was anything discouraging?  
 Did the mandated nature of the contract affect the relationship in any 
way? How?  
These questions were essential to create a dynamic conversation in which the 
researcher could spontaneously ask for more clarification and raise questions 
based on their answers. 
3.3.3 Pilot interviews 
According to Punch (2005), pilot studies are important for adjusting and 
shaping the research plan, flows of the contents and questions. It can, 
consequently, reduce the risk of failure in collected information. Three pilot 
interviews were conducted with three representatives (One with project 
manager of one of the large companies operating in Oman, one with site 
engineer of a large company, and one with an owner of medium enterprise). 
These three pilot interviews took place prior to the actual 25 interviews. None 
of the three interviewees in the pilot study was included in the actual research. 
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Minor adjustments were subsequently made particularly in the wording of the 
questions to avoid the possibility of repeating the same question and to avoid 
any ambiguity in the questions. For instance, the owner of a SME, initially, 
discussed experiences of their enterprise in the mandated business without 
determining one specific business partner. Thus, the actual conducted 
interviews were initially preceded by providing a brief explanation of the topic 
and its boundaries. Additionally, most of the interviewees were not comfortable 
with the use of English language due to the limited capability to express their 
experiences about this kind of business interactions. So, most of the interviews 
were conducted in Arabic, only four were conducted in English.  
Issues related to sampling and sample size of participants are presented in 
the following section.  
3.4 Sampling and sample size 
Sampling in qualitative studies is not only concerned about which event to 
observe or which people to select for interviews but is considered as a tool of 
settings and processes of data collection (Punch 2005). Sampling selection in 
qualitative studies varies from that of quantitative studies. Quantitative 
sampling most often tends to use probability sampling aiming at 
representativeness, whereas qualitative research tends to use purposive 
sampling for generating data from those who are assumed to be the focus in 
mind (Punch 2005).  
Three main issues have to be considered in the selection of a purposive 
sample in qualitative studies: who to select as informants for the study, the 
strategy which will be followed to engage the purposive sampling and, finally, 
the number of informants required (Creswell, 2013).  
In examining a relationship, it is important to obtain data from both parties (e.g. 
Svensson 2006; Schoorman et al. 2007). The selection of participants 
provided the perceptions of both parties involved in the same inter-
organisational relationship. This study selected its sample from SMEs and 
large companies that were engaged or had been engaged in mandated 
business relationships in public projects. This study engaged project 
managers, site engineers and owners of SMEs. The primary aim of selecting 
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individuals from managerial posts of both companies was related to their 
involvement and experiences in this kind of business interaction. These 
individuals were expected to express their experiences and illustrate the levels 
of trust between them and their partners in mandated business interactions; 
they were also expected to reveal the factors that influenced the level of trust 
in such business relationships. 
Project managers (PM) were expected to provide an extensive overview of 
their projects and opportunities that were reserved to SMEs; they were also 
aimed at illustrating their experience of dealing with owners of subcontracted 
SMEs, such as how they have been overcoming unpredictable situations while 
interacting with SMEs, how they often dealt with SMEs, and they were also 
aimed at revealing some distinctive characteristics of SMEs and owners, and 
what encouraged or discouraged them from forming productive business 
relationships with SMEs based on trust.  
The middle management of large companies (Site Engineers) were included 
because of their direct interaction with owners of SMEs and employees of 
these SMEs on a daily basis. They were expected to be very much concerned 
about the quality of work and completion and the character of SMEs that 
frequently worked with them. They were aimed at reporting their experiences 
and discussing various issues that might refer to the trust and factors that 
influenced the levels of trust between them and their smaller counterparts. 
The sample population of SMEs was drawn from owners. The purpose of 
selecting this sampling population was to investigate their perceptions, 
experiences, and views about their relationships and specifically how they 
either formed trusting or distrusting business relationships while interacting 
with their large counterparts in mandated business relationships.  
3.4.1 Sample size 
The most important concern regarding sample size is that the selected sample 
population is appropriate for providing in-depth insights into the issues under 
investigations (Creswell 2013). It conversely depends on whom and how many 
participants are required for obtaining comprehensive and reliable data 
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(Cleary et al. 2014), else, inappropriate determinant considerations of 
sampling population may lead to an error in research findings (Creswell 2003).  
Therefore, the sample size was initially intended to engage a total of 30 
participants. Twelve from the large companies represented one project 
manager and one site engineer from each large companies. The remaining 18 
represented the owners of each of the intended SMEs in the embedded cases. 
However, 25 were finally interviewed as explained later in this section. 
Additionally, the sample of large companies was selected from different types 
of large companies operating in Oman. The rationale behind engaging 
different large companies was to interpret different perceptions and 
experiences from the diversity of business and social backgrounds.   
Two large companies were selected from each of the following three types of 
large companies: 
 Two from large joint venture companies 
 Two from large subsidiary companies 
 Two from Omani owned large companies. 
The large joint venture companies were involved in an alliance between a 
foreign based company and a local Omani owned company. The large 
subsidiary companies were solely foreign based companies. The final type of 
large company was drawn from Omani owned companies. 
The sample population of SMEs was initially intended to comprise three 
subcontracted SMEs with every single contracting company of the various 
types of large companies. This would have resulted in 18 embedded cases. 
However, for various reasons, it was not possible to include three SMEs 
contracted to each of the 6 large companies. In two instances, there were three 
SMEs engaged with two large companies; the remaining 4 large companies, 
were each engaged with 2 SMEs. This resulted in a total of 14 embedded 
cases. This is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Structure of the embedded cases 
Each embedded case was thus represented by more than one interview. 
Initially, it was intended to interview 18 from SME owners and 12 from large 
companies giving a total of 30 planned interviews to represent the embedded 
cases. However, prior to the interviews being held, one site engineer and three 
SMEs owners declined to be interviewed. Following the interviews, another 
SME owner decided to have his data removed from the study. This resulted in 
a total of 25 interview transcripts for the analysis of the data.   
In summary, 25 interviews were included in the analysis; 6 interviews were 
conducted with project managers, 5 interviews with site engineers, and 14 
interviews with the owners of SMEs. The 25 interviews took place during a 
period from March 2015 and July 2015. Each interview lasted between 40 and 
75 minutes. Most of the interviews took place in their offices in Oman except 
for two owners of SMEs who preferred to be interviewed at a neutral venue.   
3.4.2 Engagement of participants 
Due to the nature of mandated business interactions which often began within 
public bodies, the participants were engaged in a systematic way. Initially and 
after providing evidence of my identity and after obtaining ‘’To Whom It May 
Concern letter’’ (see appendix 3) from my sponsor which is the Ministry of 
Manpower’’, the Tender Board of Oman (TBO) agreed to provide me with the 
following information: 
 List of companies (Large companies and SMEs engaged in mandated 
subcontracting business interactions) in public projects. 
 List of public projects.  
Engagements of large 
companies & SMEs 
National Large 
company 1
National Large 
company 2
Joint Venture 1 Joint Venture 2 Subsidiary 1 Subsidiary 2
SME 
1
SME 2
SME 
1 SME 2
SME 1 SME 2 SME 1 SME 2 SME 1 SME 2 SME 1 SME 2
SME 
3 SME 
3
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The representative of TBO provided a list of the companies and emphasised 
that the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC) was one of the public 
institutions which was paying very significant attention towards 
implementations of mandated business interactions between SMEs and large 
companies. The general manager of TBO also expressed that MTC was one 
of the most influential public institutions involved in implementing the 
mandated business between SME and large companies in public projects. He 
stated that collecting data from MTC and particularly in road construction 
industry would be helpful for the researcher as it was very rich in terms of 
sample size. According to him, the findings of this study were expected to 
reveal the current state of interaction and trust and the factors which would 
eventually help the decision makers in Oman on how to utilise public projects 
for development of SMEs and for encouraging Omani youth to become 
entrepreneurs.  
Having obtained the required information from the TBO, the next stage was to 
contact the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC). The Tender & 
Contract Department in MTC appreciated the effort made by the researcher to 
explore the state of trust between SMES and large firms in the mandated 
business relationships. The General Manager (GM) of this department 
explained the efforts that MTC tended to make in order to ensure more 
productive business relationships between SMEs and large companies. He 
provided some documents which showed the formations of committees that 
supervised the site and monitored the interactions between large companies 
and SMEs. The GM of this department had instructed his teams to provide 
detailed lists of various types of companies that were engaged in this form of 
business interactions. The GM of tender and contract department provided a 
list of large companies and SMEs working on their sites with their contact 
details. Generally, the sample group of various types of companies and their 
subcontracting SMEs were subjected to the following conditions: 
 SMEs and large companies must be engaged in mandated business  
companies. 
 The owner of SMEs must be an Omani. 
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 The interactions between SMEs and large companies must be under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Transport and Communication.   
Immediately after obtaining the contact details of large companies and SMEs, 
potential participants were sent emails along with the information sheets and 
the consent form which were approved by the Ethical Committee of the 
University of Bradford. I initially contacted six large contracting companies two 
of each type (2 national companies, 2 subsidiaries, and 2 joint ventures). Five 
of them agreed to be interviewed and one subsidiary company declined. An 
alternative subsidiary large company was found. Arrangements for interviews 
with owners of SMEs only took place once the relevant large company 
confirmed that they would participate. 18 owners of SMEs were contacted by 
sending and dropping information sheets and consent forms into their offices.  
The researcher experienced some difficulty in engaging 4 owners of SMEs; in 
the case of 3 of them, this was due to their constant engagements which were 
more likely related to unexpected personal commitments, whereas, in the case 
of fourth one, he had decided to withdraw three days following the day of the 
interview. It is appreciated that SMEs are in a different situation than large 
companies with fewer resources and personnel. Additionally, owners of SMEs 
may have been reluctant to take part due to fear and suspicion that the 
interview might be some form of checking up on their activities. Furthermore, 
owners of SMEs might have had limited experience of interviews for research 
purposes and may not have valued the importance of such research. 
It was not difficult to engage the Project Managers (PM) and the Site Engineers 
(SE) but, surprisingly, it was much more difficult to engage owners of SMEs. 
Several owners of SMEs kept requesting for a reschedule of the interviews 
which had already been agreed.  
Preparation for face to face interviews required patience and constant follow 
up to secure potential participants. The purpose of the study and the 
information sheet had to be further explained through follow up phone calls 
particularly for owners of SMEs, some of whom appeared to be hesitant or 
reluctant to participate. This also necessitated an explanation of how their 
participation was important for the success of the relationship.  
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3.5 Data analysis technique 
From the outset, it is important to recall the two interrelated objectives of this 
study; the first objective is aimed at exploring the concept of trust and 
investigating the levels of trust that exist between SMEs and large companies 
in mandated business interactions, and for this, indicators (see: 2.7.1 to 2.7.5) 
were used to signal the levels of trust in the embedded cases of this study. 
The second objective involved an exploration of how various factors influenced 
the levels of trust in mandated business interactions.  
With regards to the first objective of the study, which was concerned about 
determining trust levels that existed between business partners, the four trust 
indicators were the means used to ascertain those trust levels. It is worth 
noting that these trust levels were derived primarily from information based on 
the perceptions of SME owners who tended to provide rich case specific data. 
In contrast, the information provided by informants from large contracting 
companies tended to be rather general in nature.   
Generally, all the interviews were carefully transcribed after the translation 
from Arabic into English. The translations were made by the researcher who 
also conducted the interviews. The researcher’s first language is Arabic. 
Additionally, the researcher is Omani by birth so is not only familiar with the 
nuances of Arabic, the senses of which are often difficult to convey in English, 
but also has a deep appreciation of Omani culture and everyday life. As far as 
was practical, the researcher remained close to the original language in 
translation, but in some instances, it was necessary to apply transliteration 
rather than direct translation in order to convey faithfully what was being 
disclosed by the interviewees. In this regard, the researcher’s proficiency in 
English was of great assistance in producing English transcripts.  
For the analysis of the transcripts, a thematic tool is the most frequently used 
method to analyse the collected data (Thomas and Harden 2008). It is 
identified as the most common approach in qualitative studies (Bryman 2012). 
This may be due to its appropriateness and abilities of analysing broad unities 
of information that may constitute several codes aggregated from a common 
idea (Creswell 2013).  
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All the transcripts were analysed thematically by using Nvivo.10 software 
which helped for better management and control of the large volume of data 
which exceeded 400 pages. This thematic analysis resulted in the 
identification of 11 main factors which were found to influence high levels of 
trust and 9 main factors which were found to influence low levels of trust. 
Thematic analysis was carried out in a series of steps as described by Bryman 
and Bell (2011). These steps began with breaking down the different themes 
after several reviews of the data; this was followed by establishing initial coding 
processes to create the final themes. The final stage was to reduce the themes 
after merging those codes which covered similar ideas.  
This process is very similar to the steps described by Creswell (2013) who 
described the above three steps as the common strategies of data analysis in 
qualitative studies.  
3.6 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations must be considered in every stage of the research 
(Hammond and Wellington 2013). The researcher complied with the 
guidelines and regulations of the University of Bradford for the conducting of 
research, especially with regard to issues of voluntary participations, 
anonymity, confidentiality and informed consent.   
Thus, after getting the list of names and types of SMEs and large companies 
that were engaged in mandated relationships from Tender Board of Oman 
(TBO), an email was sent to the potential participants, for initial request and 
approval. The emails provided potential participants with the nature and 
purpose of the research (Blumberg et al. 2005). The email also included a 
consent form as an attachment. It was explained that the giving of consent by 
signing the form implied that permission was being given for the recordings of 
the interviews to take place (see Appendix 3).  
Assurances of privacy, confidentiality, data protection and safe disposal at the 
end of the research were given to each participant. To assure the participants 
that disclosure during interview would not result in any harm or negative 
consequences for them (Robson 2011), it was explained that their responses 
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would be made anonymous by coding the names of organisations and names 
of persons. Thus, they were labelled as in table 4. 
Table 4 Coding of the participants and their organisations 
 
Assurance of confidentiality was also given by informing participants that data 
would be held securely and password protected, accessible only by the main 
researcher. Respondents were also informed that they had the right to have 
their data withdrawn within two weeks if they changed their minds. This is 
because there is a potential in any social research to cause stress, harm and 
anxiety and other negative consequences to participants. In the event, one 
SME owner requested that his data should be withdrawn and this was done.  
Finally, as a matter of courtesy, all participants received a message of 
gratitude at the end of the interview and a note of acknowledgement was 
included in the foreword to the research. 
3.7 Validity and reliability 
Validity and Reliability are two concepts for evaluating the usefulness of the 
findings of a piece of research. Validity may be either internal or external 
(Amaratunga et al. 2002). Internal validity refers to the extent to which the 
methods employed to collect data accurately measure what they claim to 
measure, whereas external validity is concerned with the generalisability of the 
findings (Yin 2003). Reliability is more concerned with the consistency of the 
Two National Large Companies Labelled as N1 and N2 
Two Joint venturing large companies Labelled as JV1 and JV2 
Two Subsidiaries large companies Labelled as S1 and S2 
SMEs subcontracted by every large 
company 
Labelled as, for example, N1-SME1, N1-
SME2 or S1-SME1 and so on. 
Project Managers of large 
companies 
Labelled as PMs of, for example PM of N1 
Site engineers of large companies Labelled as SE of, for example SE of N1 
Owners of SMEs Owners of SMEs were labelled as SME1, 
SME2 or SME3 and the embedded case 
was indicated by adding working with N1, 
JV1 etc. 
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research method. This means that if the research was repeated under similar 
circumstances, similar findings would be expected (Guest et al. 2011).  
The traditional approach for evaluating research has been to check the internal 
and external validity of the findings as well as the reliability and objectivity of 
the research. These traditional criteria arose when there was a prevalence of 
quantitative rather than qualitative studies. However, these criteria can be 
extended to apply to qualitative studies. Lincoln and Guba(1986) proposed an 
alternative set of criteria applicable to qualitative studies and these criteria are 
presented in Table 5 
Table 5 Comparison of traditional criteria with alternatives applicable to 
qualitative research 
 
Adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
These alternative criteria were utilised by the researcher in evaluating the 
current research. Each criterion is discussed in the following sections. 
3.7.1 Credibility 
This criterion corresponds with internal validity and is related to a judgment as 
to how believable the findings of the research are based on the perspectives 
of the participants. Clearly, as this piece of research is concerned with 
investigating the phenomenon of trust, it is only the key participants or those 
interviewed in the piloting stage who are in a position to judge the credibility of 
the findings. Accordingly, a draft summary of the findings was presented to a 
number of the participants and they confirmed the credibility of the findings.  
 
 
Traditional Criteria for evaluating 
Quantitative Research 
Alternative Criteria for evaluating 
Qualitative Research 
Internal Validity Credibility 
External Validity Transferability 
Reliability Dependability 
Objectivity Confirmability 
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3.7.2 Transferability  
This criterion relates to external validity and refers to the extent to which the 
findings can be generalised to other contexts. It is important to point out that 
the primary responsibility for the transferability of these results to other 
situations rests with the researcher who is attempting to generalise based on 
these results. This is why it was important to present the context of the current 
study (see 1.3). The context of this study, presented in 1.3, should provide 
ample information to assist another researcher to decide whether or not the 
findings of this research could be validly transferred to another context.  
3.7.3 Dependability 
This criterion corresponds to reliability in the more traditional approaches to 
research and refers to the extent to which the current findings would be 
replicated if the research was conducted under similar circumstances. 
However, as has already been pointed out in this chapter, circumstances in 
qualitative studies can change over time and even within the time frame of the 
current research. Dependability takes account of the changing conditions 
occurring in qualitative studies but claims that the broad results and findings 
are dependable especially under the prevailing conditions at the time of the 
research.  
3.7.4 Confirmability 
Quantitative studies aim at objectivity in their findings in order to avoid bias of 
any kind, particularly researcher bias. For that reason, the researcher must 
remain aloof from the data in the interest of avoiding any kind of bias which 
could compromise the findings. However, in qualitative studies, the researcher 
is very much involved in the data collection.  
Confirmability was established in a number of ways in this study. Firstly, the 
researcher carried out extensive piloting and background checking (see 3.2.4 
& 3.4.2) where the Tender Board of Oman actually recommended that the 
research be directed towards investigating projects supervised by the Ministry 
of Transport and Communication.  
Secondly, the exact procedures for collecting data have been outlined in the 
research design and these are available for another independent researcher 
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to assess. That independent researcher can pay special attention to any novel 
findings or those which contradict the findings of previous studies.  
3.8 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter has presented the methodology and research design of the study. 
It began by identifying and justifying the philosophical assumptions underlying 
this study. The research logic, strategies of inquiry, methodology and research 
design were discussed with brief introductions and justifications. Sampling and 
sampling size and method of data collection were presented. Issues of validity 
and reliability were discussed. The chapter concluded with a description and 
justification for thematic analysis techniques and the ethical considerations 
relevant to this research. 
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Chapter Four – The analysis and findings 
The Conceptualisation of Trust and the Assessments of its Levels 
between Large Companies and SMEs in Mandated Business 
Interactions 
4. Introduction 
The findings of this study are presented in two interrelated chapters. Each 
chapter is aimed at addressing one of the research questions of the study. 
This chapter addresses the first research question: how can trust be 
conceptualised and assessed in mandated business interactions? Chapter 
five explores the factors that influence the levels of trust between two 
companies.  
From the outset, the question arises as to whether trust in the context of 
mandated business interactions differs in any substantial way from trust in 
business relationships of choice. While, there is an abundance of literature on 
trust in the context of relationship of choice, scant attention has been paid to 
trust in the context of mandated business interactions. In this chapter, the 
conceptualisation of trust, in the context of mandated business interactions, is 
addressed by a critical analysis of the findings of this research. By considering 
how trust operates in mandated business interactions, the nature of trust in 
this particular type of business interactions is explored leading to a new 
contextual concept of trust.  
Additionally, before presenting the method by which the levels of trust were 
assessed in this chapter, it is of primary importance to recall that there are 
fourteen embedded cases in this study, each of which is a relationship 
between a large company and SMEs. Figure 4 illustrates the embedded cases. 
For instance, the National Large Company 1 appearing on the left side of the 
figure is analysed separately, and the level of trust finally is presented in 
connection with the SMEs that were engaged in business interaction with the 
same company (see figure 4).  
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Figure 4 The embedded cases engaged in this study 
 
The 14 relationships engaged in this study were obtained from the projects 
which were commenced by large companies and SMEs under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Additionally, all the SMEs 
are owned by men in their 30s or 40s, who are well educated, had previous 
jobs, but then established independent companies as a better source of 
income by working in public projects alongside large companies under the 
supervision of government. 
As stated in chapter two sections: 2.8.1 to 2.8.4, four indicators were used to 
ascertain the levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in mandated 
business relationships in this study.  
The first indicator is the recurrence of contractual arrangements. It is described 
as a situation where business partners tend to have repeated joint projects or 
where the large company repeatedly uses the SME company as a sub-
contractor and the SME repeatedly accepts these contracts. Repeated 
contractual arrangements between business partners signify a high state of 
trust. On the contrary, discharges of contracts between business partners at 
an early stage of business interactions indicate a low state of trust. 
The second indicator is the degree of formality. It is defined as the degree of 
reliance on formal contractual agreements and frequent control in the 
relationship between the large company and the SME. It implies some degree 
of suspicion by one party of the motives of the other party.  Hence, when the 
formalities between partners is reduced to the minimum, it indicates a high 
degree of trust, whereas, high formalities indicate a low trust level. 
Engagements of large 
companies & SMEs 
National Large 
company 1
National Large 
company 2
Joint Venture 1 Joint Venture 2 Subsidiary 1 Subsidiary 2
SME 
1
SME 2
SME 
1 SME 2
SME 1 SME 2 SME 1 SME 2 SME 1 SME 2 SME 1 SME 2
SME 
3 SME 
3
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The third indicator – interdependence - is described as a situation where 
business partners make a mutual commitment to the relationship. The 
partners, in high trust situations, attempt to invest in the asset of the other 
partner as both partners rely on each other for the business purpose. In this 
regard, interdependence for mutual interest between large companies and 
SMEs is set to signify a high level of trust, whereas interdependence for self-
interest and exploitation is set to designate a lower trust level.  
The final indicator - reciprocity in information exchange - can be seen in a 
situation where business partners share information about business 
opportunities, share experiences and strategies and sometimes disclose 
useful information about business partners to a third party. Hence, trust can 
be seen when the information exchanged between the partners is deemed to 
be valuable and the outcome leads to psychological and/or economic benefits 
for both parties. Thus, to ascertain the level of trust using this indicator, positive 
and valuable flows of information between large companies and SMEs would 
indicate a higher level of trust whereas low levels or only low value of 
information flows would be regarded as indicating a low level of trust. The 
following table (Table 6) summarises these trust indicators:  
Table 6 Summary of trust indicators and their scopes in each level of trust. 
 
 
Trust Indicators 
            Levels of trust indicated  
High  Low 
Recurrence of contractual 
Arrangements 
Repeated business 
interaction 
Single and discontinued 
business interaction 
 
Degree of formalities 
Less formalities and control in 
the business interactions  
More formalised, frequent and 
systematic control 
Level of interdependency Relationships where both 
partner rely on each other for 
mutual benefits 
Relationships based solely on 
the self-interest of one party  
Reciprocity in information 
exchange 
Two-way flow of information 
and experiences which are 
valuable 
Information exchanged is 
intentionally of limited 
usefulness  
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Critical analysis of trust levels between business partners 
The four trust indicators illustrated in Table 6 proved to be useful for signifying 
levels of trust between business partners. These are further elaborated in 
Table 7 following this discussion. However, following this analysis of trust 
levels between large companies and SMEs in mandated business 
interactions, this study stresses that naïve reliance on these four trust 
indicators should be avoided in favour of a more nuanced approach. What is 
evident from the findings of this study is that the tripartite nature of mandated 
business interactions, which also involved the government in the relationship 
between large companies and SMEs, has changed the dynamic of the 
business relationship and consequently, the nature of trust in the relationship. 
Consequently, influential issues were taken into consideration during the 
analysis to detect more authentic levels of trust. For instance, considering 
recurrence of business interaction as a trust indicator, it was found that some 
large companies repeatedly engaged SMEs for the sole purpose of preserving 
future public projects. Actually, a high trust level between large companies and 
SMEs was revealed when the recurrence of interactions with the same partner 
was found to continue despite the availability of alternative business 
opportunities with other large companies in the market. Moreover, a high level 
of trust was detected when recurrence of interactions had taken place even 
after having several attempts with other available business opportunities in 
which trust had failed to develop. This was largely perceived by owners of 
SMEs. Hence, it is not simply the recurrence of business interactions, per se, 
but the meaning attached to such recurrence by the partners. 
Similarly, in the case of the second of these trust indicators, degree of 
formality, it is difficult to say that trust was high when the formality level was 
low and vice versa. Instead, it was the meaning that degree of formality held 
for the partners which was significant. Some large companies exposed 
themselves to considerable risk and gave their small partners carte blanche to 
arrange all essential materials without any need for prior approval form their 
large partners. In these cases, the large partner appeared to be magnanimous 
and the superficial view of such low degree of formality could be viewed as a 
signal of a high trust when, in fact, the perception of their small partners was 
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totally the opposite. Large companies could have less formalised deals in 
order to exploit the creativity and innovativeness of SMEs. Because of 
resource constraints, power imbalance and limited management levels, 
owners of SMEs could have limited degrees of formality when dealing with 
large partnering companies. One could view this as a high level of trust when, 
in fact, there might be no trust at all. Although, the outcome of the analysis 
supports the association between less formalised deals, such as having the 
autonomy to make purchases and use of other resources without having a 
formal deal or the need for formal approval between partners, yet, levels of 
trust can be more appropriately assessed by looking at what has been 
perceived by either of the partners in terms of degree of formality compared to 
consequences and outcome of those limited formalities.  
With regards to the third trust indicator, i.e. interdependency, it is important to 
recognise that interdependency signalling high trust in mandated business 
interactions is not limited to the interests of both partners to invest cost and 
efforts in the relationship, but is also based on the interest of the government 
which actually founded the mandated form of interaction. Hence, high trust 
was also signalled when both partners collaborated throughout the project in 
order to impress the government and to ensure its approval for the sourcing 
and cost of quality material to be used in the project. 
Finally, considering reciprocity of exchange as a trust indicator, it must be 
admitted that it is not merely how independent business partners exchange 
information or experiences that could determine levels of trust. Again, because 
of the involvement of the government in the tripartite relationship, business 
partners had to, on some occasions, pass misleading information to the 
government representatives about the other partner and that both partners 
understood that passing such misleading information still served the interests 
of both companies. More precisely, the content of the information its accuracy, 
timeliness and credibility was of less importance than the fact of sharing 
information in the first place. Hence, information exchanged in mandated 
business interaction can be inaccurate but can still indicate high trust levels.  
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The following table (Table 7) summaries categorisation of trust levels. The 
table shows that 8 of the 14 business relationships were successful while 
interacting in mandated business interactions. The confidence in these 
relationships was a result of various sources of trust. In the other six cases, 
there did not seem to be any hope of developing trusting business 
relationships; hence, SMEs had to quit the business within their first business 
interaction.   
However, it is worth noting that because informants of large contracting 
companies tended to provide somewhat general views and perceptions about 
their smaller partners rather than case specific information, trust levels, in each 
case, were catogrised as high and low based primarily on the responses of 
owners of SMEs whose perceptions were generally rich and nuanced and 
case specific.   
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Table 7 Summary of the levels of trust in each case engaged in this study. 
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Summary of the cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N1 
 
 
 
SME1 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the last 4 
years 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
High & 
positive 
 
 
High, 
Characteristic 
based 
The case experienced high level of trust from 
both sides which was extensively attributed to 
the distinctive characteristics of partners such as 
commitments and interest showed to 
development of productive business 
relationships.  
 
 
 
SME2 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the last 4 
years 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
High & 
positive 
 
 
High, 
Characteristic 
based 
This case experienced dramatic trust 
development between N1 and SME2. Trust was 
slightly disturbed in the middle of the business 
interaction and intervention of public institution 
would have resolved the disturbance but the due 
to the trust formed about N1, the problem was 
resolved at inter-organisational level.  
 
 
SME3 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the last 3 
years 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
High & 
positive 
 
 
High 
Characteristic 
based 
The relationship experienced high trust at both 
inter-organizational and at interpersonal levels. 
Role of tribal norms was the reason behind 
existence of trust at interpersonal level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SME1 
Quit from 
the first 
business 
interaction 
which just 
lasted for 
nine 
months. 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
Low & 
negative 
 
 
 
 
Low 
This relationship experienced low state of trust 
from both sides. N2 attributed the failure of 
mandated business interactions with SMEs to 
the structure of the policy set by the government, 
to the discouraging characteristics of SMEs, and 
to the size of business N2 had. In contrast, owner 
of SME1 made several attempts aiming to 
develop trusting relationship with N2. 
 
 
 
SME2 
Quit from 
the first 
business 
interaction
s once 
SME2 
found 
partner 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
Low 
This relationship experienced a low state of trust 
from both sides. From N2 perspective (As in the 
case of N2-SME1). From SME2 perspective: 
several behavioural issues preventing 
development of forming productive business 
relationship based on trust.  
 
 
 
SME3 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the last 
four years. 
 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
This relationship experienced low state of trust 
from both sides. From N2 perspective (As in the 
case of N2-SME1). In contrast to the above two 
cases, SME3 had a continuing business 
interaction which seemed to be a result of 
different factors which will be presented in 
chapter five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S1 
 
 
 
SME1 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the last 
four years 
 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
Institutional 
based trust  
 
S1 advocated “a win-win” strategy to engage 
SMEs in productive business relationship based 
on trust. From the perspective of SME1, the 
mediating role played by government 
representatives was the basis for trust to develop 
between S1 and SME1.  
 
 
 
SME2 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
last 5 
years. 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
High, 
characteristic 
& institutional 
 
This relationship experienced high trust level 
from both sides and different factors played vital 
role in trust development between the two 
partners. 
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S2 
 
 
 
SME1 
 
Quit within 
the first 
business 
interaction 
 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
Low and 
express
ed from 
both 
sides 
 
 
Low 
This case experienced low trust level. S2 
experienced around 20% leaving their sites at 
initial stage of the business interactions. S1 
attributed the failure to discouraging 
characteristics of appointed SMEs. In contrast, 
SME1 attributed the failure to several 
characteristic based factors.  
 
SME2 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the last six 
years 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
High 
Characteristic 
Based 
 
This case experienced high trust and trust went 
to an extent that S2 recommended SME2 to well-
esteemed company in Oman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JV1 
 
 
 
 
SME1 
 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis for 
the five 
years 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
High 
Characteristic 
Based  
JV1, due to unfavourable characteristics of 
SMEs had a low level of trust in appointed SMEs. 
However, owners of SMEs who had access to 
public officials were favoured by JV1. In contrast, 
owner of SME1 initially experienced several 
challenges but eventually succeeded in 
developing high level of trust.  
 
 
 
SME2 
 
Quit from 
first 
business 
interaction 
 
Not 
revealed 
 
Not 
revealed 
 
Not 
revealed 
 
Low 
JV1 attributed the low trust to the poor 
characteristic of SMEs. Owner of SME2 
attributed the failure to different factors and his 
dedication to the business was the most 
influential one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JV2 
 
 
 
 
SME1 
 
 
Quit within 
the first 
business 
interaction 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High at the 
beginning  
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
Low 
JV1 attributed its low level of trust in appointed 
SMEs to their weakness and inability to meet 
expectations of large partners. In contrast, owner 
of SME1 reported several constraints which, in 
fact, did not only destroy trust formed with JV1 
but also demolished his potential hope of 
partnering with large companies.    
 
 
 
 
SME2 
Interacting 
in 
continuing 
basis & 
worked 
with JV2 
in three 
projects 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
Institutional 
based trust 
 
JV1 attributed its low level of trust in appointed 
SMEs to their weakness and inability to meet 
expectations of large partners. In contrast to the 
case of JV2-SME1, SME2 had high trust level 
which owner of SME2 attribute it to the mediating 
role played by the government  
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The following narratives present the perceived experiences and views of each 
large company and SMEs that were engaged in business interaction with the 
same company. Nevertheless, before presenting the narratives of each large 
company and its subcontracted SMEs in which the levels of trust was 
evaluated and assessed, it is primarily important to present the acronyms that 
are frequently recurring in the narratives and findings chapters. 
Table 8 presents the acronyms that are frequently recurring in the narratives 
and findings chapters. 
Table 8 Acronyms frequently recurring in the findings and discussion chapters 
PM Project Managers of large companies 
SE Site Engineers of large companies 
N1 National large company 1 
N2 National large company 2 
S1 Subsidiary large company 1 
S1 Subsidiary large company 2 
JV1 Joint venture large company 1 
JV1 Joint venture large company 2 
 
N1-SME1 
Is the acronym to describe perceptions of the embedded 
case in business relationship of N1 and the SME1 
MTC Ministry of Transport and Communication 
MOM Ministry of Manpower 
TBO Tender Board of Oman 
 
It is worth noting that due to the space limitations, transcripts of projects 
managers and site engineers of each large company were compared and 
merged according to similarity of contents. The transcripts of large companies 
were then compared and contrasted with the transcripts of subcontracted 
SMEs.  
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4.1 The first national large contracting company - N1 
N1 is one of the leading Omani road infrastructure development companies 
founded in 2000 with a small number of machines and manpower. The owner 
of N1 and his team, managed largely by Omani personnel, succeeded in 
establishing a construction company within a span of 5 years. N1 succeeded 
in building a long term relationship with its clients but mainly with the Ministry 
of Transport and Communication (MTC). The total value of work orders the 
company received from the MTC in 2014 exceeded $84 million of which $8.4 
million was reserved for subcontracted SMEs. 
Based on the first trust indicator, i.e recurrence of business interactions, N1, 
in particular, was found to have many repeated contractual business 
relationships with SMEs. In fact, the PM (Project Manager) of N1 presented a 
long list of SMEs with which N1 had been engaged over a substantial number 
of years indicating an openness and readiness to enter into repeated and 
longer term business relationships based on trust.  
‘See this list, look how we carry them. Here is a list of SMEs; [N1] 
engaged them on a continuing basis’. 
N1 seemed to treat the mandated business interactions very seriously. This 
can be seen in the expression of the PM of N1 who explained that this 
encouraged many Omani youths to not only create their own companies but 
to think of being “real entrepreneurs” who could contribute to the economy as 
a whole. He emphasised that no company could produce 100% of the work; 
hence, N1 had always been willing to maintain trusting relationships with 
SMEs:  
‘We wish and we are ready to enter into constant and repeated 
business relationships based on trust. You go and ask them’. 
The positive attitudes of N1 seemed to encourage owners of SMEs to establish 
and develop productive business relationships based on trust. This was 
revealed by the PM of N1 who stated that his company experienced some 
appointed subcontracted SMEs who had initially miscalculated some costs 
while quoting for potential business opportunities. As a common practice in his 
company, the PM called up the owners of these SMEs to show them what they 
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had failed to consider while quoting for the work and came up with a solution 
which was mutually satisfactory as in the case of one SME: 
‘I had to call him, sat with him, and explained to him what he did not take 
into consideration. He thanked me for this and appreciated this effort and 
said I wish the other large companies become like yours’.  
In fact, the PM commented on the need to be patient with SMEs as they often 
lacked knowledge, know-how and efficiency in deploying human and capital 
resources. Being himself an Omani PM and consequently having an intimate 
understanding of the modus operandi in Oman, he expressed his knowledge 
of difficulties often faced by Omani owners of SMEs: 
‘I am Omani. I appreciate the effort that the government made; I 
believed, I already noticed some local SMEs growing. In the long run, 
this will certainly encourage Omani youth, not only to establish their own 
businesses, but to think of being real entrepreneurs’. 
Furthermore, the PM further reported with distress the game that large 
companies unfortunately played in order to bring about the failures of SMEs in 
order to justify not contracting with them in the future. He pointed out one tactic 
which was to assign SMEs difficult tasks and to give them work with little value 
which did not create a competitive market. According to him, he reported this 
tactic to some officials in the government hoping that they might put restrictions 
on this practice. Revealing the bad intentions of some large companies to the 
public officials, without any direct advantage to N1, illustrates how N1 cared 
for the SMEs.  
With regards to the second trust indicator, N1 seemed to have certain levels 
of formalities with appointed SMEs. N1 did have concerns about some SMEs 
whose employees’ records were not maintained to the government’s 
standards. It was stressed by the PM of N1 that to ensure SMEs were in 
compliance with the government requirements, N1 dedicated a section to look 
into the contractual procedures and to record the progress of subcontracted 
SMEs. According to the PM of N1, the primary work of this contracting section 
was to ensure that the potential partners had clear records including SMEs’ 
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profiles such as financial records and the legal status of employees. The PM 
expressed this in the following words:  
‘One of the works of the created section is to ensure appropriateness of 
SMEs records, ownership, employee’s, experience. It is important to 
ensure that SMEs with appropriate records receive our intention’. 
Despite the limited degree of formalities N1 had with SME, N1 seemed to relay 
only on those SMEs whose official records were kept appropriately. Besides 
this, it was also important for N1 to ensure that these SMEs were meeting the 
criteria set by the client and also to avoid any kind of responsibilities for which 
the company would be ultimately held responsible. 
Although SMEs were the weaker partners in these relationships, the PM of N1, 
nevertheless, always dealt with them in less formal ways: 
‘It is necessary to understand their positions, with little formalities and 
friendly ways of dealing, they became confident, and their progress was 
quite good’. 
A good example of this was seen in the response of the PM of N1 to a SME 
which had commenced work in an unacceptable way. The only action he took 
was to talk informally to the owner of the SME in his office asking him to rectify 
matters:  
‘I also advised the owner to pay attention to the work at the site. I 
recommended him to find another engineer if he feels that his engineer 
is not capable’. 
The project manager later expressed the outcome of such positive attitudes 
towards owners of subcontracted SMEs: 
’That’s why you may find many SMEs working with us on a regular basis’. 
The avoidance of formalities caused the owners of SMEs to feel confident and 
resulted in smooth progress being made at the work places. The limited level 
of formalities that N1 had with subcontracting SMEs can be indicated in the 
expressions of the Site Engineer (SE) of N1. The SE asserted that the 
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progress of the work in most of the locations he observed was due to the 
informal and friendly ways that N1 dealt with SMEs: 
‘Imagine, I found myself, and in many cases, coping with many issues 
at the site without even referring neither to the PM of his company nor 
to the owners of SMEs’. 
Besides the lack of formalities, N1 was also able to rely and depend on SMEs 
to the extent of entrusting 40% and sometime 50% per cent of the projects that 
they got from the government to SMEs. N1 experienced several instances in 
which SMEs started with N1 a couple of years before commencing civil works. 
These SMEs currently provided specialised services to N1 as well as to other 
large companies.  
The information revealed by the PM of N1 stressed that N1 could depend on 
those who were sincere and attentive, realistic, honest and well-organized. 
Some owners of SMEs attempted to attract the attention of N1 by displaying 
their products on the sites where N1 operated. N1 was also found dependent 
on appointed SMEs, particularly those who were more familiar with the local 
market and the surrounding environment. Such distinctive characteristic 
seemed to be advantageous to N1 and the SMEs. 
Besides interdependence which signified high trust levels, N1 seemed to 
exchange valuable information with SMEs and other large companies about 
SMEs. The PM said:  
‘Introducing service that appointed SMEs provide to other large sister 
companies was important to grow the confidence of SMEs’.  
Actually, the PM illustrated with a smile that N1 did not give rewards to SMEs 
but certainly shared with SMEs any opportunities which had arisen. It was also 
found important for N1 to have a common vision with SMEs. This helped them 
both to align the priority of the project and this was achieved by transparent 
communication between N1 and the SMEs.  
In conclusion, it was perceived by the informants of N1 that N1 generally dealt 
with SMEs in a fair and transparent way, gave them assistance in fulfilling their 
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contracts and was generous in allocating additional contracts to them beyond 
what was required by the mandated relationships. 
4.1.1 The embedded cases within N1 
N1-SME1 
N1-SME1 is a medium-sized enterprise. The initial work entrusted to SME1 by 
N1 was in 2012. This was a water drainage scheme. The second business 
opportunity appeared immediately after completing the first task and that was 
in February 2013. Since then, this medium company confidently worked with 
N1 in four more projects on a repeated business interaction basis.  
Recurrence of business interaction indicating high level of trust can be 
observed in the expression of the owner of SME1 who described the 
relationship with N1 as a distinctive one: 
‘I had several experiences. Without compliment [N1] is different and I 
only felt confident with [N1]’. 
There were several reasons for this company to confidently work with N1 in 
repeated interaction bases. One of the most important of these reasons was 
the possibility to recover any cost even those caused by unpredictable 
environmental disasters. An example of this was a situation when unexpected 
heavy rain flooded the valley and destroyed the majority of the work which his 
company had commenced for N1. In fact, the owner of SME1 had been waiting 
for the advice of the engineer of N1 to concrete the floor beams which were 
intended to be the foundation for the flyover in the valley. He presented and 
gave me a photo of the work before it was destroyed by the flood (see the 
picture below).  
‘My company would have collapsed, right, if I would have been with other 
company. By the way it was good the machines and rest of the 
equipment were shifted earlier to a higher level. They were safe. 
Immediately raised up the issue to the site engineer and to the PM. [N1] 
compensated the loss and I was fine’. 
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A high level of trust between SME1 and N1 can be observed in a number of 
places in the narrative of owner of SME1. Before SME1 had any relationship 
with N1, the owner of SME1 presumed that the involvement of government 
representatives in mandated business interactions was something essential to 
minimise the risk of his small company in entering into business interactions 
with large companies. However, his experience with N1 from this first business 
interaction had changed these views.  
A less formalised deal, indicating a high level of trust between SME1 and N1, 
can be observed in several quotations in this narrative. A clear example of this 
can be seen in the following statement:  
‘I did not have to bother myself with some formalities, [N1] and from the 
first business interaction; they completed most of formalities with the 
government, I always had smooth deal with [N1]’.  
The only formal practice the owner of SME1 revealed with N1 was when N1 
asked him and the owners of subcontracted SMEs to officially submit records 
of employees. Nevertheless, he did not regard this request of N1 as a negative 
one but rather as something which sorted out SMEs with proper employee 
records from those which did not keep proper records. He evidenced his claim 
by reporting an incident. This happened when the government of Oman, 
represented by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM), made an unannounced 
inspection to check on business owners' adherence to the labour laws which 
required companies to have an accurate list of their employees working on 
sites. During this visit, many subcontracted SMEs were caught violating the 
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rules except for a few companies which included his own company. As a 
consequence, he immediately received words of thanks and appreciation from 
the project manager of the contracting company. This appeared to enhance 
the state of trust, as was found in the case of SME1 and N1.  
‘Seriously, I wish other companies were like [N1]. For such behaviour, 
you know, once I commenced the work long time before receiving the 
work order’. 
Several favourable characteristics of N1 seemed to be important for trust to 
develop between SME1 and N1. It can be stated that it was easy for the owner 
of SME1 to approach representatives of N1 at any time to discuss any concern 
as N1 was owned and operated by an Omani. 
Besides the low level of formalities which indicated a high state of trust 
between this company and N1, both companies appeared to have an 
interdependent relationship which indicated high trust. This can be noticed 
from experiences revealed by the owner of SME1. For example, once, local 
suppliers had been hesitant to provide SME1 with the large quantity of 
materials that SME1 needed to commence the assigned task by N1, N1 
provided the owner of SME1 with certificates. The owner of SME1 stated: 
‘I spoke to the main contractor. I only requested for a letter, my company 
is working under [N1], Eng. Khamis provided me with certificates 
ensuring that [N1] could be responsible too’. 
This company and N1 appeared to rely on each other throughout their 
business interaction.  
Reciprocity of information exchange indicating a high level of trust is also found 
in the case of SME1 and N1. The goodwill of N1 towards the owner of SME1 
could be seen in the readiness of the owner of SME1 to discuss his entire plan 
to commence the potential business opportunity with the PM of N1 and also 
informing him about the available local suppliers: 
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‘I already had some personal relationships with some suppliers who 
were close to the site such as Alkalili group, and Mohammed Reyad. I 
discussed this with the project manager’. 
The owner of this company appeared to be confident that N1 would not utilise 
the disclosure of such information about local suppliers to directly arrange for 
the materials; rather, N1 was not hesitant to provide him with a letter informing 
the supplier about the relationship of this company with N1. Soon after 
completing the second task, the company received an invitation to participate 
in one of the major public projects in which N1 was taking part. N1 always 
informed the owner of this company about business opportunities before they 
were announced in public. 
The owner of SME1 reported that N1 was a high trusting business partner and 
attributed this to the interest which N1 had in developing trusting and 
productive business relationships. 
N1-SME2 
The first business interactions SME2 had with N1 was in 2012. While 
interacting with N1, owner of SME2 temporarily tried working with other large 
companies. Unpleasant experiences SME2 had with these companies were 
reported as being the main reason for the owner of SME2 to strengthen his 
business relationships with N1. A high level of trust exchanged between SME2 
and N1 appeared to be the motive for SME2 continuing interacting with N1. 
‘I had several experiences with other large contracting companies. 
Frankly speaking, I only felt confident with [N1] and so far I had four 
constant business relationships with [N1].’  
The owner of SME2 related his confidence in continuing work with N1 to the 
tolerance and understanding of N1. This can be noticed in the expression of 
the owner of SME2 who stated that he did not initially inform the SE of N1 
about the expertise that his company lacked in the road construction industry 
but raised this in the second meeting with the PM.  
‘I told the project manager of [N1], I will start the work, if I face any 
difficulty or feel I can’t continue I will leave the work and go’. 
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The owner of SME2 was reported to have been pleased to hear the response 
of the PM of N1 who reassured him that it would not be necessary for him to 
leave as they would support his company in any difficulty. The owner of SME2 
reported that N1 provided him with most of the required technical and advisory 
assistance.  
The less formalized deal with N1 indicating high level of trust is evident in the 
case of N1-SME2. This can be noticed when N1 agreed to assign him an 
immediate work which included levelling and compaction of the road 
foundation of an approximate area of 10,000 square meters. The owner of 
SME2 actually mentioned that he only completed most of the formalities after 
he had actually started the work. This informal approach even extended to 
daily interactions:  
‘I was also not fully aware of calculation of some specific quantities and 
jobs. Every time, I had to knock the door of the engineer asking for 
assistance and guidance’. 
However, the good relationship which existed between SME2 and N1 began 
to change with the appointment of the new site engineer. This deterioration of 
trust between both partners was seen in the thought of SME2 planning to 
procure deals in the future by using more formal and official means. According 
to what was revealed by the owner of SME2, in the middle of the work, N1 
appointed a new engineer who was harsh and was not cooperating with SMEs. 
He emphasised that the engineer several times instructed him to make some 
changes to the work which he was about to complete; and according to the 
owner of SME2, these changes were not necessary. They were only money 
and time consuming. During that period, representatives from the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication (MTC) came for a site visit. However, due to 
the good past experiences he had with N1, he did not discuss or raise this 
concern with them. The attitude of the new site engineer immediately changed 
when he raised the complaint to the PM of N1. The following quotation 
revealed the outcome of the complaint that the owner of SME2 had raised with 
the PM of N1: 
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‘Anyways, this project manager immediately called him. He told him 
that my company was one of the SMEs which had been working on a 
constant base with [N1]’. 
According to the owner of SME2, the PM of N1 actually attributed the attitude 
of the new SE to his intention to be appointed to a higher position in N1.  
SME2 and N1 seemed to have a mutual interest in relying on each other while 
working in public projects. In fact, the owner of this medium company related 
several incidents in which his company would not have been able to 
commence the work independently: 
‘I did not have a surveyor; it was not easy for a small company like mine 
to employ a surveyor. I discovered that the main contractor will provide 
all subcontractors with surveyors’.   
The interdependency of N1 and SME2 can also be seen when the owner of 
SME2 was able to produce quality works because of the constant assistance 
received from N1 which eventually motivated N1 to consider SME2 on a 
continuing basis. The supportive and positive attitude of N1 was also met with 
special consideration by the owner of SME2: 
 ‘It is always, see, when I noticed such initiative, in return, I give the main 
contractor reasonable prices, you know, I started with little experience, I 
learned lots when I interacted with [N1]’.  
With regards to the fourth trust indicator, SME2 and N1 were shown to have 
exchanged valuable information and experience which indicated a high level 
of trust. The owner of this company admitted that before he had any 
relationship with N1, his company had no experience of the nature of road 
construction works, thus, he had to refer to engineers of N1 when his company 
required supports. The owner of SME2 also revealed that N1 had constantly 
been exchanging information about business opportunities. 
Due to the trusting relationship formed with N1, this company currently has its 
own civil engineer, a surveyor, and 23 people handling technical and driving 
jobs and also operates with some of its own road construction equipment. 
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Generally, SME2 had always placed a high trust level in N1. Even on 
occasions when trust was under threat because of the actions of some 
representatives of N1, when an opportunity arose to discuss such threats with 
the representative of the government, the SME2 owner did not do so as he 
had a strong belief in the intentions of the management of N1 towards SMEs. 
N1-SME3 
The initial business interaction this company had in public projects was in 
2013. The opportunity of participating in this project came late for the owner; 
because the work and the percentage which was supposed to be allotted to 
SMEs had already been allocated. N1 and many SMEs, by this time, had 
already started the work at the site. However, the interest that N1 showed 
towards local SMEs was what encouraged the owner of SME3 to engage in 
repeated business interactions with N1.  
‘When I began to see the chances, I started thinking, how can I utilise 
the business opportunities. I noticed. I mean [N1] had the commitment 
to Omani owners of SMEs, not like other large companies’.  
This high trust level based on recurrence of business interaction can be seen 
when the owner of SME3 stressed his confidence in N1 and reported that his 
company had continued its relationship with N1 for three further projects over 
two years. 
With regards to informal arrangements indicating high trust, the owner of 
SME3 narrated one experience. He reported that once, the representatives of 
N1 did not even ask for a guarantee or a surety for the advance payments 
which N1 made to SME3 in order to arrange for some required material to start 
commencing the work of second work assigned to him by N1: 
‘I had no cash to arrange for the required material, [N1] without asking 
for guarantee released two of my payments in advance’. 
This limited formality can also be seen in the first business interaction. This 
was when the owner of SME3 approached the Omani site engineer (SE) of N1 
to enquire about the availability of business opportunities with N1. The SE 
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suggested that he should start with the existing business opportunity. 
According to the owner of SME3, it was an open quantity of water supply. The 
owner of this small company treated the verbal and unofficial order of an open 
quantity of water supply as an encouraging message to work hard in which he 
thought he could obtain more valuable opportunities with N1 in the future. He 
also indicated that he was confident that the SE would never be unjust or take 
unfair advantage of the open quantity of water supply that SME3 was 
supposed to deliver based on verbal order by the SE.  
‘The site engineer was Omani, very kind. He was from well-known tribe. 
I started the work with the verbal order and I was only telling the one in 
charge about the quantity I was delivering’. 
The business interactions that this small company had with N1 were reported 
to be the reasons for expanding its size and its business activities.  
SME3 and N1 were found to have an interdependent relationship which 
indicated a high level of trust. In fact, the owner of SME3 asserted that N1 had 
always been investing money and efforts in his SME. This is evident from the 
fact that N1 was prepared to release payments in advance and to offer advice 
and guidance to the SME. The owner of this small company has attributed his 
confidence to work with N1 in interdependent business relationships to the 
valuable nature of work that N1 often assigned to SMEs. He asserted that N1 
did not tend to dominate over every opportunity, and this is what actually 
encouraged him to always seek for further valuable business opportunities 
with N1. 
With regards to the fourth trust indicator, this small company and N1 were 
found to have exchanged information about business opportunities which 
indicated high trust levels between the two company. This can be seen in the 
expression of the owner of this company when he asked the SE of N1 about 
business opportunities that would make his life better. He described the 
response of the SE: 
‘He immediately replied, he mentioned several civil works. He said, 
riprap bridge beam structures’. 
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He expressed that, given the various choices; he agreed to start with the riprap 
work which was the least complicated and most convenient work. His company 
had to arrange the materials during the weekends and worked on the site 
during the week. This company did its best to show its interest even to handling 
potentially higher scale activities with N1. He further expressed his gratitude 
towards N1 and said: 
‘I realized this, rather than [N1], imagine, most of large contracting 
companies leave you without even saying words of thanks, nor they give 
you a hope for further potential business opportunities’. 
Generally, he had high confidence in N1 and he wished other companies 
would follow the same path and not exploit entire works of public projects. He 
attributed his high state of trust to the supporting Omani management of N1 
as well as to the goodwill shown by representatives of N1 towards creating 
productive and trusting business relationships.  
4.1.2 Summary of the state of trust between the first national large 
company (N1) and the subcontracted SMEs engaged with N1 
The goodwill and potential interest N1 showed in developing productive 
business relationship with the follow Omani owners of SMEs based on trust 
was confirmed by the owners of SMEs. Representatives of N1 expressed how 
the strategy N1 followed in dealing with SMEs enhanced the level of trust 
between them and their small partners. As a consequence, the three owners 
of SMEs related their confidence and high level of trust to the distinctive 
characteristics of N1 which eventually motivated them to put in their best 
efforts just to confirm their interest in developing trusting business 
relationships with N1. Most noteworthy, in this regard, were the interactions 
which began in the three relationships without direct intervention from the 
government, although the government did intervene later through supervision 
and inspections.  
The sincerity revealed by N1 in engaging with SMEs in compliance with 
government rules and regulations was appreciated by the owner of SME1 who, 
during the interview, expressed how grateful he felt towards N1. This was in 
relation to a significant incident in which certain subcontracted SMEs were 
101 
 
caught violating the rule with the exception of a few companies including 
SME1.  
The owner of SME1 related his confidence in working with N1 to the good 
experience his company had had with N1 even with unpredictable disasters 
such as the flood. Furthermore, minimum formality in deals was expressed by 
representatives of N1 as aimed at raising the confidence of their smaller 
partners and was highly appreciated by owners of SMEs. Most of them 
expressed various experiences to depict the high state of trust they had with 
N1 which differed from their relationships with other large contracting 
companies. Both the owner of SME1 and SME2 emphasised that several 
times they had commenced the work based on verbal agreements before 
receiving the official documents. 
Similarly, the intention of creating interdependent relationships revealed by N1 
was confirmed by owners of SMEs. Most of them related their confidence and 
high state of trust to the confidence they had in N1 especially in investing in 
their SMEs which eventually helped them in expanding their business 
activities. A clear example of this can be seen in the case of SME3. 
With regards to reciprocity of information exchange, it can be noticed that both 
representatives of N1 as well as owners of SMEs had high confidence in 
exchanging information and experiences which were essential for both 
partners to work in an efficient manner.  
All owners of SMEs attributed their high trust level and success to the 
distinctive characteristics of N1 and its management which had always been 
supporting.  
Trust operated in these relationships in ways which differed from how it is 
presented in the literature related to interactions of choice. The main difference 
was the tripartite nature of mandated business interactions in which both 
partners tried to meet government’s expectations by complying with the 
government’s rules and regulations. A new contextual concept of trust, based 
on mandated business interactions began to emerge from the interview data 
and this is explored in greater depth in chapter six.  
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4.2 The second national large contracting company - N2 
N2 is one of the nation’s largest construction companies owned by an Omani 
but managed and operated by expatriates, mostly from India. N2 prides itself 
as being one of the largest employers of Omani nationals in the Private Sector. 
The Ministry of Transport and Communication, in 2014 alone, awarded N2 
projects worth approximately $ 261,186 million, and out of this total value, an 
amount of $ 26,118 million was reserved for SMEs.  
With regards to the engagement of SMEs in public projects, N2 appeared to 
have had very few repeated contractual arrangements with SMEs in mandated 
business interaction due to the lack of trust which he placed in SMEs. The PM 
of N2 said: 
‘Handful of SMEs succeeded in having constant and lasting 
relationships with [N2]’.  
The PM of N2 attributed this lack of trust in SMEs to the fact that even after 
receiving a contract from N2, SMEs seemed more interested in finding 
contracts with other large companies rather than prioritising the fulfilment of 
their existing contract with N2. N2 presumed that the reason which made the 
majority of SMEs seek out such opportunities with other companies was 
basically due to their weakness and inability to comply with the parameters set 
by N2. The PM said: 
‘Imagine, you expect something that we both agreed for and at the end 
you don’t find what you expect them to do. Working up to our 
expectations is a must’. 
From the perspective of N2, the project manager (PM) emphasised the need 
to investigate the abilities of SMEs to cope with large companies while 
operating in public projects. N2 seemed to be unhappy with the appointed 
SMEs and N2 found that the majority of SMEs were lacking basic knowledge 
of business as well as not having sufficient capital and human resources to 
cope with the requirements of N2. Hence, N2 was not willing to have repeated 
contractual relationship with SMEs. 
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N2 did not trust appointed SMEs. The PM stated that he was disappointed with 
many of the owners of SMEs who did not show any sense of sincerity. He 
described their attitudes in the following terms: 
‘Until owners of SMEs put their hands and work alongside with their 
employees I will not trust them’. 
Actually, the nature of the work that N2 wanted appointed SMEs to do required 
hard work and dedication which N2 did not see. Additionally, N2 did not like 
these SMEs because of their employees who had not been carefully selected. 
The PM of N2, who is an Indian said: 
‘Employees of these SMEs are from different origins and as you know 
that the Bangladeshi workforce is cheaper than Indian, also they cannot 
be easily led. They are arrogant in nature’.   
However, the minimum recurrence of business interaction with SMEs was 
found to be related to other unfavourable characteristics of SMEs. The PM of 
N2 recounted several incidents in which majority of SMEs approached N2 
without providing realistic quotations and that N2 had no time to deal with this 
matter:  
‘I experienced some of them who approach us without considering the 
risk and they don’t learn from their mistakes’.  
Similarly, the (Site Engineer) SE of N2 reported several incidents in which he 
had heard the owners of SMEs complaining to the representatives from the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication who visited the sites. SE of N2 
reported that owners of these SMEs complained about the nature and low 
value of the work allotted to them by N2 which, according to him, N2 could not 
do anything to change. The SE highlighted the fact that the completion of 
public projects was the main concern and that his company was not concerned 
about having repeated business interactions based on trust: 
‘Confidence does not exist in our dictionary, completing the given task 
perfectly and within time is what concerns [N2]’. 
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N2 related the failure of having repeated business interactions with SMEs to 
the structure of the mandated business strategy which led many SMEs to quit 
the business interaction due to the delay of payments from the government. 
The PM of N2 noted the need for the government to treat both parties equally. 
He stated that the government insisted on N2 releasing payments to SMEs in 
28 days whereas, the government delayed payments to N2 for a year or more 
and this was not acceptable. As a consequence of the perceived unfair deal 
with the government, the PM of N2 expressed the knock-on effect on the 
relationship which such unfair practices might cause:  
‘When the relationship with the government fails, the relationship with 
our subcontractors also fails’. 
With regards to degree of formality, N2 was found to have mitigated the risk of 
partnering with SMEs in public projects by having fully-fledged sets of 
agreements in which the interests of N2, particularly from the government 
perspective, was protected and secured. Actually, the PM stressed that 
appointed SMEs were tied by contracts in which there were penalties for delay 
of works or any other concerns.  
With regards to interdependency, the PM of N2, having revealed his 
experiences with SMEs, had no hope of developing any interdependence of 
relationships with SMEs: 
‘We rarely depend on anybody, and we are sure that most of SMEs do 
not have the capacity to execute any given work’. 
However, as will be seen later in the analysis of the SMEs’ perceptions on this 
matter, there is a conflict of perceptions here which raises the issue of whether 
N2 was being prejudicial or not. The PM of N2 indicated that he was not 
confident at all about their ability to commence the work efficiently. Similarly, 
the SE recounted several experiences in which he found that the majority of 
SMEs had required regular assistance which he was not free to give. In the 
view of N2, the government was supposed to provide Omani owners with 
some management courses and financial and technical support which the 
government did not seriously take into consideration. Due to the above 
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mentioned reasons, N2 preferred to work on its own instead of depending on 
subcontracting SMEs.  
‘See, you must understand that [N2] is a huge and well known 
contracting company. We have most needed equipment which we try to 
deploy in our work… this is in any projects… as much as we can.  
As a result of such negative impressions of SMEs, N2 did not see any 
necessity for exchanging knowledge or experiences with SMEs. Actually, the 
PM asserted that, in order for him to believe in the necessity of exchanging 
knowledge and business opportunities, he firstly wished to see some initiatives 
such as employing the right people and being honest in stating what they had 
to offer in terms of resources. Almost similar impression was revealed by the 
Site Engineer (SE) of N2 but with different issues and concerned. The SE 
expressed several cases in which he experienced many owners of SMEs not 
willing to express their difficulties arguing that it was also possible to think of 
alternatives, the PM said:  
‘But I don’t see any problem in telling their difficulties, we will not take an 
instant action, I mean think of alternatives like replacing them’. 
His point of view was that articulating their problems was important so that the 
work was not impeded and to avoid incurring penalties for delays. 
N2 was not satisfied with the strategy of mandated business interactions and 
as revealed by the informants of N2 that there was no hope of developing 
trusting and productive business relationships with appointed SMEs. N2, 
throughout its experiences of working with SMEs, had always a low state of 
trust in them. 
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4.2.1 The embedded cases within N2 
N2-SME1 
The first mandated type of business experience SME1 had was with N2 in 
2013. The opportunity arose when he was checking for available business 
opportunities that had been initiated under the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (MTC). It was expressed by the owner of this SME that he had 
no clue about the importance of the MTC to N2, he attempted to attract the 
attention of N2 representatives in two ways; firstly, he thought about the 
delivery of the required quantity of specified materials which N2 instantly 
needed and, secondly, the owner of SME1 engaged the assistance of other 
SMEs to complete the work allotted to SME1 and provided N2 with the profiles 
of those SMEs. N2 was able to use the second action of SME1 to their own 
advantage by creating the impression with government officials that N2 was 
actually engaged with many SMEs not only SME1, in order to attract more 
public projects in the future. 
The owner of the SME tried to attract the attention of N2 by completing the 
assigned work within the time frame. This was also witnessed by engineers of 
N2 who stated that the work had been achieved with a high degree of quality. 
Despite his efforts, the owner of SME1 asserted that he did not have any hope 
in developing or having repeated business interaction based on trust with N2.  
‘I experienced [N2], several times, they approached me and other SMEs 
when they were not in a position to handle many public projects on their 
own, I know them very well'. 
After this first and the only experience of working with N2, the owner of SME1 
was invited to work with N2 but he refused due to the bad experience he had 
had with N2. 
The owner of SME1 reported several incidents to express the low trust level 
he had with N2. First, N2, retracted parts of contract which had been initially 
assigned to his company by purposefully delaying payments in order to limit 
his capacity to complete the works:  
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‘[N2] purposefully delayed my payments. It was just to limit my progress 
and my efficiency. They always play stupid games’.  
The failure of having repeated business interaction based on trust was not 
found to be limited to delay of payments; the owner of SME1 reported several 
other tactics employed by N2. One other reported ploy used by N2 was to 
spend so much time checking quantities delivered which resulted in holding 
up his work. It was mainly the perseverance and independence of this owner 
which enabled him to overcome the lack of government interventions which 
according to him were necessary to minimise the power and control of N2. 
Because the project was at an advanced stage, the government 
representatives were rarely seen visiting the site. The owner of this company 
seemed to be in a hopeless position with N2 especially when he hired 
equipment, tools and workforces from other SMEs to commence the work 
assigned to him by N2. He sums up his experience: 
‘I have faced many challenges to cope with the main contractor but did 
not succeed, I realised that there was no hope’. 
With regards to the second trust indicator (i.e degree of formality), the 
relationship between SME1 and N2 was found to have been characterised by 
a high degree of formality. Actually, the owner of SME1 perceived that the 
restriction set by N2 was another impediment to the development of trust with 
N2. N2 offered SME1 an opportunity to do some levelling work in addition to 
the first assigned work order but the owner of SME1rejected the offer. The 
rejection was due to two reasons. The first reason was related to restrictions 
set by N2 in checking the quantity delivered by SME1 every time. The second 
was due to checking upon sincerity of the PM of N2 in developing productive 
and repeated interactions based on trust with the SME1. To check upon 
sincerity of the PM of N2, the owner of SME1 said: 
‘I said to them I don’t have the cash to arrange the required resources’. 
The owner of SME1 stated that the PM of N2 had agreed to provide him with 
some financial assistance but again put many formal restrictions on this 
assistance. The assistance was accompanied by stringent methods of 
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inspections without paying attention to or acknowledging the sincerity and 
commitment which he had already shown in the first assigned job.  
With regards to interdependency, the experience this company had with N2 
showed the minimum of interest of SME1 and N2 in establishing a relationship 
based on interdependency and mutual interest.  
‘After realizing the intention of [N2], my concern was to gain as much as 
I could of this interaction just to strengthen; I mean to grow my company’. 
From this statement, it can be revealed that the owner of SME1 had no interest 
in developing further his relationship with N2. The lack of interdependency, 
indicating a low trust level, was recounted in several incidents. SME1, within 
the second allotted work by N2 had arranged for most of the required tools 
and equipment and started the levelling work which N2 had basically 
requested SME1 to do alongside the delivery order. However, N2 retracted 
part of the allocated work and began using N2’s resources to complete the 
work rather than relying on SME1. These incidents soured relationships 
between them and led to the breakdown of trust.  
N2 shared information about a business opportunity when N2 was not in a 
position to handle the work on its own. The owner of this medium company 
asserted that he was only called when N2 was under pressure and needed to 
delegate some tasks to him.  
The owner of this SME attributed his unpleasant experience with N2 even in 
exchanging information about business opportunities to the fact that it was 
managed and operated by expatriates, mostly from India. The owner of this 
small company asserted that N2 was favouring and supporting SMEs 
managed and operated by Indians. Hence, until Omani personnel were 
appointed on managerial posts of these large contracting companies, he 
decided not to engage in any relationships. 
‘[N2] is mostly managed and operated by Indians. The project managers 
in most of these large companies must be Omani, Omanis are more loyal 
to the country, to the national entrepreneurs, and to the owners of 
SMEs’.  
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SME1 left N2 with a bad impression and had a low level of trust throughout his 
business interaction with N2. 
N2-SME2 
The first business interaction SME2 had with N2 was in 2013. His brother, who 
was an employee of N2, encouraged and supported him by putting in a word 
with N2 for him. The profit margins which were anticipated by the owner of this 
medium enterprise in the first business interaction were low. Nevertheless, due 
to the need to cover various expenses, he agreed to take it. SME2 quit the 
business with N2 during this first business relationship.  
The power position of N2 in the market and its powerful influence, even at 
government level, appeared to be one of the main reasons which led to SME2 
quitting the business with N2 within the first business interaction. The owner 
of SME2 illustrated how N2 had strong network with public officials to an extent 
that N2 paid minimum attention to the mandated policy. N2 was perceived to 
have power even over the government. The interviewee expressed the power 
of N2 in these terms: 
‘I heard that [N2], once, threatened the government, if the government 
decided to limit their scope in public projects. Yes, it is no wonder. They 
said they would release the Omani employees working with [N2] if the 
government tries to limit their participations in public projects. 
SME2 emphasised its bad impression of N2 starting with their first and only 
business relationship. In fact, the intention to discontinue business interaction 
was evident when the large partner (N2) decided on its own to take away the 
supply order of the material and to only assign the civil work to SME2. This 
happened without any prior notification in the case of N2-SME2. The owner of 
SME2 stressed that N2 put his company in a serious situation especially when 
he had already placed the order for the materials. This company was again 
irritated with the constant instructions of the SE of N2. This was to make 
changes to the assigned work which had basically been good as witnessed by 
an engineer of another company working at the same site.  
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However, the deals between SME2 and N2 were found to change and improve 
when the government officials paid visits to the sites: 
‘It happened couple of times, when government representatives visit the 
site, their way of dealing was different, it became better’. 
With regards to degree of formality as the second trust indicator, it was clear 
in the transcript of the owner of this small company that the use of formal 
methods of dealing was the only option for him to minimise the control and 
power of N2. However, the use of a formal deal did not please the 
representative of N2 and, as a consequence, N2 later attempted to lengthen 
the procedures of releasing payments. Later on, this company faced difficulty 
even in terminating the first contract with N2. According to the owner of this 
small company, this was taken to make it difficult for his company to get into 
the business of another large company working in the same public project. 
SME2 was about to go bankrupt but soon recovered after getting into another 
interaction with a national company which was owned and operated by Omani 
teams, unlike N2. The owner expressed his confidence and highlighted the 
difference between the two experiences in the following terms:  
‘In fact, I tried to avoid working for a company like [N2]. If you look at 
[N2], you will say it’s an Indian company. This national large company 
was totally different. Although it is not as large in size as [N2], but I am 
confident and happy’. 
With regards to interdependency, it was clear from the expression of the owner 
of SME2 that he had never experienced N2 investing any effort into the 
relationship instead, N2 used SMEs just to show the government 
representatives that they were engaging SMEs in public projects. Clearly, N2 
manipulated and distorted the government’s mandated policy, effectively 
rendering it ineffective.  
N2, in the view of the owner of this small enterprise, was an old company with 
multi-disciplinary business activities which also tended to not only dominate 
the market but also to dominate Omani staff working with N2. As a result of 
their dominance, even his own brother, who was working for N2, could not 
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tolerate the humiliating behaviour and practices of the management of N2 and 
had resigned his job: 
‘No. My brother left this company when he was harassed. Let me tell you 
one thing about [N2], it is full of Indians. You know that Indians try to 
control everything and do not allow Omani to work in peaceful 
environment’. 
With regards to reciprocity of information exchange, the interviewee expressed 
that his experience with N2 was the worst experience his company had ever 
had. SME2 and N2 never exchanged any information regarding opportunities 
or experiences; instead, both business partners were reported by the owner 
of this small company to have concealed information even about their 
intentions and this signalled low trust.  
SME2 had a low level of trust which ended up with the breakdown of the 
relationship, and this was particularly due to the discouraging characteristics 
of N2 and its management.  
N2-SME3 
N2-SME3 is a national medium enterprise established in 2009 with the core 
business of fixing of road safety crash barriers. This company received the 
opportunity to work with N2 due to government instruction. N2 was actually 
resistant to considering his application claiming that N2, at that time, did not 
have sufficient work required for a partnership with his company.  
Although, the owner of this medium company stressed that he was not quite 
happy with N2 and the trust throughout the interaction remained at the lowest 
level, he found the business interaction with N2 beneficial. Unlike the two 
earlier SMEs who did not manage to have repeated contracts with N2, SME3 
managed to have repeated and continuing interaction with N2 in the following 
two and half years. 
‘In general, it did work; this is my fourth business interaction since I 
started my business relationship with [N2]’.   
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The recurrence of business interaction between SME3 and N2 occurred 
despite the deal which seemed to be based on racism. The owner of SME3 
reported a conflict taking place between his employees and the employees of 
N2 and asserted that he was shocked to see the PM of N2’s resistance to 
accept the fact that it was employees of N2 who had started the conflict.  
‘Despite the mistake which was caused by employees of [N2], the project 
manager who is also Indian was defending. I had to raise it with the 
client’. 
The owner of this medium company attributed the discrepancy and position of 
the PM of N2 who was Indian to a racism issue. 
‘See, the majority of my employees are from Pakistan and they are 
polite, whereas majority of employees of [N2] are Indians, and you know 
the history of Indian and Pakistani’. 
The recurrence of business interactions existed between the partners despite 
the delay of payments to SME3 by N2 which N2 most often claimed was the 
government’s fault and not theirs:  
‘I already completed two phases and I already started the third one, 
when I spoke with the project manager, he told me that the [N2] did not 
release my payment because the payment was not yet received from 
the government. I told him it is your problem; I have a contract with you 
not with the government’.  
Besides the delay of payment, it was clear from the expression of the owner 
of SME3 that N2 attempted to use him to put pressure on the government 
representatives to release payments to N2. He was not clear about why N2 
had to do that but he asserted that not only his payments but payments of all 
SMEs were too small. When he followed up this matter with the government, 
he was told that N2 had submitted invoices for work in excess of what they 
had actually completed.  
The insincerity of N2 in establishing and developing productive business 
relationships based on trust can clearly be noticed in the relationship between 
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SME3 and N2. N2 sent a survey via email to all subcontracted SMEs to have 
their opinion about the deal with N2 (see Appendix 4). As stressed by the 
owner of this small company, the intention of N2 was just to convince the 
government that N2 was its role in mandated business interactions. Therefore, 
the owner of this medium company was hesitant to take part in the survey as 
N2 might negatively react against him:  
‘This contracting company may react against me; I wasn’t pleased with 
many issues including delay of payments’.  
With regards to degree of formality, this medium company experienced 
formalities with N2 as one of the big constraints. The detailed contracts 
appeared to go to such an extent that the Site Engineer (SE) of N2 was 
following every single step of his work. The owner of SME3 described this in 
the following statement: 
‘All of these things happen when you get tired, tied up with detailed 
contracts, things don’t go as you plan. They are not loyal to the country 
as we’. 
In the view of the owner of SME3, assigning small works which were not of 
great value and with detailed contracts to deliver quality works was one of the 
main impediments to developing a productive relationship based on trust with 
N2:  
‘I seriously thought of quitting this business and closing the company; I 
thought this would be the option to have peace of mind’. 
With regards to interdependency signalling level of trust, SME3 had no 
confidence that N2 had any intention to develop interdependent relationships 
based on trust; he asserted that N2 was simply using him and other SMES to 
satisfy their government obligation. In fact, the owner of SME3 illustrated an 
incident where the insincerity of N2 in creating interdependent relationships 
based on trust can be seen:  
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‘The company intentionally forced subcontracted SMEs to work behind 
their maximum capacities… I mean capacity of equipment. Within a few 
months only half of the SMEs were out of work because of over usage’.  
N2 attempted to use this tactic in order to utilise its own resources: 
‘This is just to convince the government representatives to allow [N2] to utilise 
their own resources instead of giving the portion away to SMEs’. 
With regards to reciprocity of information exchange, the owner of SME3 
reported an astonishing experience in which he received an email from N2 
thanking him for the past good experiences. However, the owner of this 
company eventually reported that he had a personal network in the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication (MTC), and this is where he was informed 
about every visit that the committee responsible to report about the mandated 
business interaction used to make visitations to the sites; this was to follow up 
and check upon the interaction between SMEs and large companies in 
mandated business interaction: 
‘I was not missing any of the committees’ visits. [N2] thought I had strong 
connection with MOT but this helped me a lot. They had to deal with me 
in, at least acceptable manner’.  
Due to his specialisation in health and safety, he attempted to attract the 
attention of N2 by delivering free health and safety courses for N2 employees. 
SME3 had a low level of trust and attempted to improve the relationship with 
N2 by delivering courses to employees of N2 as well as using the network he 
had with the public officials.  
4.2.2 Summary of the state of trust between SMEs and the second 
national large company - N2 
The transcripts of N2 and the three subcontracted SMEs 1, 2 and 3 indicate 
the low state of trust between N2 and the SMEs throughout their business 
interactions. Although the SMEs were engaged in the business chain of N2 
with government support, owners of SMEs did not see any hope of developing 
productive business relationships based on trust.  
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N2 initially attributed the failure of relationships with the SMEs to the 
government policy which forced large companies to release payments to 
SMEs in 28 days while the government itself delayed payments of N2 for more 
than a year. This practice was most unacceptable to N2. Additionally, N2 
asserted that trust of SMEs was constrained due to their limitations of business 
acumen and lack of resources. In contrast, most of SME owners reported their 
failures in developing trusting relationship with N2 despite their many attempts. 
No interpersonal or inter-organizational trust appeared in these relationships, 
only an attempt to create indirect interpersonal trust raised in the case of SME3 
and particularly when the owner of SME3 thought of employing Indians feeling 
this action would please the staff of N2 which was mainly Indian. The role of 
institutional trust was also evident in the same case and particularly when the 
network which the owner of SME3 had with public officials helped him to 
manage the relationship with representatives of N2. Surprisingly, the influence 
of public officials in the case of SME2 was not very strong as the government 
representative had only recommended the owner of SME2 to utilise his staff 
in another location where SME2 was commencing some work for N2 too. This 
showed that the well intentioned mandated government policy could be easily 
circumvented by N2 so that its real intentions were being nullified. 
4.3 The first subsidiary large contracting company - S1 
S1 is a subsidiary large company with diversified business activities. The 
Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC) is one of the major sources 
of projects for S1 in Oman. MTC in 2014 alone, awarded S1 projects worth 
approximately $ 289,655 million of which nearly $ 28,965 million were reserved 
to be commenced and completed by the appointed SMEs.  
S1 advocated a win-win situation in its strategy while interacting with SMEs. 
SMEs who succeeded in meeting the expectations of S1 were those who 
obtained repeated business interactions with S1. This can be seen in the 
expression of the Site Engineer (SE) of S1 who described an exceptional 
experience with one of the SMEs: 
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‘Because he was dedicated to the assigned work and his employees 
were productive, I requested the project manager to reserve another 
opportunity for him and at the same site’. 
In contrast, the PM of S1 narrated an experience with one of the appointed 
SMEs in which he had asked the owner of the subcontracted SME to quit the 
contract after a few months of the first business interaction. In this case, the 
SME was caught using less than the required quantity of material which was 
essential to ensure the highest quality of work. The PM of S1 stressed that this 
was done in order to save some money: 
‘Such things raise the bad taste in our mouth. I told the owner not to 
come into our business with low prices. Having the intention of doing 
faulty jobs is a major defect in our businesses’.  
Unfortunately, S1 also experienced some owners of SMEs coming with the 
intention of a hit and run operation by grabbing a quick job resulting in low 
quality work.  
‘Owners of SMEs must demonstrate their commitment. They must be 
transparent and should not hide things under the carpet. How can we 
trust them when they are insincere?’ 
S1’s win-win strategy came about for several reasons and the most critical one 
was expressed by the PM of S1: 
‘The majority of owners of these SMEs did not envisage the complexity 
of several activities; the mandated business interaction involves different 
parties, SMEs, large companies, and the government’. 
With regards to formalities, S1 treated contractual procedures as only 
preliminary information. The PM of S1 stated that he most often increased the 
work of SMEs whom he felt confident about from his site visitations.  
‘I noticed, when you don’t try to act smart or abuse them they become 
closer to you, I encouraged the productive ones by increasing their 
scope when I visited the sites. This makes them feel confident about 
[S1]’. 
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S1 avoided having formal deals with SMEs. This can be noticed when the PM 
of S1 recounted several incidents in which he called his site engineers and the 
representatives of SMEs in order to avoid a more formal procedure. An 
incident which had actually happened just prior to the interview. An owner of 
a medium company was in the office of the PM of S1 discussing the risk that 
his company was exposed to because of some miscalculation in the scope of 
work. The PM of S1 stated that he immediately agreed with the owner of this 
medium company, and the expected risk was confidently shared between the 
two. The PM evidenced this by showing me the initial agreement and showed 
how flexible both parties were in shar the risk. He further added that, taking 
such initiatives often resulted in greater loyalty on the part of SMEs and 
according to the PM of S1, trust was given a chance to develop by limited 
formalities, ignoring some mistakes and sharing risks. 
With regards to the interdependency, it was revealed by the PM of S1 that his 
company did not deal with SMEs merely to use their services, but to have 
interdependent relationships based on trust developed over time.  
‘What they lack and hinder them from coping with our business we try to 
solve it by providing direct and indirect assistance. This is our strategy’. 
However, S1 also took the view that SMEs needed to stand on their feet firmly, 
rather than being swept away by the winds of emotion as they were being 
supported by the government.  
Finally, with the principle of entering into business interactions with SMEs by 
advocating a ‘’win-win situation’’, S1 trusted those who were efficient and had 
been informing them about potential business opportunities. The PM of S1 
stated: 
‘Advocating a win-win situation made many of them think of long term 
consequences” 
Generally, S1 had a low state of trust with SMEs and this was due to their 
vulnerability and limited knowledge of business. S1 experienced some of them 
who were mostly relying on government intervention instead of standing on 
their feet firmly to discuss their challenges with S1 in order to overcome them.   
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4.3.1 The embedded cases within S1 
S1-SME1 
SME1 started with basic activities including a block factory in 2009 and later 
on became specialized in waterproofing works. This small company 
succeeded in having repeated contractual business interactions with S1. 
SME1 initially managed the relationship with the involvement of government 
representatives where he had to refer to these government representatives to 
comment on the instructions given by S1 which, according to the owner of 
SME1, was not always appropriate.  
SME1 reported two incidents to highlight the mediating role played by the 
government which eventually led to the development of trust between SME1 
and S2. The first of these incidents occurred when S1 rejected a delivery of 
certain materials made by SME1: 
 ‘The site engineer rejected some material which was largely used; the 
site engineer did not approve it. I had to raise it to the consultant who 
was appointed by the ministry; I told him I can’t work in such 
environment’. 
The government representative instructed that the material should be checked 
by an independent laboratory and the material was approved. The second 
incident happened when S1 instructed the owner of SME1 to commence some 
work in a nonsensical manner. The owner of SME1 was not convinced and 
accordingly asked the SE to give him the instruction in written form. This was 
for no reason but to protect the interest and image of his company.  
Again, the government representative was more inclined with the opinion of 
SME1. In both cases, government representatives were the mediators who 
defended the position of SME1 which eventually showed how they should deal 
with each other rather than looking at each other as large and small partners. 
With regards to degree of formality, the owner of SME1 stressed that prior to 
the involvement of the government, he had had a low level of trust in S1 and 
had even asked the site engineer to give him every instruction in written form. 
This was for no reason other than to protect the interest and image of his 
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company. However, after involving the government, the idea of dealing with 
S1 in an official manner changed. 
The owner of SME1 found the mediating role played by the government 
representatives essential and helpful until he proved his capability and 
developed trusting business relationships with S1. However, the self-
confidence in the efficiency of his company enhanced his position to work with 
S1 on a constant basis.  
‘Once I knew that what I am doing is right I do it without any hesitation. 
This is my philosophy, if the relationship does not work with [S1], I 
believe that it will work with others’. 
With regards to the interdependency and reciprocity of information exchange 
trust indicators, the owner of SME1 did not experience S1 very much relying 
on his company, nor exchanging any valuable information with him; instead 
the owner of SME1 who was approaching S1 seeking for business 
opportunities: 
‘I noticed that [S1] will not come, they will not to ask or bother after 
completing the work which is part of the 10%, I had to see what they 
have and how I can be of interest to them’.  
Although, SME1 did not experience S1 relying on SME1, nor informing him 
about business opportunities, yet SME1 had a high level of trust in S1. The 
mediating role played by government representatives was considered by 
owner of SME1 as the critical factor which helped both companies to form 
trusting business relationships. 
S1-SME2 
S1-SME2 established his company in 2008 and began to engage with S1 in 
public projects since 2012, this was by supplying heavy load trucks. SME2 
succeeded to form trusting relationships with S1. The owner of SME2 
described his experience with S1 as one of the distinctive trusted business 
relationships which had been repeatedly recurring for the last four years. The 
120 
 
owner of SME2 described the success his company his company attained with 
S1 in these terms: 
‘Because of the quality of work my company delivered, the project 
manager increased the size of my contract. He also realized how other 
SMEs whom he used to rely on had cheated [S1]’.   
The owner of SME2 also reported an attempt by those who were handling 
SMEs with improper records trying to convince him to cheat and not to bother 
about delivering quality work, but he never listened to them. He expressed this 
saying: 
‘There were temptations, temptations from managers of these SMEs to 
move me away, they wanted me to be like them, cheating, paying bribes, 
I never listened to them. I knew it is short lived. I always remember the 
values I learned since my childhood’.  
The owner of SME2 initially experienced a high level of formalities while 
dealing with S1. S1 often adopted a tough stance in checking the quantity of 
materials delivered every day but he did not regard this as a negative factor 
but rather as something which sorted out active SMEs from those which were 
inefficient. He described his experience with S1 and reported how important 
to be sincere and honest saying: 
‘I must say… the work I have done was above their expectation. At this 
time and because of me the project manager discovered how others 
have been cheating him. He realised the big difference between what I 
was doing once compared with those whom he was trusting before’. 
SME2 after attaining a certain level of trust was treated differently. SME2 was 
trusted to such an extent that it was the only company which was exempted 
from delivery checking procedures. 
The owner of SME2 recounted how his latest experience with S1 compared to 
that of the first one asserting that S1 now assigned SME2 works without any 
hesitation and with low level of formalities. He attributed this to the honesty 
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and to the moral value of people living in villages which were not new to the 
PM of S1 who had been in Oman for many years: 
‘He trusted me when I explained to him where I came from. Dear brother, 
we are brought up with conservative society and the project manager 
has been in Oman for many years. He had no doubt our society is tribal 
and the insult doesn’t affect you only but also your tribe’. 
Relating interdependency to a high trust can be seen in the expression of the 
owner of SME2. He emphasised how trust had made S1 reliant on his 
company. He stated that the project manager of S1 assigned tasks, constantly 
relying on his company to the extent that S1 reduced the quotas of others 
whom he used to trust previously.  
The owner of SME2 showed the big difference between the value of the first 
work order that his company had received four years previously and the values 
of work orders that his company had received in the current year. In fact, the 
owner of this SME produced documentary evidence which showed that the 
value of the contract had significantly grown over the four-year period (see 
appendix 5). 
With regards to reciprocity of information exchange, the transcripts of SME2 
working with S1 emphasised that S1 trusted him to such an extent that S1 
informed him about future business opportunities in advance, giving the 
smaller company a distinct advantage in tendering. 
‘I remember the words from the projects engineer who said to me ‘’ 
where were you from before’’, he meant to continue to assign me works. 
My company became one of the favourable partner for [S1], they inform 
me about every work [S1] gets from the government’. 
Generally, his self-reliance in arranging required resources, patience, honesty 
and perseverance made him one of the favoured partners to S1. The company 
had started with a local purchase order of $ 15,000 and the orders in later 
interactions had often exceeded $ 500,000 (see Appendix 5).  
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The competency-based trust was the type of trust that SME2 had with S1; this 
is to such an extent that SME2 had always been a favoured partner for S1. 
The inter-organisational level is also clearly apparent in this relationship; this 
can be seen when S1 exempted SME2 even from the check points which the 
other SMEs had to go through.   
4.3.2 Summary of the state of trust between the first subsidiary’s large 
company S1 and subcontracted SMEs 
Representatives of S1 revealed that S1 had always advocated a win-win 
situation to confidently work with SMEs in public projects. The owner of SME1 
reported that he initially experienced representatives of S1 favouring SMEs 
that they had previously known. Additionally, S1 attempted to force him to 
commence the work as S1 had wanted but with his self-confidence regarding 
what he was supposed to do, with the assistance of government involvement, 
he was able to convince S1 to such an extent that the latter formed trusted 
relationships with SME1.  
The experience of SME2 was different. The owner of SME2 revealed that 
when S1 noticed the efficiency, productivity and honesty of SME2, S1 went to 
the extent of increasing the size of the contract of SME2 and reduced the work 
of SMEs that S2 used to previously rely on and trusted. Interestingly, 
knowledge of the PM of S1 about the social and tribal background of the owner 
of SME2 enhanced the notion of trust between the two interacting companies. 
To conclude, the competency and institutional types of trust were the 
predominant types in the case of S1-SME1. The case of SME2 was slightly 
different, the competency based trust was the only type and the trust was even 
at organizational level.   
4.4 The second subsidiary large contracting company - S2 
S2 is one of India's largest construction companies. The Ministry of Transport 
and Communication and Muscat Municipality were its two major sources of 
business. In 2014 alone, MTC awarded S2 projects worth of approximately 
$12,740 million in which nearly $1,273 million were reserved for the appointed 
SMEs. 
123 
 
S2 rarely had repeated business interactions with SMEs based on trust. 
According to S2’s reports, around 20% of SMEs quitted the business 
interaction at an early stage of the business. This was clearly expressed by 
the PM of S2: 
‘According to my records, around 20% of the subcontracting SMEs often 
leave us at initial stage, they have no patience. You see them looking 
for business opportunities with other large companies, something 
strange’. 
Only a few SMEs succeeded in having repeated contractual arrangements 
with S2. Similar expression was found in the transcript of the site engineer of 
S2 who reported his low trust in appointed SMEs. This was based on his 
experience of the project that he was observing at the time of the interview: 
‘In this project, there are SMEs which quit the business in short time, I 
would say in a few months’. 
The site engineer of S2 was found to be suspicious about engagement and 
productivities of SME and could not find explanation why many of them quitted 
the business without even letting representatives of S2 know. Nevertheless, 
he expressed that he wished to see them exercising more patience:   
‘Owners of SMEs should learn how to be patient and should not expect 
themselves to achieve what is in their mind with little effort, within a short 
period of time. Things do not happen overnight’. 
SMEs with Innovative solutions seemed to be the SMEs who had repeated 
business interaction based on trust with S1. The PM of S2 reported one 
exceptional experience with a SME that S2 had developed a trusting business 
relationship with. This was when the owner of the SME proposed to the PM of 
S2 that he would manufacture some materials in his workshop. The Ministry 
approved the proposal and the SME supplied the material to S2 at almost half 
the price of the imported ones. The PM described this distinctive experience 
of the SME: 
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‘In fact, I did not believe that he will make, he supplied the material with 
almost the same imported quality and with reasonable prices’. 
With regards to degree of formality and trust that S2 had in SMEs, S2 was 
reported by its informants to have a high level of contractual formality with 
appointed SMEs. This reason was to protect the interest of S2. The PM of S2 
said: 
‘See, our policy is to safeguard our interests; we always try to have full-
fledged sets of agreements where all our interests are secured. We try 
to mitigate our risks which are more likely due to unknown relationships’. 
The reason for having full-fledged sets of agreements was due to the criticality 
of time which informants of S2 described as being an important requirement 
of the contract and that failure to meet targets would be punished by some 
form of penalty.  
‘When the government imposed any penalties or liquidity damages on 
our company, we passed them on to SMEs as they were largely 
responsible for the delay or the damage’.  
With regards to interdependency as a third trust indicator, S2 experienced 
appointed SMEs as partners who could not be relied on due to their weakness 
and limited capacity. This was in addition to their intention to discontinue 
working with S2. The PM said: 
‘Once they are committed they should work until the end. I rarely 
experienced any of them whom [S2] can rely on’. 
S2 also found it hard to cope with owners of SMEs as most of them rarely 
came to the sites to check upon progress of their employees and progress of 
the work.  
‘Unfortunately, many of them work in public sector and we hardly see them at 
the site. It happened last week, we came across some challenges, and we 
thought of plan B and we had to decide on something and discuss the plan, 
we struggled to get them and their representatives couldn’t decide on 
anything...you tell me how can you trust a partner who is not dedicated?’. 
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The transcripts of both informants of S2 highlighted that availability of owners 
was essential to discuss progress of the work, to observe the performance of 
their employees, and to be available for consultation in decision making. 
With regards to the reciprocity of information exchange, S2 did not share any 
sensitive issues such as designs, expertise knowledge, and strategies with 
appointed SMEs. The PM said: 
‘Sensitive like we don’t share our designs; we don’t share our strategy 
with them. But when they have some difficulty like how to do the binding, 
how to clap steels, what can make particular components work like this... 
We can support’. 
In general, S2 had a low level of trust with appointed SMEs. S2 trusted those 
who added value to them such as providing specific services or materials at 
reasonable prices. 
4.4.1 The embedded cases within S2 
S2-SME1 
S2-SME1 is a small security service enterprise specialized in the installation 
of CCTV cameras. The first business opportunity this company ever had was 
with S2 in 2012. SME1 left S2 after completing the first contractual interaction 
and did not see any hope of working with S2 in the future: 
 ‘That was the first and the last experience my company had with [S2]. It 
was a bad experience” 
The owner of SME1 related his failure in having repeated business interactions 
based on trust with S2 to the misplaced loyalty of managers of S2 who 
favoured SMEs managed by people of the same ethnic origin and not to SMEs 
managed and operated by indigenous Omanis.  
With regard to formalities, SME1 and S2 found to have high degree of formality 
which indicated the low trust level throughout their interaction. The owner of 
SME1 reported that S2 was dealing with his company in an officious manner 
to such an extent that he had to write a letter to S2 in order for S2 to send the 
engineer to inspect the completed work. What also discouraged him to work 
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with S2 was the payment issue which was taking a long time because of long 
and unnecessary formalities. According to the owner of SME1, long and 
unnecessary formalities were for no reason but to fail him and to show the 
government weakness of SMEs and the failure of mandated business strategy. 
Lengthening the procedures of inspections and delaying payments was a very 
serious issue for SME1: 
‘I borrowed some money to start my business, actually, I have no doubt 
that the delay of payments was done purposefully. You can’t imagine 
[S2]) had always been delaying the inspection and my payments’. 
To relate degree of formality to trust, the owner of SME1 illustrated two 
different experiences; one was with S2 and another one which was with a 
national large company. SME1 appeared to have a totally different experience 
working with the second company in which SME1 was given the freedom to 
carry out the contractual arrangement without undue interference and even 
went so far as to make payments in advance of the contract so that the owner 
of the SME could pay his employees’ wages and other expenses. 
SME1 did not experience or notice any initiative by S2 to create an 
interdependency relationship with his company. With regards to reciprocity of 
information exchange, the owner of SME1 reported an incident where he had 
to beg representatives of S2 to give him a copy of the drawing which he 
needed in order to submit his quotation for one of the potential opportunities 
with S2. This showed how negative or minimal disclosure of information was 
associated with low states of trust. 
Generally, none of the indicators did signal presence of trust despite his 
attempted to manage the interaction through the involvement of his uncle. This 
was in addition to his attempt to create an interpersonal trust through an 
appointed person from the same ethnic origin as most of the employers of S2 
to work on his behalf and to control the contract.  
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S2-SME2 
S2-SME2 is a national medium company established in 2005. SME2 had its 
first business opportunities in public projects in 2009, and this was with S2 on 
three road junctions within Al-Seeb area. This case was unlike the previous 
case (SME1 and S2) in which none of the indicators signalled the presence of 
trust. SME2, since 2013, worked with S2 in four projects and on a continuing 
basis and was found to have a high level of trust. 
SME2 and S2 seemed to have low degree of formality which indicated high 
level of trust. Actually, being familiar with the culture of representatives of S2 
and being aware of the language (Urdu) that the owner of SME2 used to 
communicate with the representatives of S2 minimised degrees of formalities 
with S2: 
 ‘You know I am Balushi and I speak Urdu and they are Indian, the 
language I speak helped me to minimize the formalities, I have never 
thought the language and understanding the cultural background would 
work for developing a great relationship’. 
He explained that the language that they both shared created a kind of 
confidence as it also helped him to express his intentions, needs, and helped 
him to convince the representatives of S2.  
With regards to interdependency, S2 initially invested in the assets of SME2 
so that SME2 became one of the approved dealers for the traffic light 
cantilevers. Both companies worked together especially in submitting tenders 
to the government. This can be seen in the following reported experience by 
the owner of SME2 when he cooperated with S2 to arrange for some material 
from neighbouring countries: 
‘I finally found one company in Tehran sold this product for almost half 
of the price that I got in Dubai. When I returned to Oman I and the PM 
of [S2] convinced the engineer in the Ministry of Transport about the 
quality of the material I and [S2] intending to install. I immediately 
arranged it when I got the green light. Imagine, later on I became the 
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dealer for the material and [S2] has been purchasing the material from 
my company ever since’. 
S2, since then, had placed orders for the same material from SME2 and that 
both companies were benefiting from the arrangement. S2 later on relied on 
SME2 for supply and installation services. This indicated a high state of trust 
found in a mutual interdependent interaction. 
SME2 and S2 exchanged valuable information which ultimately enhanced the 
state of trust between the two partners. It was reported that the disclosure of 
valuable information about SME2, particularly by significant parties such as S2 
to well-esteemed companies such as Petroleum Development of Oman 
(PDO), was considered to be a sign of trust. In fact, the owner of SME2 stated 
that it was an honour for him to know that S2 was the one who had 
recommended his company to PDO: 
‘I received a phone call from PDO requesting me to deliver my 
company’s profile. I doubted no one will do this but [S2]. I appreciated 
this and thanked the project manager for his trust’. 
The cognitive-based trust was apparent in this relationship. Additionally, trust 
in this relationship started at an interpersonal level and, when the competency 
of SME2 was evident, it shifted to inter-organisational level. This can be 
noticed when S2 introduced SME2 to well-esteemed companies. This was 
considered to be a sign of high trust level. 
4.4.2 Summary of the state of trust between the second subsidiary’s 
large company (S2) and subcontracted SMEs 
Experiencing an approximate ratio of 20% of appointed SMEs exiting the 
business interaction with S2 at an initial stage was one of the main 
impediments raised by S2 to trusting SMEs. Among all SMEs, S2 had an 
exceptional experience with one SME which, in fact, provided S2 with a local 
product at reasonable prices. S2 was also proud of this SME to such an extent 
that S2 helped that SME to get the material approved by the government.  
The owner of SME1 attributed his failure in developing a trusted business 
relationship to the preference S2 shown towards SMEs managed by 
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individuals from India rather than from Oman. However, SME2 had a high level 
of trust in S2. The (Urdu) language that the owner of SME2 spoke, as well as 
being familiar with the culture of representatives of S2, facilitated the 
interactions between the owner of SME2 and representatives of S2. 
Consequently, trust was raised between the two companies to such an extent 
that S2 recommended SME2 to another well-esteemed company. How trust 
operated between SME2 and S2 was clearly different from trust in 
relationships based on choice as SME2’s cost effective actions had impressed 
S2 and was driven by the motive of impressing the government. Thus, the 
conceptualisation of trust in such mandated business interactions differs from 
the conventional view of trust in IORs of choice. A more in-depth discussion of 
this new conceptualisation of trust is presented in chapter six (section 6.1).    
4.5 The first joint venture large contracting company - JV1 
JV1 is a joint venture Italian company which teamed up with an Omani national 
company in 2008 for road and bridge construction. The Ministry of Transport 
and Communications (MTC) has always been the main source of its business 
in Oman. In 2014 alone, the MTC has awarded JV1 projects worth $ 371.3 
million, of which $ 37.128 million was reserved for the appointed SMEs.  
The work quality, time delivery and finally, the cost were the most important 
conditions that JV1 expected appointed SMEs to fulfil. Hence, according to the 
experience of the PM of JV1, only a few SMEs succeeded to have repeated 
contractual arrangements and this was due to the lack of SMEs’ efficiency: 
 ‘Only few, I mean whom I am confident about, and those whom we are 
confident about have been working with us in a continuing basis’.  
Absence of commitment of SME owners was one of the main constraints for 
JV1 to trust SMEs. Additionally, detailed and long discussions of every issue 
were some of the unfavourable characteristics of appointed SMEs led by 
Omanis; this was in contrast with SMEs managed and operated by expatriates 
in the view of the PM of JV1. However, some owners of SMEs were favoured 
by JV1. The PM said: 
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‘Those who have access to official bodies like the Ministry of Manpower 
are favoured to us, some of them helped [JV1] to secure the required 
permissions’.  
With regards to formality, JV1 attempted to protect its interest with the 
government by signing detailed contracts with SMEs. This was to avoid any 
responsibility that might arise if SMEs failed to meet expectations of large 
partners as well as the government: 
‘In order to minimize the risk of partnering them, I had no choice but to 
sign detail contracts with them’. 
JV1 did not see any opportunity to create interdependent relationships based 
on trust.  The PM specifically said:  
‘We thought we could reduce the maintenance, development, and 
training costs. As you might know, I cannot keep such specialized and 
trained section and only use it when there is a need, but what to do, I 
couldn’t rely on them’.  
The conditions of SMEs the PM of JV1 had experienced stopped his company 
from depending on them. This was because he experienced some owners of 
SMEs who were negligent: 
‘Instead of leading their labourers, the labourers were left to my 
company, to be told what to do and I had to do this because of the 
government obligation. Their failure affects us’. 
Nevertheless, the PM of JV1, while discussing interdependency, described an 
incident with an owner of a SME in which he would have destroyed the existing 
trust with that SME. The incident started when the PM of JV1 thought of 
utilising the free resources of JV1 on work allotted to subcontracted gas 
pipeline medium enterprise. He justified his intention to get into the work 
allotted to SME to commence the entire project as fast as JV1 could. However, 
he ultimately revealed what this would cost his company by committing what 
he described as one of the biggest mistakes he could have made. This was 
because the subcontracted gas pipeline company had trusted JV1. The PM of 
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JV1 expressed the reaction of the owner of subcontracted SMEs in the 
following terms: 
‘The owner of the SME said, you are the main contractor but I will do the 
work the way I see it right. This is if you like it, if not then you can find 
someone else to do the work’. 
Clearly, this expressed the low state of trust where a relationship was driven 
by the self-interest of one of the parties. 
According to the PM of JV1, JV1 had no hope in exchanging information with 
most SMEs. The PM asserted that it was difficult for him to coordinate with 
owners of SMEs, because these owners thought their job was completed once 
the contract was signed between them and JV1. Most of them were rarely 
seen following up the progress of their employees.  
Generally, JV1 seemed to have a low state of trust with SMEs. Those who had 
access to public officials were favoured by JV1. The PM of JV1 experienced 
owners of SMEs being negligent and insincere and he could not coordinate 
with many of them as owners of SMEs were basically busy with their works in 
public projects.  
4.5.1 The embedded cases within JV1 
JV1-SME1 
SME1 is a medium enterprise founded in 2005 and specialised in the road 
construction industry, particularly in technical support services. The owner of 
SME1 started his career working as project manager for one of the largest 
national construction companies in Oman. Due to the experiences that the 
owner of SME1 had, he was able to attain continuing and repeated contractual 
arrangements with JV1: 
‘The managerial experiences, formalities, and previously developed 
networks with, you know Tender Board of Oman, in addition to my 
network with representatives of the Ministry of Transports and 
communications. Most of these helped me and JV1 to work with 
confidence’.    
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SME1 succeeded in having repeated business relationships with JV1 and the 
trust seemed to gradually increase and eventually became high after the first 
business interaction. SME1, between 2011 and 2015, worked in more than 4 
projects with JV1 and had business chains with other large road construction 
companies in Oman. The SME1 today has more than 45 items of equipment 
and machinery and employs 64 people excluding the owner and his two sons. 
With regards to degree of formality indicating high trust, the owner of SME1 
reported that his company and JV1 had low levels of formalities. The owner of 
the SME1 related several incidents in which he arranged for expensive 
equipment from JV1 through phone calls and without the need for any official 
records: 
‘It happens several times when I need some specific equipment, they 
are expensive, I only call the project manager of [JV1] and we settle 
things later on’. 
The owner of this small enterprise was the only one who did not totally blame 
large companies including JV1 for being formal with some owners of SME. He 
asserted that he did not agree with many owners of SMEs who misused the 
government attempt to enhance their position while interacting with large 
companies in public projects. He said: 
‘Some of them work in the public sector and they are rarely seen. I mean 
following with their employees, checking their performance. Large 
companies became suspicious, who is serious and who is not and large 
companies are responsible for handing over the projects on time’.  
He added that he never had any cheque which was dishonoured and, 
according to him, nothing was hidden or underhand and this was one of the 
reasons for JV1 to deal with him with minimum formalities.  
With regards to interdependency, SME1 and JV1 had mutual 
interdependency; JV1 has been relying on the owner of SME1 to overcome 
some temporary difficulties with public bodies such as licences and 
permissions. SME1 and JV1 were exchanging information about business 
opportunities. The owner of SME1 asserted that JV1 took advantage of the 
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structure of SME1 which was largely operated by an Omani to such an extent 
that the representatives of JV1 had been reporting the success of JV1 in 
trusting business relationships with the government and described the 
characteristics of SME1. This was mainly to attract the attention of the 
government. This was advantageous to JV1 to get more opportunities in public 
projects.  
In general, SME1 and JV1 seemed to have high levels of trust.  
JV1-SME2 
JV1-SME2 is a small enterprise and was established in 2010, SME2 was 
engaged in a supply of road studs’ materials to road construction companies. 
The first business interaction SME2 had was with JV1 and commenced in 
2013.  
SME2 failed in creating a productive business relationship with JV1. Working 
as a journalist did not give him enough time to experience the development of 
productive business relationships. The company today has a team of 7 
employees excluding the owner and earned approximately $ 55,000 out of the 
three last work orders received from JV1.  
4.5.2 Summary of the state of trust between JV1 and subcontracted 
SMEs 
JV1 revealed its low state of trust throughout its business interactions with 
subcontracted SMEs. JV1 found that the majority of SME owners failed to 
supervise their employees and left them to be guided and managed by JV1 
whereas the intention of JV1 was to rely on the subcontracted SMEs in order 
to concentrate on its core business. However, the incident revealed by the PM 
of JV1, when he thought of utilising some of JV1’s free resources in the work 
allotted to the SME, contradicted the strategy that JV1 claimed to follow in 
relying on subcontracting SMEs. 
JV1 seemed to be more concerned about its own self-interest. Omani owners 
of SMEs, who had contact with public bodies, were favoured by JV1. Actually, 
what the representative of JV1 highlighted can be confirmed from the 
experience of the owner of SME1 who revealed that his accessibility to public 
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officials served his company and JV1 in which they both attained trusting 
business relationships.  
Additionally, being an owner of a medium company which is extensively 
managed and operated by an Omani team gave an opportunity to JV1 to show 
the government representative the success of JV1 in partnering with an Omani 
SME.  
4.6 The second joint venture large contracting company - JV2 
JV2 is a joint venture between a Portuguese company and the Omani National 
Construction Company. Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC) 
awarded JV2 five projects with a value in access of $137 million. An 
approximate value of $13.7 million was reserved to subcontracted SMEs. JV2 
often tried to limit its activities to the core business as well as to supervision 
and seemed not to be confident about subcontracted SMEs. The PM said: 
‘Only a few SMEs succeeded; I mean only few whom we felt confident 
about and carried them in a regular basis’.  
Engaging inefficient employees and improper utilisation of resources were 
some of the issues which the PM reported and often discussed with the owners 
of SMEs. 
‘I worked in more than one country. Unfortunately, SMEs in Oman are 
not organized, most of SME owners believe that it is always better to 
have large number of workers instead of having specialized teams’.  
The constraints to have repeated business interaction based on tryst was not 
limited to believe of owners of SMEs such as having large number of workers 
instead of employing specialised people, the PM of JV2 further stated that he 
experienced some owners of SMEs not fully aware of the specification of 
materials that they supplied to JV2, and this was shocking to the PM of JV2:   
‘It was shocking to see some of them not fully aware, I mean of the 
product and differences between one product and the others. How I can 
trust a partner with such character’.  
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With regards to level of formalities, JV2 had a high degree of formality with 
appointed SMEs such as signing detailed contracts. These agreements even 
included details of employees of SMEs; this was done to protect its interest 
with the government. The PM of JV2 experienced incidents in which some 
appointed SMEs were caught violating the provisions of the Labour Law, and 
this caused JV2 to take extra care while engaging SMEs in public projects: 
‘I came across some cases where the extra employees are not 
registered under the same company and they were caught working on 
our site’.  
With regards to interdependency, JV2 revealed some experiences where 
reliance on SMEs was successfully attained. The PM revealed an incident in 
which he decided to sell some old equipment and replace it with new 
equipment, asserting that the high cost of maintenance was a burden to JV2. 
Meanwhile, an owner of a small company who was a technician suggested to 
him to keep the equipment and sign the maintenance contract for a reasonable 
price. He stated that his company saved money, receiving satisfactory 
maintenance services while relying on efficient small enterprises. This was a 
clear example of a high level of trust between JV2 and enthusiasm that some 
owners of SMEs had which eventually led to mutual benefits.  
In relation to the final trust indicator – reciprocity of information exchanged - 
JV2 stressed that there was no hope of exchanging any valuable information 
with appointed SME.  JV2 had unpleasant experiences with many of them who 
were not well organised, not committed to the work and not fully aware of what 
they want to be in the future. The PM said:  
‘Because the majority of SMEs are not efficient, I usually don’t tell them 
about any expected opportunities hoping to find better SMEs’.  
In general, it can be summarised that JV2 had a low state of trust with 
subcontracted SMEs and this was mainly due to inefficiency of appointed 
SMEs. 
 
136 
 
4.6.1 The embedded cases within JV2 
JV2-SME1 
JV2-SME1 is a national medium enterprise established in 2008. Surprisingly, 
it was JV2 who actually approached this medium company in 2013 and 
assigned SME1 the construction of a hydraulic bridge. This bridge was for one 
of the national ferry companies which was targeted to become a contributor to 
the maritime transport infrastructure and development in the Sultanate of 
Oman. The project, which lasted for 18 months, was the only work that SME1 
did for JV2. The owner of SME1 has, since then, ceased any business 
arrangements with JV2 and dedicated its business to deal with individuals’ 
orders after quitting the first business interaction with JV2. 
‘It was the only experience my company had with [JV2], it was very bad 
experience, I quit and I didn’t want to go through similar experience 
again’.  
This company had several unexpected bad experiences with JV2 which 
eventually forced him to decide not to have any repeated interaction with JV2. 
As revealed by the owner of this small company, and particularly at the time 
of launching the projects, the owner of SME1 realised the duplicitous intention 
of JV2. He confirmed that the cost of the work which JV2 assigned to his 
company was much less than the real cost that was approved by the 
government. Actually, he provided evidence of this. The owner of this small 
company was disappointed because the JV2 attempted to keep this 
information hidden from the owner of SME1. What also seemed to be serious 
and which caused frustration to the owner of SME1 was that JV2 presented 
the creativity of the core work of SME1 in the social media as the work of JV2 
and this was what led to the breakdown of trust between them. Secondly, an 
inconclusive Ministry of Transport and Communication’s response to the claim 
of the owner of SME1 made the owner of SME1 feel insecure. According to 
the owner of SME1, trusted business relations with JV2 could have been 
established if JV2 had given serious attention to the government initiative 
which aimed to enhance the growth of SMEs.  
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With regards to the formalities, JV2 and SME1 initially had a very limited formal 
deal. The low degree of formality, however, was found to be a tactic played by 
JV2. The PM of JV2, in the middle of the project, gave the owner of SME1 the 
green light to arrange all essential materials that he had not considered while 
submitting his quotation. The PM of JV2 informed him to arrange the material 
at any cost and even without seeking prior approval. The owner of SME1 
expressed that experience, saying: 
‘Imagine, the account was open, if someone else with bad intention, you 
know, can easily make use of this opportunity and nobody will know’. 
It should be noted that with a contract value of approximately $ 177,000, JV2 
in trusting SME1, had exposed itself to some considerable risk. Such 
confidence being placed in a low formality context is a supreme example of 
trust.  
SME1 had an interdependent relationship with JV2. JV2 invested in the assets 
of the SME and provided the owner of SME with most of the technical and 
financial assistance. However, this interdependency was revealed to be based 
on self-interest on the part of JV2: 
‘I was not having the capability to establish and run my workshop on my 
own; I cannot deny that I relied on them but when I realised their bad 
intention I said there is no hope of developing business relationships 
with [JV2]’. 
With regards to the last trust indicator- the reciprocity of information exchange, 
SME1 had low trust on JV2, therefore, the owner of SME1 did not exchange 
any information with JV2. 
Generally, the state of trust was high at the beginning of the business 
interaction between SME1 and JV2 but declined at the end of the first and only 
business interaction SME1 had with JV2. The interdependency in this 
relationship is not related to trust but to the self-interest of JV2. The minimal 
influence and presence of government representatives in this relationship had 
given an opportunity to JV2 to dominate the relationship. 
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JV2-SME2 
JV2-SME2 is a medium enterprise founded in 2008. The first business 
interaction that SME2 had with JV2 was in July 2013. SME2 and JV2 had 
repeated business interaction based on trust.  
However, the owner of SME2 attributed this to the presence of the government 
which facilitated the development of trust between SME2 and JV2. Actually, 
presence of the government was extensively seen in the public project which 
was commenced by JV2 and SME2: 
‘Representatives from the Minister of Transport and Communication 
asked me once, in front of the project manager of [JV2], whether I was 
satisfied with the interaction and the given business opportunities. I said 
yes. I worked with [JV2] in three contractual arrangements since 2013’. 
The government intervention was perceived by the owner of SME2 to be 
important to limit the choices of SMEs and large contracting companies to deal 
with SMEs with proper records as there are many SMEs operate in the market 
with improper records.  As such SMEs offer cheaper prices to large 
companies. 
‘[JV2] used to engage SMEs with improper records because of their 
lower prices’. 
It was even revealed by the owner of the SME2 that he and owners of other 
SMEs had reported such practices by large companies, including those of JV2, 
to the Ministry of Manpower which then sent unannounced inspection teams 
to the working companies and caught many illegal labourers. The restrictions 
put by the government tended to minimise such dishonest practices. 
Additionally, government intervention helped most SMEs to obtain the 
required financial and human resources and this enhanced the level of trust of 
large contracting companies about their subcontracted SMEs: 
‘The appointed government representative was holding regular 
meetings. I mean between us and our contracting companies including  
[JV2]. This was to discuss progress and constraints issues we face’.  
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The transcript of SME2 indicated a low level of formality between SME2 and 
JV2, and this seemed to be the result of the presence of government officials 
at the site on a continuing basis. 
With regards to interdependency, the owner of SME2 experienced a high level 
of interdependency which indicated a high level of trust between SME2 and 
JV2. 
‘Imagine, representatives from offices of project managers were highly 
depending on us to quote for the jobs. I myself used to put higher prices. 
I don’t remember that any of my quotations got rejected’. 
The final trust indicator is the reciprocity of information exchange. SME2 and 
JV2 had constantly exchanged information about business opportunities. The 
owner of SME2, actually, revealed that JV2 had been sharing with his 
company potential opportunities in future public projects, and this signalled a 
high level of trust between the two companies.  
The owner of SME2 expressed this experience as one of the exceptionally 
good and trusting business interactions that he had ever encountered. Strong 
institutional arrangements particularly in the form of regulative and normative 
arrangements were seen as significant.  
4.6.2 Summary of the state of trust between the second joint venturing 
large company (JV2) and subcontracted SMEs 
JV2 attributed its low levels of trust to the unfavourable characteristics of 
appointed SMEs. Unnecessarily engaging of extra work force, limited 
knowledge of specifications and differences of the quality of material supplied 
by subcontracting SMEs and, most importantly, experiencing some SMEs 
which were caught violating the rules, were the major issues that concerned 
JV2 in this form of business interactions. 
In contrast, the owners of the subcontracted SMEs revealed different facts and 
they both formed a low state of trust with JV2. For the owner of SME1, the 
duplicity of intention of JV2, particularly in the cost of the work which JV2 had 
assigned to his company being much less than the work approved by the 
government, led the owner of SME1 to be very distrustful towards JV2. JV2 
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attempted to keep the information of the real cost of the work hidden from him 
and, most importantly, presenting the creativity and the innovation of the 
hydraulic bridge which SME1 made in the social media as though it had been 
the work of JV2. This was enough to describe the unacceptable intention of 
JV2 which compelled the owner of SME1 to immediately quit the business of 
JV2.  
The work which SME1 had commenced with JV2 was in a border region of 
Oman and very distant from central government. Consequently, this work 
received little attention or supervision by government officials and, because of 
this, the state of trust was low. In contrast, there was a high state of trust 
between JV2 and SME2 where the project was regularly monitored by the 
government.  
Hence, the institutional based trust was the dominant type in the relationship 
between JV2 and subcontracted SMEs.  
4.7 Summary of the findings 
The summaries of the analysis which followed each of the embedded cases 
revealed the state of trust within each case, and the indicators used to 
ascertain the state of trust have helped to determine the levels of trust that 
existed between some large companies and SMEs. However, based on the 
perceptions of the informants, it was found necessary to modify these four 
indicators so that they were more appropriately relevant to the context of 
mandated business interactions. These modifications are fully discussed in 
chapter 6.  
The concept of trust in the context of mandated business interaction was found 
to be notably different from the mainstream understandings of the term in the 
literature. Immediately, the question arises of whether trust is possible at all in 
mandated business interactions as there is some level of enforcement by a 
third party namely the government. However, the findings of this study, based 
on the perceptions of the key informants in the research, reveal that trust exists 
in mandated business interactions. The definition of Nguyen et al. (2005) was 
found to be useful with its emphasis on trust as “a psychological state 
characterised by positive affect towards qualities of the partner and confidence 
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that the partner will perform certain actions” (Nguyen et al. 2005- p 214). 
However, the motivation of trust was different in mandated business 
interactions as both partners strove to impress the third partner, i.e. the 
government. Far from restricting the development of trust, the presence of the 
third party was found to have facilitated the development of trust. This is 
discussed in greater depth in chapter six (section 6.1). 
It is also important to point out that trust in some cases was dynamic in nature, 
and some types of trusts were driven by different social, environmental, and 
institutional sources. Some types, such as institutional based trust which was 
driving the behaviour of interacting companies, seemed more influential than 
others; yet, the influence of the institution was still dependent on the presence 
and power placed by the government in interacting companies.  
Having identifying the levels of trust that existed between SMEs and large 
companies in mandated business interactions, the various factors which 
influenced levels of trust are explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Five – The analysis and findings 
The factors influencing the levels of trust in SMEs 
and large companies in mandated business 
interactions 
5. Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and the findings related to the second 
research question:  
How do various factors influence trust levels between SMEs and large 
companies in mandated business interactions? 
The chapter identifies the factors that are commonly commented on in the 
literature but in addition new factors emerged from the data analysis which 
were particularly pertinent to the context of mandated business interactions. 
The influence of these factors on levels of trust is presented in accordance to 
the levels of trust found in the fourteen embedded cases which were revealed 
in the previous chapter. The fourteen embedded cases (see chapter four: 
introduction) were explored using the indicators to assess their levels of trust. 
Table (4.3) in chapter four showed that 8 of the 14 business relationships had 
a high level of trust while the remaining 6 were found to have a low level of 
trust. A high level of trust was found in all the cases of N1 and subcontracted 
SMEs as well as S1 and its subcontracted SMEs. The trust in these embedded 
cases was a result of goodwill, competency and institutional based trust. The 
embedded cases with N1 and S1 were unlike the case of N2 and 
subcontracted SMEs, where most of the relationships were indicated as low 
trust level. The remaining cases were with S2, and JV1 and JV2 as the large 
company. Each had a relationship with two SMEs, one of which was indicated 
as high level of trust and the second relationship as low level of trust in each 
case. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts: the first presents the factors 
underlying a high level of trust; the second presents the factors which led to a 
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low trust level. To list the factors in a systematic way, they are first presented 
by the dominant types of trust (characteristic based trust, process based trust, 
and institutional based trust, see chapter two section: 2.9).  
The interview data was analysed using Nvivo.10 software. Initial coding was 
performed and produced over 200 codes from the 25 interview transcripts and 
these were compared and merged according to similarity of contents. The 
codes were then compared and contrasted. This thematic analysis resulted in 
the identification of 11 factors which were perceived as influencing high levels 
of trust and 9 factors which were perceived as influencing a low level.  
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5.1 Factors which led to high state of trust 
The factors which led to a high level of trust are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9 Factors which led to high trust level 
Note: distinction is made in table 5.1 between the factors which emerged from 
the data by presenting these in underlined Italic format. The factors which were 
derived from the literature are presented in a plain text format. The sign (√) in 
the table indicates occurrence of the factors in these cases. The sub-factors 
are also included in the table. 
Large companies N1 S1 S2 JV1 JV2 
No SMEs 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 2 
 Factors Sub-factor    Characteristics Based Trust factors 
1 National loyalty  √ √ √  √    
2 Cognitive 
proximity 
Social similarity  √ √ √      
Social proximity      √   
Process Based trust factors 
3 Reputation of 
large company 
 √ √ √      
4 Reputation of 
SMEs 
Records keeping √     √   
Innovativeness      √   
5 Commitment Large partner √ √ √      
SMEs 
-Dedication 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
- Enthusiasm √    √    
6 Goal congruence  √ √ √   √   
7 Sharing Risk  √ √ √      
8 Tolerance of 
partner 
 √ √ √      
9 Transparency    √       
Factors related to institutions 
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11 
- Tribal norms 
 
   √  √    
Institutional 
factors 
-  Inspection 
- Supervision 
 √   √     
 √     √  √ 
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5.1 characteristic based factors 
5.1.1 National loyalty 
National loyalty emerged from the data analysis as a new factor and refers to 
a situation where some interviewees from both large companies and SMEs 
had an expectation that the other partner would be trustworthy in the business 
interaction based on the putative sense of loyalty to one’s country by being 
committed to the success of the mandated business interaction. National 
loyalty was, thus, largely a matter of subjective perceptions and expectations 
which were mostly borne out in reality. Both companies became willing to 
engage with each other in trusting relationships based on the sense of national 
loyalty. National loyalty as a factor influencing trust was seen in N1 where the 
PM of N1 stated:  
‘I am an Omani. Being in this position, I should pay significant attention 
towards this strategy (Mandated business interaction) in order to 
enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in the market. Actually I can give 
you a list of Omani owners of SMEs who never let us down due to their 
strong sense of commitment’. 
This statement by an Omani manager is a very strong affirmation of his 
perceptions that the fidelity of Omani managers of SMEs was a factor which 
created trust. Apart from the perception of fidelity, he stated, as an objective 
fact, that Omani owners of SMEs have “never let us down” and was willing to 
evidence this by supplying a list of SMEs. Thus, the compulsory nature of the 
government initiative was not the driver of trust but rather the sense of national 
loyalty which led to the development of high levels of trust between some large 
companies, particularly N1 and its subcontracted SMEs.  
From the perspective of SMEs, the shared sense of national loyalty lay behind 
the owner of SME2 in working on a continuing basis with N1: 
‘[N1] is a national company and is very supportive of the government’s 
strategy of mandated business interactions. This is why I was confident 
to enter into business interaction with [N1] for the last four years’. 
Even when the large company and the representatives were non-national, 
their perceptions that the partnering company was loyal to their own 
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government initiatives was still a driving force for trusting their partner from the 
beginning of the business interaction. For example, the owner of SME2 
working with S1 (Non-national company) was able to observe how the non-
national company placed confidence in him based on perceptions of his 
national loyalty. 
These examples show that national loyalty was an important factor which led 
to high trust levels between some large companies and SMEs. 
5.1.2 Cognitive proximity 
Cognitive proximity, in the literature, refers to perceived similarity between 
business partners and is based on their shared perceptions, interpretations 
and evaluations of the world (Nooteboome, 2000). Shared world views are 
perceived as facilitating communications as people draw on the same 
knowledge base in their interactions (Boschma, 2005).  
Cognitive proximity was found in this study where interacting partners felt more 
confident and secure in entering into business relationships with a partner 
whose cultural background and world view was congruent with their own. This 
can be seen in the case of SME2 working with S2 who expressed the 
advantage of similarity of language and shared values: 
‘You know I am Balushi and I speak Urdu with the same dialect as these 
people, the language I speak helped me to minimize the formalities, it 
was easy to understand each other as we both understood how each of 
us think’. 
All of the cases in which N1 was involved showed the positive influence of 
cognitive proximity on the state of trust which existed between the partners. 
Cognitive proximity had also enabled both partners to discuss their needs and 
challenges freely. For example, the owner of SME3 stated that once, in a 
rather light-hearted way, he had approached the Omani Site Engineer (SE) of 
N1 asking him about business opportunities that would make his life better. 
Due to the cognitive proximity of both actors in this case, the SE immediately 
understood that what had been asked for in a light-hearted way was a cultural 
device used to ask a serious question. The owner of SME3 expressed the 
response of the SE in the following terms:  
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‘He immediately replied, he mentioned several civil work, he said, riprap 
bridge beam structures’. 
The three owners of SMEs working with N1 have related their confidence in 
the Omani representatives of N1 with whom they felt close due to common 
understandings based on cognitive proximity: 
‘I mean that this company is at least national, the project manager is 
Omani. It has always been easy for me to approach them and they are 
always supportive’. (Owner of SME1 working with N1). 
The advantages expressed by the three owners of SMEs who worked with N1 
included accessibility to available business opportunities, the assurance of not 
acting opportunistically and the assistance which was often found with Omani 
representatives of large companies.  
These examples serve to demonstrate how cognitive proximity resulted in 
shared understandings which led to high states of trust between business 
partners. The distinction between social proximity and social similarity is 
presented in greater detail in the discussion chapter (6.5.2). 
5.2 Process based trust factors 
The factors of process type of trust, in the literature, were found to be based 
either indirectly on the reputation of the potential partner in the market, or 
directly on experience of working together in the past. Both reputation and 
experience were connected with the perceptions of the reliability of the partner 
in fulfilling their roles in the mandated business interactions. This is a situation 
in which a business partner has to make a conscious decision to trust based 
either upon the evidenced competency of the other partner as reported by a 
third party or else the direct experience of having previously worked together 
(Ren et al. 2016).  
Firstly, the reputation factor resulting in a high level of trust included three sub-
factors, one attributed to reputation of the large company within the market, 
and the remaining two are related to the reputation of SMEs for accurate 
record keeping or for being innovative.  
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Secondly, experience factor resulting in a high trust level had several sub-
factors which arose from direct experience with a partner. These included: 
commitment of companies, goal congruence, sharing risk, tolerance of a 
partner’s mistake and transparency.  
Due to the distinction between reputation and experience factors, the following 
section is divided into two parts: the first considers factors arising from 
reputation; the second part presents factors which emerged from the 
experiences of SMEs and large companies.    
5.2.1 Reputation 
In the literature, the reputation of interacting companies was seen as referring 
to a situation where a perceived distinctive character of one business party 
attracted the attention of other partners to enter into the business interaction 
with confidence. This is a situation in which a business partner often makes a 
conscious choice and decision to trust based on evidenced competency of the 
other partner reported by a third party.  
5.2.1.1 Reputation of the large company 
This sub-factor arose as perceptions from owners of SMEs and was 
acknowledged by some representatives of large companies. Despite the 
nature of the mandated business interaction which is aimed at enforcing 
positions of SMEs while interacting with large companies in public projects, 
yet, owners of SMEs were selective in terms of which large company they 
chose to interact with. The reputations of large companies, which were based 
on knowledge and perceptions of other owners of SMEs, were critical sub-
factors for owners of SMEs to work with confidence. This was seen in the 
comments of the SME1 working with N1:  
‘See even before getting into business relationship with [N1], I had a 
friend who did some work with [N1] , I asked him, if he was trusting them 
and he told me he was receiving his payments on time, and that was 
what I actually found when I started interacting with  [N1]’.  
The reputation of the large partner in the market was what had motivated the 
owners of SMEs to trust that the large partner would continue to behave in a 
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trustworthy manner and not to act opportunistically. The good reputation of N1 
was also reported by the owner of SME2: 
‘Even before getting into a business relationship with [N1] in mandated 
business interaction, I asked about the company, nature of its business, 
the activities the company involved with. I came to know that the core 
business of [N1] is in road constructions and I did not hear any complaint 
about their dealings with SMEs and actually that was what I experienced 
with [N1] from my first the business interaction’. 
Thus, the reputation of the larger company was a driving factor leading many 
SME owners to enter into trusting business relationships with the larger 
company. 
5.2.1.2 Reputation of SMEs 
Reputation of SMEs was perceived by interviewees of both, owners of SMEs 
as well as large companies and was based on evidence of past innovativeness 
and on the record keeping of the SMEs. Where a SME had a proven track 
record of being innovative in the past, large companies were found to be willing 
to enter into mandated business interactions with them. The PM of S2 
recounted one of his experiences with an owner of a SME who had a 
reputation for being innovative: 
 ‘As I said such a product was not available in the local market. I 
approached (X); I trusted his creativity and he actually assured me with 
possibility of developing the system and actually told me that he even 
can make the containers locally, he made them and, if you ask me, those 
whom I trust and like to work with are SMEs such as (X)’. 
Thus, trust developed between the two companies based on the reputation of 
the smaller partner for being innovative.  
The same can be seen in the experience of owner of SME2 working with S2: 
‘I developed the idea to have a centralized control panel and connected 
the three junctions with one control panel which can serve the three 
traffic lights at once. In fact, the creative idea that I developed was what 
actually made [S2] trust me’. 
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In contrast, the owners of SMEs who were not innovative remained suspicious 
about the intentions of their large partners to consider them in the future or 
whether they would have to shut down.  
The diligence of the SME in keeping accurate records was another approach 
to establishing the good reputation of SMEs in the market which was viewed 
favourably by the larger partner and often led to a high level of trust. Keeping 
clean records included: keeping employees details as well as the financial 
solvency of the SME.  
From the perspective of large companies, keeping clear records as required 
by the terms of the mandated business regulations led to a high level of trust 
and this can be seen in the case of N1 and its subcontracting SMEs. N1 
actually experienced some difficulties with the government due to SMEs which 
had not kept clear records. Following this, N1 created a dedicated section to 
oversee the record keeping of all subcontracted SMEs. The reason for this 
was to have a prudential approach by ensuring that all relevant matters were 
recorded transparently to avoid any potential risk of legal liability as expressed 
by the PM of N1: 
‘One of the works of the section is to ensure appropriateness of SMEs 
records, ownership, employee’s, experience. It is important to ensure 
that SMEs with appropriate records receive our attention’, 
An example from a SME’s perspective was narrated by owner of SME1 
working with N1. There was an incident where government checks were made 
of SMEs’ records subcontracted with N1. SME1 was one of the SMEs whose 
records were found to be in order and this led N1 to trust SME1. The owner of 
SME1 expressed the incident in the following terms:  
‘One day, the team (By the Ministry of Manpower) had an inspection visit 
and some labourers were caught without ID, and some of them were 
working for different subcontracting companies at the same time. By that 
time I had 32 labourers working officially in this location. My company 
always kept clear records and [N1] continued to trust me’.  
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With regards to financial solvency, this was expressed by the owner of SME2 
that he was always favoured by JV1 because of his financial probity: 
‘The impression about my company had grown very well due to various 
factors. First of all, I have never had any cheques which got bounced’. 
Thus, reputation based on clear record keeping including employees records 
and financial solvency were sub-factors which led to high level of trust in 
mandated business interaction.  
5.2.2 Factors arising from direct experience 
Direct experience factors are not so much related to the reputation and 
previous track records of partners but rather on direct experience of working 
with a partner. A number of sub-factors were found and these are presented 
in the following sub-sections. 
5.2.2.1 Commitment 
The commitment of interacting companies emerged from the data analysis as 
referring, not merely to their compliance with the rules and obligations set by 
the government, but also to the genuineness of either party in being committed 
to the success of the partnership.  
Commitment on the part of large companies was perceived by the owners of 
SMEs in the decisions and actions of the large companies in implementing the 
mandated policy. Commitment on the part of SMEs, as perceived by 
interviewees of large companies, was not only attributed to the dedication and 
presence of owners of SMEs on sites on a constant basis but also to the 
enthusiasm of those owners which resulted in a high level of trust.  
Among the large companies, N1 seemed to be the most committed in fulfilling 
the mandated business interaction. Both the project manager and the site 
engineer of N1 emphasized their appreciation of the effort made by the 
government to support SMEs which in their perceptions was an essential step 
to enhance their efficiency. This can be seen in the expression of the Omani 
PM of N1: 
‘I appreciate the effort that the government made; I believed, I already 
noticed some local SMEs growing. In the long run, this will certainly 
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encourage Omani youth, not only to establish their own businesses, but 
to think of being real entrepreneurs’. 
N1 and the owners of SMEs found that government intervention was important 
for both of them to work in an amicable environment which eventually led them 
to develop high trusting business relationships. The owner of SME2 attributed 
his confidence in working with N1 to the commitment that N1 showed which 
was unlike his experiences with other large partners: 
‘Not all large companies are committed to the mandated business policy. 
I wish other large companies would become sincere like [N1] and for this 
reason I have been working wholeheartedly. [N1] doesn’t engage SMEs 
with improper records, these SMEs offer low rates and many large 
companies still approach SMEs with improper records because of the 
low prices they offer’. 
This statement showed the high degree of trust that existed between N1 and 
subcontracted SMEs which was based on the commitment of representatives 
of N1 in working towards the success of mandated business interactions.  
From the perspective of SMEs, commitment was demonstrated in two distinct 
ways: the presence and dedication of the owner of the SME to the business 
and, secondly, the enthusiasm shown by the owner of the SME.  
Most of the interviewees of large companies made it clear that it was 
fundamental for owners of SMEs to be available at the sites on a constant 
basis for reasons such as discussing the progress of the work and overseeing 
the performance of employees. The PM of S2 expressed such an incident:  
‘Unfortunately, many of them work in public sector and we hardly see 
them at the site. It happened last week, we came across some 
challenges, and we thought of plan B and we had to decide on 
something and discuss the plan, we struggled to get them and their 
representatives couldn’t decide on anything...you tell me how can you 
trust a partner who is not dedicated?., 
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Such lack of dedication led to the diminution of trust and eventually to the 
decision of the larger company to avoid entering into contracts with those 
SMEs. Even when the large companies, such as N1, had goodwill towards 
developing business relationships with SMEs, these eventually avoided 
contracting with SMEs which displayed lack of dedication. 
One example was seen when the owner of SME2 recounted how the 
representatives of S1 appreciated his availability at the site which actually led 
his company to complete the initial assigned task to specifications and within 
the time frame. This pleasing outcome was seen to be the result of the owner 
of SME2 being readily available at the site to discuss progress, to be part of 
the decision making process and to continually supervise and monitor his 
employees. Consequently, SME2 was always favoured by S1 due to the trust 
that had developed between them as a result of the owner of SME2’s constant 
dedication. The owner of SME2 working with S1 said: 
‘I remember the word of the project engineer who said to me ‘’where 
were you previously, as I really needed an owner of a SME like yours’’, 
by this he meant that he intended to engage me in most  works [S1] 
would get from the government in the future’. 
The owner of SME2 had commenced with a small project from S1 worth 5,000 
Omani Rial (OR), but due to the trust that had grown between them, this had 
grown to works valued at 450,000 OR (see chapter 4 section: 4.3.1.2). To see 
the evidence of the stated value (see Appendix 5).   
The enthusiasm which owners of SMEs showed was another sub-factor which 
led to development of a high level of trust in SMEs. Enthusiasm is related to 
the eagerness which owners of SMEs showed to enter into business 
relationships with large partners and to sustain these relationships. The owner 
of SME2, working with S1, described how, although the project manager of S1 
had been initially resistant to assigning any job to him based on previous poor 
experiences with other appointed SMEs, after a long conversation with the PM 
of S1, the PM agreed to assign him an initial contract. The reason for doing so 
was based on the enthusiasm shown by the owner of SME2 which proved to 
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be a genuine expression of willingness to be committed to the contract. This 
resulted in high state of trust between them which led to continuous contracts.  
Enthusiasm from the perspective of large companies can be seen in the 
expression of the PM of N1 who commented on the enthusiasm of some 
owners of SMEs and reported one case which he regarded as exceptional:  
‘He was not only chasing opportunities that may arise out of our 
business, but he was seeking for opportunities with subcontracted 
SMEs, this helped the SMEs and us to complete the project to get 
another one’. 
Thus, commitment of large companies to the mandated relationship and 
towards attaining productive business relationships with SMEs was a very 
influential sub-factor in the development of high trust, from the perspectives of 
SMEs. On the other hand, dedication and enthusiasm of owners of SMEs, from 
the perspectives of representatives of large companies, were very influential 
sub-factors which also led to developing trusting business relationships.  
5.2.2.2 Goal congruence 
In the literature, goal congruence refers to the alignment of goals and 
objectives of both partners. Goal congruence between SMEs and large 
companies included involvement in the planning for the future expansion of 
business activities, joint planning for the commencement of work and 
utilisation of human and financial resources. Goal congruence was found to 
be important for large companies and SMEs to succeed at the practical level 
and, consequently, for the development of trust. 
This factor occurred where there was a fit between the aims and objectives of 
both companies which were directed towards achieving common goals.  Goal 
congruence was raised by the PM and the SE of N1 as one of the critical 
factors for N1 and the subcontracted SMEs to work within a trusting 
partnership. The PM said: 
‘See, disagreements over achievements of goals is expected when two 
independent companies must work in parallel and together to achieve 
certain objectives. Therefore, being clear about the objectives helped us 
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to plan and align the priority of the project and eventually led both of us 
to work alongside each other with confidence’. 
This showed how goal congruence was a factor in the development of a high 
level of trust. 
From the perspectives of SMEs, and as a consequence of goal congruence 
between N1 and subcontracting SMEs, the owner of SME1 related his 
confidence throughout his interaction with N1 to the congruence of their goals 
which led to efficient and cost effective use of resources.  
The owner of SME2, working with S2, recounted how goal congruence was an 
important factor which led to the development of a high level of trust between 
his company and S2: 
‘I was working in parallel with the main contractor regarding the goal 
which would be good for both of us in this project and in the future 
projects. I finally found one company in Tehran sold this product for 
almost half of the price that I got in Dubai. When I returned to Oman I 
and the PM of [S2] convinced the engineer in the Ministry of Transport 
about the quality of the material and [S2] intends to install it. I 
immediately arranged it when I got the green light. Imagine, later on I 
became the dealer for the material and [S2] has been purchasing the 
material from my company ever since’.   
Due to working towards the same objectives of cost effectiveness, both 
companies worked cooperatively and developed a high level of trust based on 
their goal congruence.   
5.2.2.3 Sharing risk 
Sharing risk emerged, from the perspectives of some interviewees of large 
companies, as a factor referring to the readiness of partners to assume a share 
of the responsibility in certain risk-taking activities. It occurs in situations where 
the outcomes may not always be easy to predict and one company does not 
assign all the risk to the other but shares it.   
Sharing risk was mostly found in the cases of N1 and subcontracted SMEs. 
This was seen in the incident reported by the PM of N1, particularly when N1 
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showed its readiness of sharing risk with appointed SMEs which eventually 
led to the development of trusting business relationships between them: 
‘I assigned different tasks to local SMEs. Owners of SMEs were 
desperately waiting for the work to start. These SMEs were caught 
commencing the work before permission from the government was 
issued and they were fined, we tried to minimise the effects of the fines 
imposed on them by allocating additional job opportunities to them’. 
The willingness of the PM of N1 to take on some of the burden of the fines 
imposed on SMEs resulted in a high level of trust being established between 
them. This was evident in a further comment made by the PM of N1: 
‘What would I lose if I don’t do it? That’s why you may find many SMEs 
working with us on a regular basis’. 
It is found that SMEs in asymmetrical business relationships are the ones who 
are often exposed to greater risk. The owner of SME1 narrated several 
incidents which demonstrated the readiness of N1 to share the risk entailed in 
certain ventures. For example, he reported an incident when there had been 
unexpected heavy rainfall which had resulted in flooding and the destruction 
of the majority of the work his company had commenced for N1: 
‘My company would have collapsed, right, if I would have been with 
another company. Immediately, when I raised the issue to the site 
engineer and to the PM of [N1], they compensated the loss and I was 
fine. I sincerely thanked them for their goodwill and this is what led me 
to confidently work with [N1] in many other projects’. 
Such sharing of risk demonstrated the trust that the PM of N1 had in SME1 
due to his readiness to share the risk that SME1 had been exposed to. This 
trust on the part of N1 was reciprocated by SME1 who showed his 
trustworthiness by putting in his best efforts by commencing the work 
efficiently and handing it over to N1 in eight months instead of twelve months 
as originally agreed. This further enhanced the trust that N1 had in the 
productivity and efficiency of SME1 
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5.2.2.4 Tolerating short comings of a partner 
In the literature, tolerance refers to a situation where one partner is ready and 
willing to be patient with the mistakes or shortcomings of the other partner in 
order to give that partner the time and opportunity to prove their 
trustworthiness (Hamida, 2011).  
Firstly, tolerance on the part of large companies in mandated business 
interactions, emerged from the data, and refers to situations in which the larger 
partner willingly supports the smaller partners in various ways either by advice 
or encouragement. The PM of N1 emphasised the importance of showing 
tolerance towards the errors of appointed SMEs. The PM of N1 even described 
how some large companies, unfortunately, used the mistakes unintentionally 
made by SMEs for unfair advantages instead of being patient and supporting 
them.  
The PM of N1 stressed the limited knowledge and experiences that most 
SMEs had and he reported how the assistance which his company often 
provided enhanced their productivity: 
‘It happens very often, the SMEs miscalculate quantities in the submitted 
quotations, we call them, point out what they had missed to consider in 
their calculations and we easily come up with a solution which is of 
mutual benefit’.  
The influence of tolerance on development of trust was confirmed by the owner 
of SME2 who worked with N1 who reported that, before interacting with N1, 
his company had not been fully aware of certain issues in calculating 
productions of some equipment. For example, SME2 had no prior experience 
of major projects such as highway construction and consequently, was unable 
to make realistic estimates regarding the timescale of such projects. He 
asserted that trust in N1 had been raised due to the tolerance his company 
had been shown by N1: 
‘I had to knock the door of the engineer of [N1] every time asking for 
assistance and guidance. I have received constant support which I have 
never felt with any other large companies. I must acknowledge that I 
started with little experience. I learned lots when I interacted with [N1]’. 
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However, tolerance was not only shown by large companies towards the 
mistakes of their small counterparts but, occasionally, tolerance of SMEs of 
the mistakes made by large partners was also influential in the development 
of trust. The tolerance of the owner of SME2 was the starting point for the 
development of trust between S2 and SME2. The owner of SME2 reported an 
incident when the government representatives came to the site and raised an 
enquiry about the delay of the project. The site engineer of S2 responded to 
the enquiry and placed the blame on SME2 in order to protect the image of S2 
in the eyes of the government representatives. The owner of SME2 reported 
his reaction in the following terms: 
‘I will tell you how trust began to rise after this incident. The government 
representatives had to call both of us. The client asked me first about 
the reason behind the delay, I replied “such delays always happen and 
I promise you to finish the work within the time frame”. I had to reply in a 
way that did not disturb our relationships’. 
Thus, the owner of SME2 was prepared to cover up for the inaccurate report 
of the SE of S2. One reason for this was the fact that, if the delay was attributed 
to S2, the outcome would have had dire consequences for future government 
contracts for S2. This could also harm SME2 in the long run as S2 might not 
be in a position to subcontract SME2 in mandated business interactions. This 
explains why the representatives of S2 apologised and praised the tolerant 
action of the owner of SME2 which protected S2 in the eyes of the government 
representatives. This also led S2 to trust the owner of SME2 and pay specific 
attention to developing further business relationships based on trust. These 
examples show how a high level of trust can develop between partners when 
either partner is prepared to tolerate the mistakes of the other.  
5.2.2.5 Transparency 
Transparency is perceived by informants of both companies as an open and 
verbal discussion between business partners of challenges that may hinder 
them both in attaining productive business relationship leading to completion 
of projects. Transparency implies that there should be no hidden agendas 
between business partners. Transparency between SMEs and large 
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companies implies openness between the partners rather than involving the 
government in resolving the challenges that they face. 
Several cases provide evidence of how transparency during the interaction 
resulted in high trust levels. An example from the perspective of large 
companies can be clearly seen in the expression of the PM of S1: 
‘As I said, those owners of SMEs were not transparent. They were only 
picky. Because of the involvement of the government representatives, 
they were raising every problem related to our business interaction and 
this was wrong.’  
The PM of N1 had also indicated several experiences in which he always had 
preference to work with specific SMEs due to their transparency: 
‘I like the SME owned by (X) because of his transparency, whenever he 
says yes I can handle this job and within this period of time, he commits 
himself, when he says no, he means it, he tells why’. 
The owner of SME3 considered transparency to be a safety net in which his 
company and N1 developed trusted business relationship: 
‘I was transparent with the project manager, and from the beginning. I 
told him I will start the work, but if I face any difficulty or feel that I can’t 
continue I will leave the work and go. The project manager was 
transparent with me, he said he would not leave me alone and this is 
what happened’. 
He continued by stating that, even during the first business interaction, he had 
reported the weakness of his company to the PM of N1. The PM of N1 
eventually thanked him for his transparency and worked with him side by side 
until his company was able to work independently.  
Thus, within mandated business interactions, transparency was found to be 
an important trust factor.  
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5.3 The institutional based trust factors 
Institutional based trust in mandated business interactions emerged from the 
data analysis as an important type of trust factor. Institutional based trust 
factors, in this study, are related to social institutions such as tribal norms and 
as well as to the government intervention which existed in the form of 
inspection and supervision practices.  
5.3.1 Social institution 
5.3.1.1 The tribal norms 
Tribal norms emerged as a new sub-factor. They were perceived by the 
informants of the study as a living law of the community which was binding 
and even took precedence over legal dictates. Tribal norms are usually 
unwritten customs, tradition, and laws which influence and control the 
behaviour of its members. They extend from customs and rituals covering 
table manners and shared meals to regulations and human institutions of birth, 
marriage and death. These tribal norms are to some extent present in all 
societies but tend to be much more powerful in traditional and developing 
countries such as Oman. Tribal norms cover all important aspects of 
communal life and this includes business transactions. 
A clear example of tribal norms can be seen in the incident revealed by the 
owner of SME3 who worked with N1. Trust in the case of the owner of SME3 
was caused by the perception that the other party would behave honourably 
because they belonged to a particular tribe. The incident began when the PM 
agreed to assign SME1 one of the promising business opportunities. While the 
owner of SME3 waiting for the promised work order to be issued by N1, the 
PM of N1 went on sick leave for aperiod of time. The PM was replaced by 
another person on a temporary basis during his absence. The replacement 
PM’s background was such that he was unfamiliar with local traditions and 
tribal norms. The business opportunity, which had been promised verbally by 
the PM who was on sick leave, now arose and the replacement PM began to 
advertise for tender. The owner of SME3 drew the attention of the temporary 
PM to the verbal agreement he had with the sick PM and then left the final 
decision to the replacement PM without getting involved in negotiation or 
disputes.  
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The owner of SME3 narrated how the replacement PM had been in touch with 
the PM on sick leave by telephone updating him on various matters and 
discussed the opportunity which the owner of SME3 had mentioned to him. 
The PM on sick leave immediately instructed him to award the opportunity to 
the owner of SME3 as he was honour-bound by a verbal promise. The owner 
of SME3 commented on the incident: 
‘The representative immediately called me and I got the job. I had a 
strong belief that the PM on sick leave would not let this matter go and I 
had no doubt that he values the words of his mouth’.  
He expressed that it was not the personal relationship between him and the 
PM which had led to honouring the agreement, nor was it due to his being 
bound by the mandated nature of business interaction. Rather it was the force 
of the tribal norm governing the expected behaviour following a verbal 
agreement among the people in the tribe to which he belonged that determined 
his decision to honour his word. Moreover, the verbal agreement had been 
confirmed ritually by shaking of hands. Within the tribal culture, the ritual hand 
shake has even more force than written legal documents, as a person’s status 
within that society would be adversely affected by failing to honour such an 
agreement.  
Tribal norms have also arisen as an influential factor from the perspectives of 
representatives of large companies. An example of this leading to high level 
of trust was seen in the expression of the PM of S1: 
 ‘It was important to know their tribal background. Those who came from 
well-known family backgrounds tended to be more reliable and 
trustworthy, because they feared that failing to honour agreements with 
larger companies would bring insult to their families’. 
Although fear of bringing dishonour to their families was the overriding 
motivation for fulfilling their contracts, it often resulted in the development of 
trusting relationships. The PM of S1 understood tribal norms of owners of 
SMEs and the force of these norms in terms of fulfilling agreements and on 
this basis, mutual trust existed between them. 
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What the PM of S1 revealed about the significance of tribal norms was 
confirmed by the owner of SME2 who reported how the PM of S1 became 
confident and assigned works to him without any hesitation, particularly when 
the PM came to know that he came from a traditional family:  
‘Dear brother (the interviewer), we are brought up in a conservative 
society and the project manager has been in Oman for many years. He 
understood that our tribal customs were influential over our behaviour 
and that failure to fulfil agreements would bring dishonour not only on us 
personally but also on the whole tribe’. 
He attributed this to the honesty and to the moral values binding the people 
living in villages based on their tribal norms. These were not unknown to the 
PM of S1 who had been in Oman for many years. He also narrated an 
experience in which S1 was about to take legal action against an owner of a 
SME who was supposed to return some equipment to S1. The owner of SME2 
requested the PM to wait and to delay taking legal matters further. He asked 
him to give him a chance to see if he could resolve the dispute between S1 
and the owner of SME through reliance on tribal norms. The owner of SME2 
also expressed how resolving disputes through legal actions in the case of 
mandated business interactions would create a bad impression for both 
parties with the government representatives, while there were tribal customs 
which were more effective in resolving disputes. The owner of SME2 described 
the effectiveness of tribal norms in the following terms in which the PM of S1 
eventually thanked him for his initiative: 
 ‘I went to the house of the owner of the SME who refused to return the 
equipment until S1 had paid his bill, I explained to him that as the owner 
of a new small company and the fact that he is from a good family, I told 
him besides thinking of his name in the market he is supposed to think 
of the dignity of his family and tribe’.   
The owner of SME2 succeeded in resolving the dispute between S1 and the 
other owner of the SME. The significance of entering the house of a person is 
understood as an act of reconciliation in which past disputes are considered 
to be resolved and completed. Thus, the tribal norm factor was one of the 
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important influential factors which led to a high level of trust between business 
partners. 
With regards to public institutional factors, two forms of government practices 
were found to be influential in trust development. These were the inspection 
and supervision practices which are presented in the following sections.  
5.3.1.2 Public institutions 
5.3.1.2.1 The inspection practice 
The inspection is an action often taken by specific teams from the Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM). One of the responsibilities of this team is to pay field visits 
to sites of companies engaged in public projects. This is to ensure their 
implementation of laws and ministerial decisions regarding the legal status of 
employees as well as ensuring their full compliance with health and safety in 
the workplace. These types of visits were often unannounced.  
Interviewees of large companies were found to be very careful in abiding by 
government regulations since the source of most of their business was the 
government. Most of them tended to avoid any liability by not engaging SMEs 
with improper records.  
Evidence from the perspective of large companies can be seen in the 
experience of the site engineer of S1 who expressed how disappointed he and 
his company were when the inspection team had caught labourers of some 
SMEs in whom they had previously placed their trust. The inspection practice 
has also limited the choice of some SMEs to engage their own employees 
instead of hiring unskilled labourers through unofficial channels. Thus, meeting 
the standards required by government inspection teams was an important 
factor for the development of trust between SMEs and large companies.  
Inspections were also necessary from the government’s perspectives in order 
to ensure that its mandated business policy was being correctly implemented.  
From the perspectives of SMEs, the owner of SME1 working with N1 reported 
an incident which showed how the inspection visits facilitated the development 
of trust between his company and N1. This happened during an unannounced 
inspection visit when some labourers were caught without ID. The owner of 
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SME1 emphasised that the visit made by the inspection team was what 
actually led N1 to recognise SMEs which complied with the government rules 
particularly SME1 which continued to work with N1: 
‘I really encourage the inspection team represented by the Ministry of 
Manpower to keep up their inspections and do it on a regular basis. The 
inspection was what led my company and [N1] to develop trusting 
business relationship’. 
The owner of SME1 had ensured that N1 would not be exposed to any liability 
or risk and taking such care resulted in a high level of trust being placed in his 
company by N1. Similarly, the owner of SME2 working with JV2 was able to 
state that the inspection made by the team from MOM cleaned the market of 
the undesirable practice of engaging SMEs who did comply with government 
rules and regulations. The inspection practice helped those SMEs who 
complied with government policies to be the choice for large companies. Illegal 
practices were considered as constraints to the growth and development of 
SMEs who were law abiding. The owner of SME2 working with JV2 expressed 
the outcome of the inspection in these terms: 
‘Imagine, representatives from head office calling you to quote for the 
jobs. I used to put reasonable prices and sometimes high, I don’t 
remember any of my quotations being rejected. This is because they had 
to deal with registered and official SMEs fearing that if they engaged with 
SMEs who disobeyed regulations they would be caught’. 
5.3.1.2.2 The government supervision practices 
Government supervision is different from inspection practices. Supervision is 
the responsibility of committees formed by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (MTC) with the purpose of regulating and monitoring the 
interactions between SMEs and large companies. The regular visits made by 
the committees were intended to check upon opportunities that could be 
utilised efficiently by large companies and SMEs as well as to discuss 
obstacles that might hinder business partners from developing productive 
business relationship based on trust. These committees attempted to fulfil the 
needs of SMEs from human and financial resources, clarified enquires of 
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significant issues such as release of payments, attempted to help both 
companies in fastening their needs of license and permissions from other 
government authorities and operated as arbitrators when any 
misunderstanding occurred between large companies and SMEs. Such 
practice has encouraged business partners to work with confidence and in an 
efficient manner.  
From the perspectives of large companies, the PM of S1 asserted that the role 
played by the committee which supervised the work commenced by S1 and 
subcontracted SMEs facilitated the development of trust between S1 and 
SMEs: 
‘I shouldn’t ignore the role played by the supervision committee and the 
group of government representatives who actually helped SMEs in 
obtaining required resources, they have also clarified, you know, 
payment and issues that were not clear.’ 
The supervision practice and its influence in development of trust was 
acknowledged by the owner of SME1 who worked with the above company 
(S1). The owner of SME1 experienced several constraints which had led him 
to develop a bad impression of S1. To highlight the mediating role played by 
the government which eventually led to the development of trust between 
SME1 and S1, he reported two incidents. The first of these incidents occurred 
when S1 rejected a delivery of certain materials made by SME1. 
The government representative instructed that the material should be checked 
by an independent laboratory and the material was approved. The second 
incident happened when S1 instructed the owner of SME1 to commence some 
work in a nonsensical manner. The owner of SME1 was not convinced and 
accordingly asked the SE to give him the instruction in written form. This was 
for no other reason than to protect the interest and image of his company.  
Again, the government representative was more inclined to side with the 
opinion of the owner of SME1 and the PM of S1 instructed the site engineer of 
S1 to respect the judgement of the owner of SME1 whose previous 
assessments had been accurate. In both cases, government representatives 
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were the mediators who brought about a fairer way for large and small 
companies to cooperate.  
5.4 Factors which led to low state of trust 
Low level of trust was found in six embedded cases. These are presented in 
Table 10 which provides an overview of the factors and sub-factors. 
Table 10 Factors leading to low levels of trust 
Note: the factors that emerged from the data which led to low trust are 
underlined and presented in Italics in the table above and factors identified in 
the literature are presented in a plain text format. Occurrences of each factor 
No The factors influencing 
trust 
Perception of 
Cases in which the factor 
appeared 
 
Factors related to characteristic of partner 
N2-SMEs 
S2-
SME1 
JV1-
SME2 
JV2-
SME1 
1 2 3    
1 Discrimination based on 
nationality/ethnicity 
Both 
companies 
√ √ √ √   
Process based trust factors       
2 
Unfavourable reputation of 
a potential partner 
Owners of 
SMEs 
√ √  √   
3 
The manipulation of the 
mandated business strategy 
by large companies 
Both 
companies 
√ √ √   √ 
4 
 
Exploitation of a partner 
- Focusing on self-
interest 
Both 
companies 
√ √ √ √ √  
- Asking for a bribe 
Owners of 
SME 
  √    
- Violation of contract 
Large 
company 
      
                 Factors related to institutions       
5 
Lack of Government 
supervision  
Both 
companies 
 √    √ 
6 
Inequality of treatment by 
the government 
Both 
companies 
  √    
7 
Low quality of works allotted 
to SMEs 
Owners of 
SMEs 
√ √ √ √  √ 
8 
Inadequate government 
database 
Both 
companies 
√ √ √ √  
 
9 
Unfavourable conditions of 
labour market and labour 
laws 
Owners of 
SME 
√     
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in particular cases are indicated by the (√). Each factor is presented in detail 
in the following sections. 
5.4.1 Factors related to characteristics of a partner 
5.4.1.1 Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity 
Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity within mandated business interactions 
emerged from the analysis of the interview data as a factor which led to low 
levels of trust. It refers to a situation where top management of large 
companies dealt differently with SMEs on the basis of ethnicity. Most large 
companies operating in the construction industry in Oman are managed by 
non-nationals. Such management of large companies was found to contract in 
an unfair manner by dealing less favourably with SMEs managed and 
operated by Omanis. This led to a low level of trust between Omani owners of 
SMEs and these large partners operated by non-nationals. One of the clearer 
quotations was by the owner of SME1 who worked with N2: 
‘Most large companies in the construction industry are operated by 
expatriates and I found them loyal to individuals from their own origins. 
[N2] engaged SMEs managed and operated by Indians. I am talking 
from experiences, the representatives of [N2] stood for SMEs managed 
by Indians, and they were avoiding us because they feared that if Omani 
SMEs continued to grow they might represent a threat to their positions 
in time. How do you expect me to trust them?’ 
Most owners of SMEs who experienced low trust with large partner, reported 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity as one of the main reasons for them to 
quit business interactions with large companies.  
The PM of N2, who was an expatriate, explained his preference for SMEs 
managed by other expatriates of similar ethnicity rather than SMEs which were 
Omani managed: 
‘Unfortunately I experienced SMEs managed by Omani not to be 
efficient and requiring detailed explanation, why is this why is that?’.  
In all the transcripts of owners of SMEs who worked with N2 and S2, it was 
clear that the low level of trust between them and certain large partners was 
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due to the preferential way of dealing based on ethnicity which worked against 
SMEs managed by indigenous Omanis. They perceived that the discrimination 
was appearing in terms of deliberately delaying inspections of work in order to 
delay payments to SMEs managed and operated by indigenous individuals 
while no such delays were experienced by SMEs who were managed by 
people of the same ethnicity. Consequently, Omani owners of SMEs working 
with such companies had a low level of trust in them and often quit the 
relationships. For example, the owner of SME1 working with N2 asserted that: 
 ‘Until Omani persons were appointed on managerial posts of large 
companies such as (N2), I decided not to engage in any relationships’. 
Another example can be seen in the experience of the owner of SME1 working 
with S2. To overcome the unfair discrimination, the owner of SME1 appointed 
a manager from the same ethnic origin as the representatives of S2 in the 
belief that this would appease them. This resulted in a more favourable 
approach to SME1 by S2. However, this situation underlines unfair practices 
which generally led to low levels of trust between SMEs managed by nationals 
and larger companies managed by non-nationals. Furthermore, it frustrated 
the aims and objectives of the government’s mandated business policy. 
Owners of SMEs had no choice but to get into the business of large companies 
which were owned and operated by national teams where they felt that they 
would be dealt with in a fair manner. This can be clearly seen in the experience 
of owner of SME2 working with N2. 
Unexpectedly, the owner of SME2 who worked with N2 stated that his brother 
who was an employee in N2 could not tolerate the discriminatory practice of 
the top management of N2: 
‘My brother left this company because he found the situation intolerable. 
He could not tolerate the preferences the top management had towards 
Indians’. 
These examples show how the preferential behaviour of certain managers 
worked against Omani-led SMEs and resulted in a low level of trust between 
these SMEs and their large counterparts. 
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5.4.2 Process based trust factors 
Process based trust factors are of two types, one is based on suspicion arising 
from perceptions of the reputation of a potential partner which works against 
the initiation of mandated business interactions. The second type is based on 
the actual negative experience that one partner has of another with whom they 
have previously entered into business interactions.  
Both types of process based trust factors were found in the analysis of the 
data to be related to low levels of trust. Findings related to these factors are 
presented in the following sections. 
5.4.2.1 Unfavourable reputation of a potential partner 
This factor is related to perceptions rather than direct experience and was 
largely perceived by owners of SMEs who perceived the reputation of the large 
partner to be based on unfairness, expected return from the business, process 
of payment release, their power over government etc. The findings of the 
interview data show a great reluctance on the part of SMEs to enter into 
business relationships with large companies based on such reputations. For 
example, the owner of SME2 working with N2 said: 
 ‘I knew [N2], and it is not only me but everyone in the market knows 
what [N2] has and how it works. In fact, I had no choice either to accept 
or to shut down my business venture. I had no work for my employees. 
I accepted the deal because I had to pay my employees and pay for 
other expenses’.  
The influence of such a bad reputation was perceived by most owners of SMEs 
who worked with N2. Many of them stated that if they had had any alternatives 
they would not have entered into business interaction with N2.  
Therefore, the reputation of the potential large business partner led owners of 
SMEs to have suspicions about the possibility of developing business 
relationships based on trust.  
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5.4.2.2 Factors based on direct experience 
These process type factors are not so much related to the reputation but to the 
direct experience of working with a partner. A number of factors were found 
and these are presented in the following sub-sections.  
5.4.2.2.1 The manipulation of the mandated business strategy by large 
companies 
The manipulation factor emerged from the data and refers to a situation where 
the small partner experienced that their large partners used their power and 
influence over the government to the detriment of SMEs. Government policy 
regarding the award of public projects to large companies had a twofold 
condition. The first was the mandated business interactions with SMEs 
whereby the large company would be awarded projects by the government 
provided that they subcontracted a minimum of 10% of the work to SMEs. The 
second condition was that a minimum of 30% of the workforce must be 
indigenous Omanis. The twofold nature of these conditions allowed some 
large companies to fulfil one of the conditions and to use this to threaten the 
government against imposing the second condition. For example, a large 
company could employ Omani workers in excess of 30% of the total workforce 
and then use this as leverage to force the government to avoid enforcing the 
10% mandated rule. Thus, the large company could fulfil one side of 
government legislation and then use this to manipulate the government. For 
example, the workforce of N2 included over 30% of Omani workers. N2 used 
this to obtain more projects from the government, but when it came to 
subcontracting with SMEs in mandated forms of business interaction, N2 
threatened to make the Omani employees redundant. This can be clearly seen 
in the expression of the PM of N2: 
‘Our company is a commercial organization. We are asked to employ job 
seekers; it is simple... If we don’t get projects from the government, we 
will not have jobs for them. We do not want SMEs. We rarely depend on 
anybody else, and we are sure that most SMEs do not have the capacity 
to execute any given work’.  
Consequently, owners of SMEs had very negative experiences with such 
companies. Most of the owners of SMEs who worked with N2 did not see any 
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hope of developing trusting relationships with N2 as N2 had a strong position 
which could hardly be influenced by the government. The manipulative 
technique which is clearly revealed by the PM of N2 can be confirmed by the 
experiences of SME1 and SME2 working with N2. The owner of SME1 stated:  
‘I heard. (N2) threatened the government, if the government decided to 
limit their scope in public projects. (N2) will release the Omani 
employees working in (N2)’. 
Owners of SMEs working with N2 reported different incidents to describe how 
N2 had different manipulative techniques to deal with them in the mandated 
business interactions. The owner of SME1 reported such manipulative 
practice on the part of N2 who set up SME1 to fail. N2 initially asked him to 
increase the number of workforce during the commencement of the work. N2 
was quite cunning in doing so as he realised that SME1 would be compelled 
to employ foreign labourers as he would not be able afford the higher rates of 
pay demanded by Omani workers. When SME1’s applications for visas to 
employ foreign labourers were rejected by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) 
due to the requirement that 30% of the workforce should be Omanis, SME1 
was left with no choice but to employ retired Omani workforce and the poor 
quality of the work delivered by these employees weakened his position in the 
project. Subsequently, N2 used this as an excuse to employ its own 
specialised workforce in commencing the remaining tasks.  
The owner of SME3 reported another tactic that N2 used to show the failure 
of mandated business interactions. He reported that N2 forced subcontracted 
SMEs to work beyond their maximum capacities and when their equipment 
and machines were out of order because of over-usage, N2 attempted to 
convince the government that SMEs had limited capacities proven by their 
poorly maintained equipment which was unsuitable for the work and that they 
should only use N2’s own resources instead.  
The manipulative practise of N2 over the relationship and over the government 
can also be seen in the incident reported by the owner of SME2 who stated 
that while his company was waiting for an inspection by N2 which was 
necessary before continuing the work, N2 delayed the inspection which meant 
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that SME2 had no work or income during this delay. When a representative of 
the Ministry visited the site, instead of insisting that N2 should carry out the 
inspection in order that SME2 could continue their work, the representative 
actually suggested to the owner of SME2 that he could move his employees 
to another site. This showed the weakness of the government representative 
who, rather than confronting N2, acted unfavourably towards SME2. The 
government representative yielded to the power and influence of N2 and failed 
to protect the interest of the smaller company. The exercise of manipulation 
by large companies led the owners of SME2 and SME1 to leave N2 with no 
hope of developing business relationships based on trust. Thus, these large 
companies were actually subverting government policy through manipulative 
tactics. 
5.4.2.2.2 Exploitation of partner 
Three sub-factors related to exploitation of partner were perceived by 
representatives of large companies and owners of SMEs to be the reasons 
behind failing in developing business relationship based on trust: focusing on 
self-interest by exploiting advantageous character of a partner, asking for a 
bribe in order to release payments, and thirdly, violation of contract for the 
purpose of saving some money.  
The following illustrate each of the three sub-factors: 
Focusing on self-interest 
Focus on self-interest factor is based on perception of the interviewees and 
refers to the situation where a partner gets into the relationship with another 
partner with the sole intention of furthering their own self-interest without caring 
for the interest of the other partner. Some representatives of large companies 
unintentionally expressed the self-interest of partnering certain owners of 
SMEs in some unguarded comments in which they let slip their motives and 
intentions to take advantage of the SME. An example of this can be seen in 
the transcript of the PM of JV1: 
‘One of them (an owner of SME) always provides exceptional services 
to us. it reaches to a point that I rely on him for many things, he is aware 
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of most of the procedures that our company would need such as 
licences, permissions, etc’. 
A first view of the comments of the PM of JV1 does not seem to suggest ulterior 
motives. It is only when these comments are compared with the expressions 
of some of his subcontracted SMEs that his ulterior motives are laid bare: 
‘I had a feeling about the motive of the main contractor, their project 
manager attempted to make use of me when he came to know that I 
previously worked for (X) company. I also noticed a totally different deal 
when the project manager came to know that I was fully aware of the 
procedures followed in the Tender Board and the deal became much 
better when he realized that I had a network in the Ministry of Transports 
and communications’ (laughed). 
It was clear from the laughter at the end of the comments of the owner of SME1 
that he had seen through the self-interest of the PM of JV1 and that this PM 
could easily terminate his relationship when another more advantageous one 
came along. Clearly, the SME did not trust JV1. 
Another example of focus on self-interest and how it led to low level of trust 
can be seen in the case of SME1 working with JV2. JV2 initially assigned to 
SME1 the construction of a hydraulic bridge for the one of the national ferry 
companies which was targeted to become a contributor to the maritime 
transport infrastructure and development in the country. JV2 initially exposed 
itself to some considerable risk when JV2 gave the green light to owner of 
SME1 to arrange all essential materials he had not considered while 
submitting quotations without referring or seeking prior approval from JV2. 
However, JV2, in return, presented the creativity of the core work of the SME1 
in the social media as though it had been the work of JV2. 
The owner of SME1 asserted that he had suspicions about the intention of JV2 
particularly when he was given the green light to arrange all that he needed to 
commence the work without even the need for approval from JV2. He 
expressed that the reason behind the bad motive and intention of JV2 was the 
attempts to keep the information about the real cost of the assigned work by 
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the government hidden from him. This was in addition to presenting the 
creativity of the core work of SME1 in the social media as though it was the 
work of JV2. This resulted in the breakdown of trust between them. 
However, ulterior motives and intentions were also found to be attributed to 
some SMEs and this resulted in a low level of trust between them and large 
partners. For example, the project manager (PM) of JV2 mentioned: 
‘I experienced many owners of SMEs come to our business chain with 
the intention of hit and run, unfortunately, they only think to grab quick a 
job and try to get it done as quickly as possible and get the money and 
go’.  
Asking for bribes 
Bribery in IORs is based on perceptions of the interviewee who experienced 
unacceptable and immoral practices by one employee in a partnering 
company or by the entire company and such practices impacted on the level 
of trust in the exchange. A clear example of bribery was reported by the owner 
of SME3 working with N2. The offer by an employee of N2 to release payments 
quickly to the owner of SME3 in return for the payment of a bribe had the effect 
of destroying any trust that might have existed between them. His refusal to 
pay the bribe led to lengthy and unnecessary transaction delays by N2 which 
necessitated the owner of SME3 appealing to an acquaintance in the Ministry 
of Transport and Communication (MTC):  
‘I said I will never do this, as you know this is prohibited, big shame. I 
had to call the person in MTC and my payment was released. Their 
practice changed once I involved an individual from the government’.  
 
Thus, the action of one employee in N2 in seeking a bribe in return for 
preferential treatment damaged the relationship between the SME and the 
larger company and there was never any trust placed in N2 by the owner of 
SME3. 
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Violation of contract 
This sub-factor is based in perception of representative of large companies 
and related to the violation of the contract of the subcontracted SMEs. It was 
noted by most of large companies who experienced low level of trust with 
SMEs. For example, the PM of S2 reported that his site engineer caught some 
SMEs using less of a specific material than they were supposed to use for the 
sake of saving some money. The PM  stated that he told owners of these 
SMEs not to return to the business chain of S2 after completing their assigned 
works. Dishonest behaviour had resulted in the complete breakdown of any 
trust between them.  
The PM of N2 reported another experience in which the site engineer of N2 
caught some SMEs using materials supplied by N2. These SMEs, instead of 
using the materials in the work allotted by N2, utilised the material to 
commence work belonging to another large contracting company. According 
to the PM of N2, these SMES had taken this action in order to get their 
payments released with other contracting companies. However, he stated that 
his company could understand the purpose of utilising resources of N2 if they 
had been open and honest about their need to borrow the materials until they 
had received payment. This unethical behaviour created some ambiguity 
which diminished the level of trust between N2 and subcontracted SMEs. 
Owners of SMEs related actions of some appointed SMEs to the low value of 
works assigned to them which they tried to cover by reducing the quantity of 
materials they were supposed to use. Nevertheless, the majority of 
representatives of large companies and owners of SMEs attributed such 
behaviour to the unintended consequences of the terms of the government 
policy of mandated business interactions. These factors are reported in the 
following section. 
5.4.3 Institutional based trust factors 
The institutional based trust factors were based on perceptions of both 
interacting companies and refer to a situation where the role of a third and 
independent party influences the actions of interacting companies. The third 
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party often represent the government institutions which legitimise the rules and 
regulations which business partners have to consider.  
Most of the factors emerging from the data which led to low level of trust were 
related to the government’s shortcomings in managing the mandated 
interactions between SMEs and large companies. These factors include: lack 
of government supervision, inequality of treatment by the government, low 
quality of work allotted to SMEs, lack of adequate government database and 
finally unfavourable conditions of labour market and labour laws. The following 
sections present these factors.  
5.4.3.1 Lack of government supervision 
Government supervision factor refers to the action taken by committees which 
had been formed by the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MTC) for 
the purpose of regulating and monitoring the interactions between SMEs and 
large companies. However, due to the many public projects which were also 
at different locations, these committees had limited visits to the sites, and as 
a consequence, many disputes were not easily resolved which led to low levels 
of trust between partners. Some cases experienced a low level of trust despite 
the innovativeness of the SME which had initially attracted the attention of the 
large partner. Such attraction and potential interest is what the government 
wished to see as an outcome of mandated business policy but, due to the 
limited visits to sites, such expected innovativeness often passed unnoticed. 
This was true in the case of SME1 working with JV2 which was responsible 
for the innovative construction of a hydraulic bridge for which the SME 
received no recognition. As a consequence of this lack of due recognition, the 
level of trust between SME1 and JV2 was low.    
In contrast, another case within the same large company, SME2 working with 
JV2, which had received frequent visits from government committee, 
experienced a high level of trust.  In the second case the companies were 
located close to the ministry and this enabled frequent visits to be made.  
5.4.3.2 Inequality of treatment by the Government 
Inequality of treatment by the government refers to a situation where 
representatives of some large companies did not see any hope in developing 
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productive business relationships with SMEs based on trust because the 
government did not treat both parties equally. This practice was found to cause 
frustration to some large companies. The PM of N2 clearly stressed that 
forcing the release of payments to SMEs in 28 days while the government 
delayed payments to N2 for more than a year had always been an irritating 
issue for N2: 
‘When the relationship with the government failed, the relationship with 
our subcontractors also failed’. 
Owners of SMEs working with N2 always experienced N2 attributing the delay 
of payment to the government and not to themselves. Repeated enquiries 
caused suspicions with SME owners about their larger partners. The owner of 
SME3, workings with N2, asserted that once he lost his temper and shouted 
at the PM of N2: 
‘I could not tolerate this. I told the project manager if I don’t get my 
payment I will raise this issue to the Tender Board of Oman and the 
government. I threatened him’. 
He was irritated when N2 even attempted to use him to put pressure on the 
government representatives to release the payments of N2. Yet, when the 
owner of SME3 working with N2 followed up the payment issue with the 
government, he was told that the large partner had submitted bills in excess 
of the completed work and he was told by the government representatives that 
he should receive the payment from N2 as per law in 28 days. Thus, the 
owners of SMEs were in a hopeless position. The delay of payments caused 
the owners of SME2 and SME3 to use their savings, and the case was even 
worse with SME2 when N2 intentionally delayed his payments and he had to 
lose some of his employees because he was not in position to pay their 
salaries on a regular basis. 
Thus, inequality of treatment by the government caused the larger partner to 
be in a stronger position and the slow pace of releasing payments to large 
companies which, in turn, resulted in delayed payments to SMEs, resulted in 
the diminution of trust between SMEs and their larger counterparts. Thus, the 
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unequal treatment of the government in expecting the larger partner to wait for 
payments for long periods while insisting that the large partner should pay 
SMEs in 28 days led to a low trust between the two companies.  
5.4.3.3 Lack of an adequate government database 
The third factor was the absence of an accurate government database with 
information about SMEs. The database was supposed to include detailed 
information of each SME such as ownership, SMEs human and financial 
resources, and history and business experiences of SMEs. As a consequence, 
both SMEs and large companies remained suspicious about each other. Large 
companies were unable to contract with SMEs with any degree of confidence 
due to the lack of details on the government databases. Owners of SMEs were 
not confident about their large partners as large companies were still inclined 
to subcontract with SMEs offering lower prices and these SMEs were often 
working in illegally. The owner of SME2 working with JV2 said: 
‘As you know large companies always look for the cheapest cost offered 
to them by SMEs and such cheap prices are offered by those who have 
no commercial registrations and work in any kind of job’.  
The absence of accurate records had also given an opportunity to large 
companies to portray SMEs as inefficient. The PM of N2 said: 
‘Without knowledge of their history and performance we can only employ 
them while remaining cautious about their ability’.  
The lack of an adequate government database of SMEs gave an opportunity 
to large companies including N2 to force SMEs to reduce their prices otherwise 
N2 would not offer them contracts but would use other SMEs who were 
keeping inaccurate records and that the government would not easily detect 
this. 
The owners of SMEs, on the other hand, had been passing messages to the 
Ministry of Manpower to send the inspection team to the sites to check the 
legality of SMEs subcontracted by their large partners. The owner of SME2 
working with JV2 illustrated one of these experiences: 
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‘I immediately called the inspection team from Ministry of Manpower and 
almost 40 workers were caught illegally working on that site’.  
Such threats did not allow for the development of trust between large 
companies and owners of SMEs.  
5.4.3.4 Low quality of the work allocated to SMEs in mandated business 
interactions 
The quality of work reserved for SMEs in the mandated business interactions 
was the fourth sub-factor which emerged under government shortcoming 
factor. The low level of trust in this factor related to a situation where most 
large companies assigned difficult tasks to SMEs which had little potential to 
return a fair profit. Some large companies intentionally reserved works which 
were difficult for SMEs for the purpose of persuading the government that the 
mandated business policy was ineefective. Consequently, these SMEs either 
had to quit the business at an early stage as in the case of S2, or else they 
delivered poor quality works as was reported by the PM of S1. SMEs had to 
violate the contract by using minimum quantity of materials in order to obtain 
something out of their business interactions with large partners, and this 
resulted in large companies being suspicious about their small counterparts. 
Most of the owners of SMEs related the failure in developing productive 
business relationships based on trust to the poor and discouraging quality of 
works assigned by their large partners. They pleaded that it was the 
government which should determine the quality and nature of the work 
reserved for them and not their large partners as expressed by the owner of 
SME1 who worked with N2: 
‘The government needs to determine the quality and nature of assigned 
work and not [N2]. 
5.4.3.5 Unfavourable conditions of labour market and labour laws 
Unfavourable conditions of labour market and labour laws were largely 
perceived by owners of SMEs and emerged from the data as a shortcoming 
of the government policy in considering the capabilities of SMEs in meeting 
the regulations of employing nationals. The labour market condition and labour 
laws in Oman have been greatly influenced by certain government policies. 
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One of these is the policy of Omanisation by which all companies, large and 
SMEs, were obliged to employ a minimum of 30% Omani workers prior to 
being considered for public projects. This government policy was well-
intentioned as it was aimed at tackling unemployment among indigenous job 
seekers. However, most of the SME owners complained that they could not 
employ Omani nationals due to their expectations of high salaries which were 
unaffordable. In cases where Omani citizens joined SMEs, their turnover was 
rapid as they tended to soon leave in search of better paid jobs elsewhere.  
In practice, the Omanisation policy was found to have had some unintended 
consequences. For instance, most SMEs attempted to employ low-waged 
unskilled and retired citizens to meet the 30% rule and these workers tended 
to produce low quality work. This left a bad impression on large partners about 
the efficiency and productivity of SMEs and eventually led to low levels of trust 
between business partners as expressed by the owner of SME1 working with 
N2: 
‘When your ministry (Ministry of Manpower) rejected my application, this 
is to prevent me from receiving visas to employ expatriates until I have 
achieved 30% of Omani workforce in my company, I had no choice but 
to employ retired people’.  
Thus, the unintended consequences of government employment policy 
created problems for SMEs and weakened the possibility of developing 
trusting business relationships between SMEs and large companies. 
5.5 Summary of the chapter 
The first part of this chapter presented the factors which led to high levels of 
trust. The second part of the chapter presented the factors that led to low levels 
of trust. To list the factors in a systematic way, they were presented in 
accordance to the dominant types of trust: characteristic based, process 
based, and institutional based trust.  
The following derived theoretical model summarises the factors that influenced 
high and low levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in mandated 
business interactions. 
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Figure 5 the derived model out of the findings of the current study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 5 Factors influencing levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in mandated 
business interaction: A theoretical model 
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Chapter Six – The Discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to explore the concept of trust and its presence 
between SMEs and large companies in the specific context of mandated 
business interactions between SMEs and large companies. This was 
accomplished by utilising certain indicators of trust, derived from the literature, 
to assess the levels of trust within the relationships and exploring how various 
factors influenced levels of trust in mandated business interactions. 
The findings of this study contribute to understanding relatively neglected 
issues of trust in mandated business interactions. The first issue is related to 
conceptualisation of trust in mandated business interactions. The second 
issue is related to the assessment of trust and the identification of factors 
influencing high and low levels of trust between SMEs and large companies. 
This study found that levels of trust in mandated business interactions required 
a modified group of indicators. Additionally, some critical new factors 
influencing levels of trust were identified.  
This chapter is designed as follows: the first part of the chapter 6.2 presents a 
new contextual concept of trust which emerged from the findings and the 
analysis. The next section 6.3 discusses four trust indicators used in this study 
and presents the modification made to these indicators in which levels of trust 
between large companies and SMEs in mandated business interactions can 
be assessed more appropriately. Section 6.4 discusses and critiques a 
schema of inter-organisational trust relationships which was prominent in the 
literature as a trust indicator. Section 6.5 presents and explains the model 
derived from the current study. Sections 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 present and discuss 
characteristics based trust factors, process based trust factors and institutional 
based trust factors respectively. The final section 6.8 is the summary of the 
chapter.  
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6.2 Conceptualisation of trust 
Most previous studies conceptualised trust in IOR as the confidence that one 
party had that the other party would perform as expected and would not act 
opportunistically (Nguyen et al. 2005; Cerri 2012; Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki 
2012; Jones et al. 2014). This common definition stresses two key elements 
of trust, firstly, the willingness of a party to be vulnerable, and secondly, the 
expectation of one party of favourable treatment by another party. Thus, the 
willingness of partners to engage is based on expectation (McEvily and 
Tortoriello 2011). These definitions emphasised trust as largely dependent on 
the goodwill of both partners and especially avoiding opportunistic behaviour 
in the relationship.  
However, in this study, trust was found to be contextually different. The main 
point of difference arose from the mandated nature of the business interaction; 
unlike the relationships of choice, mandated business interactions involved 
three agencies. In addition to the two partners, the integral role played by the 
government in the relationship was found to have changed the dynamic of the 
business relationship and, consequently, the nature of trust in the relationship. 
Therefore, the following definition of trust within the context of mandated 
business interaction is proposed as a new definition of trust: 
Trust in mandated business interactions is a psychological state which is 
characterised by a willingness of both partners to collaborate with each other 
confident that the relationship can work as the element of risk has been 
satisfactorily mitigated by the agency of a third party. 
In those cases, where the mandated business interactions were characterised 
by high trust, the findings of this study showed that trust between large 
companies and SMEs was enhanced by the agencies of the government within 
those relationships. One company was more disposed to place trust in the 
other company based on the knowledge that the other company was bound 
by the government’s regulations and criteria. For example, a large company 
such as N1 was willing to engage with SMEs on the basis of the knowledge 
that the SME was in compliance with the government regulations such as 
record keeping and employments law. Thus, the element of risk was minimised 
184 
 
in a way that was not possible in relationships of choice. On the other hand, 
the SME was more confident about engaging with a large company as the risk 
involved was minimised by the knowledge that the large company was bound 
by certain conditions laid down by the government. Far from restricting the 
development of trust in the relationships, the presence of the government in 
mandated business interactions was found to be the basis and foundation of 
the high state of trust between the partners. 
In the cases where low level of trust was found, this was often due to 
opportunism on the part of one party or their power to manipulate the 
mandated business policy as in the cases of N2 and its subcontracted SMEs. 
However, such failures were not intrinsic to the mandated nature of the 
interaction but rather a failure of the government to fully enact its stewardship 
of the relationship. This was found in the case of JV2 and SME1 where the 
government inspection and supervision were either ineffective or limited due 
to the distance of these projects from the capital city. If such failure or limitation 
to the government’s role of inspection and supervision could be addressed, 
then it was clear that the development of trust between the partners would 
have been more likely to have been established. Thus, in principle, the 
tripartite nature of the relationship created a new dynamic in which the large 
company encouraged the innovativeness of the SME, thereby fulfilling one of 
the aims of the government in establishing mandated business interactions as 
in the case of S2 and SME2. Additionally, the innovative SME tended to work 
hard to meet the expectation of the large partner and at the same time to 
impress the government so that this particular relationship would be noted by 
the government for its success and would be attractive to the government for 
the award of future projects.  
6.3 Modification of trust indicators 
The literature revealed the challenging nature of the assessment of trust 
between business organisations (Rus and Igli 2005) and the inadequacy of 
relying on a single indicator to signal trust (Jena et al. 2011). Consequently, 
most studies use a number of indicators. It was preferable, therefore, in this 
study, to rely on a number of trust indicators in the interest of reaching a more 
balanced and in-depth assessment. This supports the position of many 
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researchers (e.g. Laeequddin et al. 2010; Ayadi et al. 2013) that levels of trust 
could be more adequately assessed by using several indicators. 
In the literature review (see section 2.8), a justification was presented for the 
selection, from a broad range of possible indicators, of four key trust indictors 
that were found to be particularly useful in the context of mandated business 
interactions. These were: recurrence of business interaction, degree of 
formality, level of interdependency and reciprocity of information exchange. 
However, in this study, these four indicators required some modification in 
order to be more appropriate in the context of mandated business interactions. 
Additionally, this study confirmed the views of some researchers (e.g. 
Svensson 2006; Schoorman et al. 2007) who noted that trust could be 
assessed more appropriately when opinions and perceptions of both partners 
involved in the interactions were taken into account as the perception of one 
party might be contradicted by the perceptions of the other partner (Svensson 
2002). Thus, it is not a matter of a naive reliance on certain indicators to signify 
the presence of trust. Rather, it is the meaning that those indicators hold for 
both partners which is important. For that reason, this study explored not only 
the presence of these indicators in a relationship, but how both partners 
interpreted trust based on those indicators. 
Table 11 shows the limitations of indicators derived from the literature to 
assess levels of trust in the context of mandated business interactions. The 
amendments to these indicators which should be considered by researchers 
to appropriately assess levels of trust are also included.  
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Table 11 Summary of the limitations and amendments made to the 
indicators 
Trust 
indicators 
Scope of the indicators in 
the literature 
Amendments made to the 
indicators 
 
 
Recurrence 
of business 
interaction 
In the absence of trust, companies 
often have no intention to have 
continuing business interactions 
with other partner (Sung and Kang 
2012b). Business parties engage 
in repeated interactions due to 
their confidence resulting from 
familiarity in term of planning and 
operations (Cerri 2012). 
It is not simply the recurrence of business 
interactions per se, but the meanings 
attached to such recurrence by both 
partners which signals trust. Due to the 
tripartite nature of mandated business 
interactions, recurrence could simply be 
for the sake of preserving future projects 
and might not signal trust. Only by 
ascertaining recurrence through the 
perceptions of both partners can level of 
trust be assessed. 
 
 
 
Degree of 
formality 
Based on less formalised control 
in which business parties rely on 
trust rather than detailed 
contractual arrangements 
(Aalbers 2010; Hamida et al. 
2011). 
 
The existence of less formalised 
contracts is presented as an 
indicator of high trust.  
A naive reliance on degree of formality as 
a trust indicator could be problematic. 
The findings revealed situations where 
low formality did not signal high trust but 
opened a door for opportunistic 
behaviour. Thus, levels of trust can more 
appropriately be assessed by looking at 
what has been perceived by either of the 
partners in degree of formality compared 
with the outcome and consequences of 
those limited formalities. 
 
 
 
Level of 
interdepen
dency  
Efforts and resources that one 
partner invest in other business 
partner (Sako and Helper 1998). 
High trust is indicated when 
partners rely on each other for 
mutual benefits. Low trust is 
indicated when the relationships 
are based solely on the self-
interest of one party. Based on the 
goodwill of the larger partner in not 
taking unfair advantage of the 
SME. 
In addition to the goodwill of the larger 
partner, the tripartite nature of the 
mandated business interactions implies 
that the interdependency between both 
partners is such that fulfils the interest of 
the government by encouraging the 
growth of SMEs. High trust level was 
indicated when both partners 
collaborated to impress the government 
to ensure its approval for cost-effective 
sourcing of quality material to be used in 
the work. 
 
 
Reciprocity 
of 
informatio
n exchange 
Business partners openly share 
information and exchange 
knowledge and experience and 
sometimes exchange experiences 
of good reputation of a partner 
with a third party (Sung and Kang 
2012). High trust is indicated when 
two-way flow of information and 
experiences which are deemed to 
be valuable. Low trust is indicated 
when the information exchanged 
is intentionally not valuable or 
useful. 
It is not merely the reciprocity of 
information exchanged which is the 
signal of trust in mandated business 
interactions, but the meaning that such 
information sharing holds for both 
partners. Within the tripartite nature of 
the mandated interaction, the dynamic of 
trust is altered so that even the exchange 
of information known to be inaccurate by 
both partners can signify high trust 
because it is the significance of the 
sharing which counts.  
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6.3.1 Recurrence of business interactions 
Many researchers associated high trust level with recurrence and length of 
business interaction (e.g. 2005; Cerri 2012; Sung and Kang 2012), and the 
association between the two was based on the view that business partners 
became familiar with each other’s culture, work method and goals (Blomqvist 
et al. 2005). The recurrence of business interactions as an indicator of high 
trust can be as a result of technical competency, functional competency, or 
task reliability (Connelly and Miller 2012). Thus, the positive nature of the 
relationship between partners is facilitated by the expectations of both that 
such business interactions would continue into the future and this expectation 
was an indicator of trust (Poppo et al. 2008). 
Although this study reported some cases which confirmed this association, 
recurrence of business interaction was not always found to signal a high trust. 
This is because large companies were found to have engaged SMEs in 
repeated business interactions for the sole purpose of convincing the 
government that they were fulfilling their role in mandated business 
interactions. For example, the owner of SME1 recounted how on one occasion 
he had been present when a representative of JV1 informed the government 
that JV1 had succeeded in partnering with an Omani SME (i.e. SME1). From 
the perspective of the owner of SME1, such reporting was lacking in sincerity 
and was only done to ingratiate his company (JV1) with the government 
official. This supports the findings of the empirical study by Auko et al. (2011) 
which concluded that when the primary driver of such repeated contractual 
arrangements with SMEs was due to the desire to maintain a good reputation 
with the government, SMEs tended to remain suspicious about the motives of 
their large partners. Thus, recurrence of business interaction does not 
necessarily signify high trust. 
Another motive which emerged from the findings of this study was that 
recurrence of business interactions were often due to limited choices rather 
than trust. In other words, either partner did not really have any alternative 
except to engage with the other. In some instances, the larger partner only 
engaged with a smaller partner while his resources were unavailable. 
Therefore, recurrence of business interaction did not signify trust but rather the 
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exploitation of the SME by the large company as in the case of SME1 working 
with N2. This supports the view of Dyer and Wujin (2011) who asserted that 
when the behaviour of a partner changed in ways that disadvantaged the other 
partner, that company was more likely to be considered untrustworthy. 
However, when recurrence of business interactions was not the result merely 
of self-interest, Lewicki et al. (2006) noted that high trust could be indicated. 
To conclude, in this study, a more nuanced conceptualisation of the recurrence 
of business interactions as a trust indicator emerged. A high trust level 
between large companies and SMEs was found in different circumstances. 
Firstly, when the recurrence of interactions with the same partner was found 
to continue despite the availability of alternative business opportunities as in 
the case of N1-SME3, this frequently indicated high trust. Secondly, when the 
recurrence of interactions took place even after having several trials with other 
available business organisations in which trust had failed to develop as in the 
case of S1-SME2 and N1-SME2. Thirdly, the level of trust was high when the 
recurrence of interactions between partners took place whether the project 
was easy or complicated, indicating that the relationship was not based on 
opportunism as in the case of N1-SME2. 
A low level of trust was indicated when one partner refused to have further 
business interaction with the other partner even when there were no other 
business opportunities available as in the case of N1-SME3. Thus, it was the 
perceptions of the meaning that recurrence held for both partners which 
signified trust rather than simply the presence of the indicator itself. 
6.3.2 Degree of formality 
McEvily et al. (2003) have pointed out that formal agreements and full control 
mechanisms were often found in the literature to signal attitudes of suspicion, 
ill-will and scepticism which indicated a low level of trust. Where trust existed 
there was less need for high degree of formalities (Gausdal and Hildrum 2012). 
Connelly and Miller (2012) asserted that mangers of interacting companies 
often minimised their insistence on high degree of contractual formality when 
the trust level was high. 
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However, this study found that a less formalised deal was not always a sign of 
trust; rather it often signified the limited involvement of external institutions 
which allowed the larger partner to exploit the smaller partner. Hence, 
assessing the level of trust using this indicator could be problematic. A clear 
example from this study can be seen in the case of JV2-SME1. JV2 initially 
had had less formalised arrangements with SME1 but actually became 
exposed to considerable risk by the PM of JV2 giving the owner of SME1 carte 
blanche to arrange all essential materials without prior approval from JV2. The 
hidden agenda of JV2 was its duplicity in appearing to be magnanimous in 
awarding such a valuable contract to a smaller company when in fact, the real 
value allocated by the government was considerably greater. One could argue 
that this is how business works but this was a public project where greater 
transparency was expected by the government. Furthermore, JV2 in the 
media, claimed the credit for exceptional and creative works which in reality 
should have been attributed to SME1. Welter et al. (2012) has drawn attention 
to the two-edged-sword nature of trust which can influence entrepreneurial 
activities positively or negatively.  
Empirical studies in IORs confirm that some parties tend to use less formal 
contracts to attain certain objectives; these studies have shown that up to 50% 
of interacting companies were completely selfish (Woolthuis et al. 2005). 
Jones et al. (2014) emphasised that trust frequently failed to emerge because 
even well-intended partners could be exploitative when the opportunity arose. 
Incomplete contracts are more open to interpretation and can lead to risk as 
they contain fewer clauses or because the clauses are not clearly stated (Yang 
et al. 2011). Because of the resource constraints of the majority of SMEs, 
power imbalances and limited management knowledge, SMEs are at greater 
risk in less formalised contracts (Jones et al. 2014). This seemed to be a 
fundamental problem in large companies and SMEs business relationships. It 
is surprising that there are few, if any, studies that explicitly investigated this 
mechanism which could preserve either of the companys from the 
consequences of opportunistic behaviour. In fact, Jap and Anderson (2003) 
have defined less formalised contracts as post-opportunism which often arose 
out of self-interest by which one partner intended to act opportunistically 
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through low levels of formality in order to cheat, lie, steal or by misrepresenting 
information in the contract. However, the main thrust of the literature in this 
regard only goes as far as stating that such opportunistic behaviour is difficult 
to anticipate (Krishnan et al. 2006). 
The risk inherent in low level of formalised control, as revealed in this study, 
had substantial consequences for SMEs and entrepreneurial activities which 
could not be anticipated at an early stage of business interaction. The 
exposure to risk presented by trust in less formalised contracts was found by 
Connelly and Miller (2012) to be constrained by the context in which that trust 
had been developed. Thus, even though many studies regard less formalised 
contracts as indicators of trust in IORs, in the specific context of the mandated 
business interactions, this was not always borne out and it was found that a 
low degree of contractual formality sometimes resulted in opportunistic 
behaviour. A more subtle understanding has been found in this research. Trust 
can appropriately be assessed by looking at what has been perceived by either 
of the partners in term of degree of formality compared with the outcome and 
consequences of those limited formalities. 
6.3.3 Level of interdependency 
Interdependency refers to a situation where business partners make a mutual 
commitment to a relationship for their mutual benefit. The minimal level of 
interdependency between large companies and SMEs, noted in the literature, 
refers to situations where the SME is expected to commit to a specific market 
segment which often represented a niche for them and in which the large 
companies were inefficient because the market size was too small for them. 
This eventually created interdependency between the two companies (Paleari 
and Giudici 2000). The niche market situation adopted by the smaller partner 
is valuable for the larger partner and is mutually beneficial. There are many 
other types of interdependency but this is seen as the minimal level in the 
literature. In such a situation, the market for the larger companies’ products is 
the small-scale goods and service sector (Subrahmanya 2008) and most large 
companies try to cut down their expenses by subcontracting with SMEs 
(Okatch et al. 2011). High trust can be indicated when SMEs and large 
companies are ready to invest cost and efforts and accept any potential risk 
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such as the failure in producing goods or services that meet expectations of a 
partner (Wicks et al. 1999). 
Two types of interdependency trust indicators were identified in previous 
studies. Firstly, is the workflow interdependency in which one party is found to 
provide specialised activity that is essential for the achievement of mutual 
goals (Capaldo and Giannoccaro 2015). Secondly, there is resources 
interdependency in which business partners depend on and use each other’s 
resources, be it human or financial, to attain mutual benefit (Capaldo and 
Giannoccaro 2015). In both cases the interdependency is viewed in terms of 
ability and integrity, and assessing level of trust from these aspects is well 
accepted (Schoorman et al. 2007). However, these studies were mainly 
concerned with relationship of choices.  
Interdependency in mandated business interactions is not based only on the 
interest of a business partner but also on the interest of the government who 
actually established the mandated business interaction in the first place. Trust 
was indicated in these relationships evidenced by partners collaborating 
throughout the projects in order to impress the government to ensure its 
approval for cost-effective sourcing of quality material. This happened when 
the owner of SME2 had discovered a cost-effective source of quality material 
required for the commencement of a mandated project with S2. The project 
manager of S2 was highly impressed by the initiative of the owner of SME2 
which highlighted their interdependency and high level of trust. Both the owner 
of SME2 and the project manager of S2 brought this important source of 
material to the attention of the government ministry who approved of it for the 
project and was also highly impressed by how both companies were working 
together interdependently. In fact, the owner of SME2, commenting on the 
level of trust based on this interdependency, reported that S2 provided 
financial resources so that SME2 could develop this source of material and 
actually became a customer of SME2. S2 did not take unfair advantage of 
SME2 by arranging for the material directly from the source which SME2 had 
found but instead permitted SME2 to retain its resource advantage. 
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Although this finding supports the view of Pretorius et al. (2008) who asserted 
that the relationships could only become effective when SMEs provided 
unique competencies to large companies, in the context of mandated business 
interactions, the interdependency enhanced the growth of both companies due 
to the favourable impression created with the government which saw its main 
objectives being achieved. The finding of this study, related to this trust 
indicator, resonates with some previous studies such as that of Ireland and 
Webb (2007) who concluded that to understand the level of trust that existed 
between business partners, it was necessary to understand the significance 
of the coordination which had taken place between them. 
To conclude, interdependency is a useful trust indicator in both relationships 
of choice and in mandated business interactions. Interdependency implies 
goodwill on the part of the larger partner. However, in mandated business 
interactions, as well as signalling trust between partners, interdependency 
often coincided with the governments’ goal of enhancing the growth of SMEs.  
6.3.4 Reciprocity of information exchange 
Reciprocity of information exchange refers to a situation where business 
partners willingly share information with each other such as business 
opportunities, experiences and strategies. The quality of the information 
exchanged was assessed by openness and transparency (Sako and Helper 
1998), timeliness, adequacy, accuracy, and credibility of information 
exchanged between business partners  (Li and Lin 2006).  
This study revealed several types of exchange between large companies and 
SMEs which were associated with high trust. Firstly, is the readiness of a 
partner to freely disclose to the other partner details of local suppliers, which 
it was willing to risk sharing with the other partner. This was done without fear 
that the other party would take unfair advantage of the disclosure of such 
information. For example, the owner of SME1 working with N1, willingly 
disclosed details of local suppliers and favourable market conditions which 
would not have been readily accessible to N1. Both SME1 and N1 perceived 
this level information exchange as signalling high trust between them. Such 
trust, based on exchange of information, actually concurs with the note made 
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by Ming and Song-zheng (2008) who found a positive correlation between trust 
and information sharing. McEvily et al. (2003) also noted that when partners 
formed high trusting business relationships, the tendency for partners to 
screen for accuracy of the information to decrease. Thus, the tendency to 
accept the information exchanged without question signalled a high level of 
trust between the partners. The finding regarding this type of exchange 
resonate with the note made by some researchers (e.g. Bianchi and Saleh 
2010; Payan et al. 2010) who asserted that high level of trust facilitated the 
exchange between business partners and enhanced performance and 
satisfaction of both companies. 
The remaining types of exchange which this study found included: exchange 
of experiences, exchange of information about potential business 
opportunities, exchange of resources and lastly, passing favourable 
information of one party about the other business partner to a well-esteemed 
large company. These points have been highlighted by Jones et al. (2014). In 
the case of SME2 working with S2, the owner of SME2 reported that S2 had 
presented his company in a very positive and favourable light to a well-
esteemed large company which resulted in additional work for SME2 based 
on that positive report. This signalled a very high level of trust between SME2 
and S2. S2 in presenting SME2 in a positive light to a third party was confident 
that the smaller company would not let S2 down in the sight of the third large 
company. This demonstrated the level of trust that existed between them. 
Hence, the findings of this study resonate with the note made by several 
researchers (e.g. Barreto 2010; Cao et al. 2010) who emphasised that high 
levels of trust between partners in business interactions could be indicated 
when new ideas, utilisation of resource, business opportunity were openly 
exchanged.  
However, in the same relationship (S2-SME2) there was an earlier incident in 
which the site engineer of S2 presented SME2 in a very unfavourable light to 
the government representative. In this situation, a low level of trust between 
the two companies would be expected to result. S2, to protect its own interests, 
laid the blame on SME2 for delays that were really the responsibility of S2. 
However, the owner of SME2 realised that if S2 lost the contract, this would 
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also result in losses for SME2. The owner of SME2 acted as the scapegoat 
and this action meant that the mandated business interaction was protected. 
Far from signalling low trust, this sacrifice on the part of SME2 signalled high 
trust, as its owner could understand that the entire contract was at risk.  
Thus, a more subtle understanding of assessing level of trust based on the 
reciprocity of information exchanged indicator has emerged from the findings 
of this study. Due to the tripartite nature of mandated business interactions, 
the information exchanged can be inaccurate but still can indicate high trust 
level. When S2 laid the blame on SME2 to government officials for the delay 
on the project, the end result was not low trust but high trust between the two 
companies. Both companies understood that it was expeditious for the smaller 
company to be the scapegoat as a damage limitation exercise. A superficial 
view of this incident might view it as signalling low trust but when the 
perceptions of the actors involved are understood by the researcher, a 
completely different picture emerges.  
To conclude, taking reciprocity of information exchange as a trust indicator 
needs a more nuanced approach. In this study, it was not the reciprocity of 
information exchange, per se, but the motivations and intentions of both actors 
in the exchange which was the trust indicator.   
6.3.5 Summary of the trust indicators 
Assessing levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in mandated 
business interaction was a critical task. Although the four selected indicators 
were helpful in assessing the level of trust, a more subtle understanding of 
how these indicators operated in practice was a major finding of this study.  
Before leaving the subject of trust indicators, by way of addendum, this study 
critiqued a schema which was prominent in IOR literature as a trust indicator. 
This schema was applied in this study as an additional means of identifying 
trust levels but did not prove to be useful in the context of this study. This 
schema is discussed and critiqued in the following section. 
 
195 
 
6.4 Schema of assessing trust based on interpersonal and inter-
organisational aspects 
In the literature, a number of authors (e.g. Mouzas et al. 2007; Nguyen and 
Liem 2013) proposed that assessing the trust level that existed between 
business partners could be indicated by the level at which the agreement was 
being expedited in the organisations. Three scenarios were seen as possible: 
organisation to organisation, person to organisation or person to person. 
These are referred to by Nguyen and Liem (2013) as upper, middle and lower 
levels. These authors agreed that, at the high level (organisation to 
organisation), trust was high and therefore, that inter relationships which were 
based on organisation to organisation would signal a high level of trust. 
Conversely, agreements based on person to person were proposed as 
signalling low trust level. At the middle level, based on person to organisation 
or between departments or groups of one organisation and the other entire 
partner organisation were proposed as exhibiting a medium level of trust.  
The use of this schema as an additional indicator of trust is refuted by the 
findings of this study in the context of the mandated business interactions. In 
fact, trust was found to be elastic in nature (Seppänen et al. 2007), and the 
level of trust was difficult to determine based on the schema of level of 
interactions. In particular, the assertion of Mouzas et al. (2007) that the level 
of trust between organisation was high when existing at inter-organisational 
level and low when existing at interpersonal level is contradicted in the context 
of mandated business interactions in the current study. The reason why this 
schema is unreliable as a trust indicator is that management changes within 
organisations can change the nature of the interactions between the 
organisations. This can be clearly seen in the case of N1-SME3. The owner of 
SME3 had always formed a high trust level with N1, yet he had stronger trust 
in the PM of N1 who had gone on sick leave, and this PM had previously 
promised him a potential business opportunity. This clearly showed the 
difficulties inherent in relationships based on the level schema simply because 
changes of personnel can affect the level of the interaction. Indeed, Abosag 
and Lee (2013) have pointed out that relationships between business partners 
developed for many different reasons and that trust became dynamic as those 
relationships changed. Furthermore, the findings of the current study is 
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supported by those of Huang and Wilkinson (2013) who found that trust 
changed from inter-organisational level to interpersonal level depending on the 
experience and outcomes of incidents that had taken place between business 
partners over time. Additionally, Lewicki et al. (2006) argued that trust was 
grounded in the choice of an actor involved in the interaction, a view re-echoed 
by Schoorman et al. (2007) who viewed trust as an aspect of relationships 
which varied and fluctuated between individuals and across relationships. 
Ming and Song-zheng (2008) further asserted the dynamic nature of trust and 
how it took on a different character at different stage of the relationship and 
could move from inter-organisational level (professional) to interpersonal level 
(personal).  
Thus, the findings of this study support the view of Jiang et al. (2013) who 
asserted that characteristics and attitudes of groups of people who were 
representing organisations often inspired confidence between companies 
involved in the interaction to trust each other. In other words, the dynamic of 
trust is often more subtle than can be encompassed by the threefold levels of 
interrelationships. Hence, it is inappropriate to report levels of trust as high 
when it exists at inter-organisational levels and low when it exists at 
interpersonal level. 
After discussing the findings related to the indicators used to ascertain levels 
of trust between SMEs and large companies, the following section discusses 
the findings related to the factors influencing the levels of trust, beginning with 
a presentation of the derived model of trust factors which emerged from this 
study.  
6.5 The derived model and categorisation of trust factors 
The derived model which was presented as a summary of chapter five is 
presented in this section again for the purpose of the discussion of the factors 
which were found to influence trust in mandated business interactions. 
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Figure 6 Categorisation of the trust factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 highlights the influential trust factors in mandated business 
interactions. The left column of the model shows the factors which led to high 
trust levels. The right column of the model presents the factors which led to 
low trust level.  
Figure: 6 Factors influencing levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in 
mandated business interaction: A theoretical model 
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Factors influencing levels of trust between SMEs and large companies 
in mandated business interactions 
In presenting the various factors influencing levels of trust, Zucker (1986) has 
been followed in categorising the factors into three main sources of trust 
namely, characteristics based, process based and institutional based trust. 
The most critical findings were:  
 The exploration of the influence of national loyalty as a factor which 
appeared in relation to the propensity to trust (which is discussed in this 
section under 6.5.1). 
 The distinction made between social similarity and social proximity in 
relation to trust.  
 Discussing the extension, contradiction, and confirmation to factors 
revealed in the literature and found to be relevant in the current study.  
 Discussion of tribal norms as a new distinctive dimension of social 
institutional based trust factor.  
 A new understanding of the mediating role played by the government 
as institutional based trust.  
Under each category, positive and negative influential factors are presented 
and discussed together rather than presenting them separately. The following 
sections discuss the various influential factors pertaining to each of the three 
trust categories.  
6.6 Characteristic based trust factors 
The characteristics based trust category refers to the confidence which the 
trustor has in the trustee based on known cultural similarities (Schilke et al. 
2016). Most previous studies related characteristic based trust factors to 
certain similarities of partners which were perceived to be the basis for 
collaboration. These included cultural and social similarities (Gausdal and 
Hildrum 2012). However, in the case of mandated business interaction, three 
distinctive characteristics of a partner were revealed to be critical in influencing 
the development of a high trust between SMEs and large companies: national 
loyalty, social similarity and social proximity.  
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The following sections discuss these factors and their influence on levels of 
trust in mandated business interactions.  
6.6.1 National loyalty 
National loyalty emerged as a new factor from the findings of this study. It is a 
new and distinctive influential dimension of characteristic based trust. National 
loyalty is related to propensity type of trust in which one party (trustor) tends 
to accept the vulnerability and trust of the trustee based on positive 
behavioural expectations (i.e. national loyalty).  
The concept of national loyalty appeared in this study as an antecedent of 
trust. It emerged as the feeling that one party had to the country rather than to 
the business partner. The attractiveness of national loyalty as a characteristic 
was based on the hope and belief that the other partner would act honourably 
in the business relationship out of a sense of loyalty to their country. Because 
the business relationship was mandated by the government, a sense of 
national loyalty was frequently found to be an antecedent of trust in this study. 
Some informants of large companies and SMEs reported that national loyalty 
was an inspiring characteristic which helped both companies to confidently 
work together as they both expected that each would fulfil their roles in the 
contracts out of a sense of loyalty to the country. This finding contrasts with 
the views of some researchers including Colquitt et al. (2007) who asserted 
that the ability of a partner to fulfil their role in the contract was alone sufficient 
for fostering trust. Ability usually captures what a business partner can do 
which is considered as a component of trustworthiness. In other words, ability 
describes whether the partner has the skills to meet what is expected of them. 
In this study, however, national loyalty emerged from the data as an important 
antecedent factor which often led to high levels of trust between partners. 
Because the mandated business interactions were understood as a 
government initiative to help SMEs and encourage entrepreneurship, the 
trustor often felt confident about engaging the services of the trustee to use 
their skills and abilities based on their sense of loyalty to the country. Some 
researchers, e.g. Azmat and Ha (2013), have claimed that national loyalty 
could not be considered as a trust factor in business environments that were 
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characterised by either corruption or domination of large companies over the 
market. This view is contradicted by the findings of the current research. 
National loyalty by either of the parties was found to be an influential 
propensity trust factor.  
It was interesting to find that, even when the large company and their 
representatives were non-national, their perceptions that the partnering 
company was loyal to their own government initiatives was still a driving force 
from the very beginning of the business interaction. For example, the owner of 
SME2 working with the non-national S1 company, understood that the 
confidence placed in him by that non-national company was based on the 
latter’s perceptions of his national loyalty. Some support for the importance of 
national loyalty as a trust factor was found Subrahmanya (2008) in the context 
of SMEs working with large companies in Japan. Subrahmanya, did not 
identify national loyalty as a trust factor, but did emphasise care for the national 
economy and for the greater success of Japanese manufacturing industry as 
an important dimension of trust development between SMEs and large 
companies.  
In contrast, the cases which experienced low trust levels often attributed their 
failure to the absence of a sense of feeling for the country which was 
substituted for by discrimination in the deal on the basis of ethnicity. Many of 
the relationships with N2 failed, not because of a lack of national loyalty on the 
part of the SME, but on the disregard for this factor on the part of N2 which 
was a company led by non-nationals who had partisan motivations.   
Thus, a key finding of this study, particularly in the context of mandated 
business interactions, is that perceptions of national loyalty on the part of either 
or both partners is an important factor leading to high levels of trust in the 
relationship. 
6.6.2 Cognitive proximity 
The second factor which was found to influence trust was cognitive proximity. 
Cognition in relation to characteristics based trust factors tended to be the 
driver of trust between business partners. Cognitive proximity is related to 
common characteristics that make business partners confidently coordinate 
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their actions in order to improve their economic outcomes (Boschma 2005). 
Cognition in general, is based on shared perceptions, interpretations and 
evaluations of the world, and this occurs where business partners share their 
world views through communications as people draw on the same knowledge 
base in their interactions.  
Cognitive proximity can be divided into two types: social similarity and social 
proximity. It is worth noting that some studies (e.g. Ben Letaifa and Rabeau 
2013) referred to social proximity as being inclusive of social similarity. Indeed, 
both terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, this study was able 
to differentiate between the two due to the engagement of national, joint 
ventures and subsidiaries in the mandated business interactions which 
involved people of many different ethnicities. This study follows Molina-
Morales et al. (2014) in its call for a reconsideration of the concept of proximity. 
Boschma (2005) noted that trust in business relationships changed in different 
socio-economic contexts. The following two sub-sections discuss the 
difference between social similarity and social proximity. 
Social similarity 
Social similarity is a strong driver of characteristic based trust and it implies 
the sharing of identical convergent social background, beliefs and values of 
parties involved in the interaction (Schilke et al. 2016). Both representatives of 
SMEs and large companies found it easier to discuss any challenges or 
progress with people from the same origin. Some owners of SMEs who 
experienced high trust levels expressed that they were approaching the Omani 
site engineer in a less formal manner. Therefore, based on social similarity, 
interactions were easier and common understandings and world views 
facilitated the development of trust. 
The influences of social similarity found in this study strengthens the note 
made by Cerri (2012) who asserted that social similarity did not only enhance 
the notion of trust but actually created an informal environment where close 
interpersonal relationships between business partners were developed and a 
better understanding of mutual needs was expressed and quickly achieved. 
This supports the point made by Bönte (2008) who concluded that it was often 
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more convenient for managers of interacting companies to handle the 
relationships with partners of the same social similarity than with those with 
greater social differences. Similarly, Nguyen et al. (2005) noted that when trust 
in IORs was based on social similarity, both the horizontal as well as vertical 
integrations between interacting companies became faster and easier.  
In summary, sharing of beliefs and values were the distinctive dimensions of 
social similarities. Nevertheless, the findings of this study supports the point 
made by Glaeser et al. (2000) who noted that when individuals were closer 
socially, both trust and trustworthiness increased. However, it contradicts 
Glaeser et al. (2000) in their view that trustworthiness is only possible where 
there is social similarity and that it is difficult to bring about individuals from 
different race and nationalities which implies social proximity.  
The following section discusses social proximity and its influence in 
development of trust in greater detail. 
Social Proximity 
Social proximity is distinguished in this study from social similarity in that it 
refers to the sharing of some social and cultural background but does not imply 
a complete shared world view or identity as is the case with social similarity. 
Between business partners, social proximity implies perhaps knowledge of 
each other’s language and ways of thinking and this facilitates understanding. 
To explain this distinction, N1 working with each of the three SMEs (SME1, 
SME2, SME3) displayed social similarity as all parties were Omani. On the 
other hand, SME2 working with S2, although the former was Omani and the 
latter was Indian, the Omani owner of the SME2 was a descendant of Indians 
who had migrated and settled in Oman. This meant that his ethnicity was 
traceable to Indian origin but there was sufficient cultural and social proximity 
which allowed the relationship to work to their mutual benefit. This distinction 
between social similarity and social proximity is strengthened by the study 
conducted by Altinay et al. (2014) who investigated how sharing language and 
similarity of ways of thinking helped franchisees and franchisors to express 
their intentions, recognise needs and exchange experiences. Altinay found a 
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strong correlation between sharing language and ways of thinking and the 
development of trust. The same can be clearly seen in the case of S2-SME2. 
The owner of SME2 expressed the advantage of the similarity of language and 
cultural background he shared with representatives of S2 in which trust was a 
result of clarity of understanding and ways of thinking. This point has been 
made by Welter et al. (2012) who commented on how the building of trust 
between communities was often facilitated by a shared history, shared norms 
and or other shared experiences. This implies that the success of the 
relationship is often dependent on some element of social proximity, without 
which, as in the case of S2-SME1, the relationship encountered many 
difficulties which militated against the development of trust. Where social 
proximity is not present in the relationship, a mediator who shares certain 
social proximity can bridge the gap. 
6.7 Process based trust factors 
In the literature, process based trust factors are of two types, one is based on 
perceptions of the reputation of a potential partner and the second is based on 
actual experience that one partner has of another with whom they have 
previously interacted (Ren et al. 2016). 
6.7.1 Trust factors based on reputation 
The discussion of reputation is divided into three subsections as follows.   
6.7.1.1 Reputation of the large company 
This factor is related to perceptions rather than direct experience. Reputation 
of large companies from the perspectives of SMEs was based on what SMEs 
revealed to follow owners of SMEs about their experiences with certain large 
companies. Large partners who were found to have diversified and 
multidisciplinary business were often less trusted. The perceived reputation of 
such large companies was that they were often less interested in forming 
relationships with SME in the first place. Otherwise, they were perceived as 
being so dominant in the market place that they were often able to steal 
employees from SMEs by offering them more attractive salaries and work 
conditions. Clearly, such a perception on the part of SMEs was hardly 
conducive to the development of trusting relationships as was found by 
Mambula (2002) who claimed that owners of SMEs were frightened to enter 
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into relationships with large companies which dominated the procurement of 
government projects or which attracted employees of SMEs by offering better 
wages and benefits.  
By contrast, the  findings of the current study also support the view made by 
Huang and Wilkinson (2013) who asserted that SMEs often felt confident to 
enter into a relationship with a large partner who was perceived to be fair in 
the deal. Furthermore, if there was some prospect of added value to the 
business of smaller companies, likewise, the smaller companies were often 
open to entering into trusted business interactions with such larger companies. 
Many SMEs in IORs strongly relied on the reputation of a larger partner 
because the time spent on resolving disputes could destroy SMEs and shift 
their focus which could immediately affect their performance (Seung-Kuk et al. 
2009). An unfavourable reputation could lead business partners to slow down 
in taking decisions or even to decline entering into any collaborative 
arrangements (Krishnan et al. 2006). 
Actually, the current research found that owners of SMEs were selective in 
terms of which large company they chose to interact with. Despite the 
involvement of the government in regulating the interactions, SMEs were still 
inclined to engage only with large companies which had a proven reputation 
for fairness in the deal, payment release on time and also for providing 
opportunities for the smaller companies to expand the size of their business 
activities. For example, the good reputation of N1 was extensively reported by 
owners of SMEs who eventually witnessed for themselves what they had been 
told about N1 before they entered into trusting business relationships with 
them.  
6.7.1.2 Reputation of the SME 
From the perspective of large companies, SMEs with innovative reputations 
and record keeping found to be two influential sub-factors in development of 
trust. 
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Innovativeness 
From the perspective of the large companies, the reputation of the SMEs for 
fulfilling their parts of the contract was equally important. Aspects of the 
reputation of SMEs included perceptions of their innovativeness and record 
keeping in compliance with the government requirements. Large companies 
only wish to partner with SMEs who have a reputation for being able to give 
and take (Thorgren et al. 2011). However, most previous studies point out the 
difficulty faced by SMEs in building up a good reputation due to their small 
size, scarcity of resources, limited managerial skills and relative anonymity in 
the market (Nguyen et al. 2005; Yang et al. 2014).  
In this study, particularly in the mandated business interactions, certain 
distinctive characteristics were found to attract the attentions of some large 
companies while working alongside SMEs in public projects. SMEs with 
innovative reputations and record keeping were found to be influential sub-
factors in the development of trust. Viitaharju and Lähdesmäki (2012) stressed 
that in order for SMEs to compensate for their size and resources constraints, 
a reputation for competency became the antecedent of trust. For example, the 
PM of S2 recounted an experience with an owner of a SME who had a 
reputation for being innovative. That good reputation led S2 to enter into 
contractual relationships with that SME. S2’s trust was well-placed as the SME 
developed an innovative operating system for underground containers. The 
implication is that for SMEs to be attractive to large companies, the smaller 
company needs to have built up a good name in the market especially for 
innovative solutions. It follows that government attempts to form mandated 
business interactions merely for the sake of enhancing the growth of SMEs 
and encouraging entrepreneurship may not be so successful if the SME has 
no proven track record in being innovative. Hence, a government backed 
training scheme for SMEs in entrepreneurship might provide SMEs with the 
knowledge and skills which they often lack. The importance of reputation for 
innovativeness was an important finding of this study which supports Pretorius 
et al. (2008) in their assertion that large companies often aligned their 
strategies with SMEs known for their innovativeness. Such an alignment could 
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result in economies of scale and scope which eventually could lead to the 
development of trust.  
Record keeping of SME 
The other important aspect of reputation which was revealed in the findings 
was the importance of record keeping such as employee’s details and financial 
records. The SME is not simply accountable to the large company but both are 
accountable in different ways to the government. One way in which 
accountability was seen to operate was in terms of the SME keeping accurate 
records especially relating to employees’ details. The government in 
exercising due diligence over the investment of public money had to ensure 
that proper record keeping was happening and that national labour laws were 
in force. This meant that SMEs had to maintain accurate records and abide by 
national labour laws. However, it also meant that larger companies should only 
engage with SMEs which had accurate records. The implication is that the 
government should first ensure that SMEs were trained in modern systems of 
record keeping and of basic financial bookkeeping.  
With respect to financial record keeping, Kasilingam and Ramasundaram 
(2012) noted that solvency in IOR in general was an important performance 
indicator which contributed to the reputation of a company. Additionally, the 
findings of this study support the point made by Webster et al. (1999) who 
emphasised that record keeping of SMEs was a vital asset in terms of 
effectiveness, efficiency and competitive advantage in which records 
themselves worked as an informant to decision-makers about the company. 
Thus, the importance of record keeping was revealed in this study as an 
important antecedent for the development of trusting business relationships.  
6.7.2 Trust factors based on direct experience 
In contrast to reputation, these factors are based on direct previous experience 
of working with a partner. The literature provided a wide range of factors that 
influenced the level of trust when SMEs and large companies interacted in 
business relationships. However, most of the following factors relating to direct 
experience were commonly found in the literature: commitment of some large 
partners and manipulation of the mandated business strategy by others, 
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dedication and enthusiasm of owners of SMEs, goal congruence of business 
partners, sharing risk, tolerance of partner’s shortcomings and transparency. 
How these operated in the context of mandated business interactions is the 
subject of this section.  
6.7.2.1 Commitment of some large partners and manipulation of others in 
mandated business strategy 
Commitment on the part of large companies was noticed by owners of SMEs 
from decisions and actions that their large partners took and particularly in 
implementing the mandated policy. On the part of SMEs, commitment was not 
only attributed by large companies to the presence on sites and dedication of 
the owners of SMEs, but also to the enthusiasm of SME owners which resulted 
in a high level of trust.  
In the perception of the SME, prior experience of the commitment of large 
companies resulted in the development of high trust and was not merely 
related to their compliance with the rules and obligations set by the 
government, but also to their sincerity in being committed to the success of the 
partnership with SMEs. It is noted in the literature that trust between partners 
was highly correlated with the presence of credible commitments 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). However, among the six large companies 
engaged in this study, N1 seemed to be the most committed in fulfilling the 
mandated business interaction. Informants of N1 expressed their appreciation 
of the effort made by the government in terms of mandated business  
interactions which they believed would certainly encourage Omani youth, not 
only to establish their own businesses, but to think of being entrepreneurs. It 
was asserted by the PM of N1 that his company dedicated a section to look 
into the contractual procedures and to record the progress of subcontracted 
SMEs as well as to ensure that SMEs’ profiles such as financial records and 
the legal status of employees met the criteria set by the government. Thus, 
there was concordance between the owners of SMEs and the informant of N1 
regarding the importance of a previous experience of the commitment of the 
other partner as an important antecedent of trust.  
Thus, the commitment expressed by informants of N1 was found to 
correspond with the expression of all the three owners of SMEs who had prior 
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experience of interacting with N1 in a high trusting relationship. This 
commitment, perceived by N1 and acknowledged by the owners of SMEs 
which led to a high trust level, corresponded with the findings of Souiden and 
Choi (2012) who noted that the commitments of companies to what was 
expected of them acted as a facilitator for trust development.  
In contrast, the remaining large companies had not shown much commitment 
in their engagement with SMEs; indeed, some of them even perceived the 
mandated business strategy as a frustrating policy. As a consequence, owners 
of SMEs who interacted with most of these companies experienced them as 
employing different tactics in order to portray the failure of this strategy. 
Actually, here was where the manipulation factor was found in the data which 
illustrated how small partners experienced their large partners using their 
power to circumvent the government mandated policy. It is obvious from the 
literature that large companies have a reputation for using their greater 
resources in order to dominate the market and to have a position of power 
over the government (Nguyen et al. 2005).  
However, in this study, a new form of manipulation was found which was due 
to the nature of mandated business interactions.  The government policy 
regarding the award of public projects to large companies had a twofold 
condition. The first was the condition that large companies would only be 
awarded projects if they subcontracted a minimum of 10% of the projects to 
SMEs. The second condition required that at least 30% of the workforce must 
be Omani citizens. These two conditions provided a loophole for certain large 
companies to implement just one of the conditions and to use the second 
condition as leverage against the government. For example, it was reported 
by the owner of SME1, working with N2, that N2 had already employed a large 
number of Omani workers and had used this fact to threaten the government 
that they would make these workers redundant if the government insisted on 
the requirement of the 10% portion of the contract for SMEs. The implication 
of this report is that the government needs to have tighter conditions and insist 
upon them rather than allowing themselves to be manipulated by the large 
company based on its power in the market. This was an unintended 
consequence of government policy. This confirms the note made by many 
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researchers (e.g. Parker and Hessels 2013) who asserted that SMEs, in 
addition to being vulnerable to several internal barriers such as lack of 
management skills and time, were also adversely affected by external barriers 
inherent in the institutional arrangements within which they had to operate. 
The implication is that a single all-embracing condition carefully constructed 
would remove the opportunity for manipulative behaviour on the part of large 
companies.  
6.7.2.2 Commitments of SMEs 
Commitments of SMEs, from the perspective of large companies were 
revealed in this study in terms of the dedication and enthusiasm of the owners 
of the SMEs. 
Dedication of owners of SMEs 
One of the prominent themes in the IOR literature is that the dedication of 
owners of SMEs is essential for the development of trust in their partnerships. 
Such dedication can often be seen in the willingness of the owners to 
constantly work with other business partners (McGrath and O'Toole 2011). It 
is obvious that business partners invest resources in the interactions which 
could be placed at risk when one business partner is having an arm-length 
relationship.  
Most of the representatives of large companies, made it clear that it was 
fundamental for owners of SMEs to be available at the sites on a constant 
basis for several reasons such as the need to discuss with owners of SMEs 
progress of the work, to observe the performance of their employees and to 
be available for consultation in decision making. Some researcher (e.g. 
Brunetto and Farr-Wharton 2007) noted that SME owners who paid 
considerable attention to the relationship such as attending meetings and 
reporting their work progress were engaged in distinctive and trusting business 
relationships. Thus, this observation, supported by the literature, implies that 
owners of SMEs need to demonstrate their commitment by actual foot work 
and on site presence. This was evidenced by the owner of SME2 working with 
S1, who drew attention to the fact that his continuous presence on site was 
much appreciated by the PM of S1 who attributed the high state of trust that 
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existed between them as being the consequence of his unswerving dedication 
seen by his presence on site.  
In contrast, the sporadic presence of owners of other SMEs led to the 
diminution of trust and eventually to the decision of the larger company to 
avoid entering into contracts with those SMEs. In the literature, the lack of 
presence of owners of SMEs is related to either poor reputation of other 
partner or else to the demanding attitude of the large company which made 
the relationship volatile. Another reason for the reluctance of SMEs owners to 
be present on site was presented by Fleming et al. (2016) as attributable to 
the imbalance of power between the two companies. 
However, despite these reasons which often made trust difficult to develop, 
this study revealed that the presence of owners of SMEs was found to be 
essential and led to the development of high states of trust as in the case of 
S1-SME2. The absence of owners of SMEs led to low trust as in the case of 
JV1-SME2. The findings of this study support the finding of Fleming et al. 
(2016) who concluded that with constant presence of SMEs’ owners, not only 
enhanced the development of trust but resulted in the development of a 
personal bond with representatives of other partnering company. This implies 
that, in mandated business interactions, trust can only arise between partners 
where the owner of the SME demonstrates their dedication by their very 
presence on site.  
Enthusiasm of owners of SMEs 
Previous studies revealed that characteristics of owners of SMEs such as 
having a high degree of self-reliance, self-confidence or a higher educational 
level had a positive correlation with empowerment of SMEs and development 
of trust in business relationships (Brunetto and Farr-Wharton 2007). However, 
the enthusiasm which owners of SMEs showed was another aspect which led 
to the development of a high level of trust between some SMEs and their large 
companies. Enthusiasm refers to a situation in which owners of SMEs showed 
an eagerness to enter into business relationships with large partners and to 
sustain these relationships by continued application to the projects. Jones et 
al. (2014) noted that when owners of SMEs revealed their potential interest 
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and promise, their large partners trusted them with some orders, and they 
actually signalled to their large partners, their intention to be reliable and 
trustworthy partners.  
In this study, the PM of N1 commented on the enthusiasm shown by some 
owners of SMEs. The PM of N1 reported how certain owners of SMEs were 
not only zealous in chasing opportunities that might arise out of the business 
of N1, but were also seeking for opportunities even with subcontracted SMEs 
which helped those SMEs and N1 to complete the project and to procure 
another. Findings of this study support the earlier argument made by Brunetto 
and Farr-Wharton (2007) who concluded that enthusiasm of owners of SMEs 
actually provided them with an avenue to learn about any additional potential 
business opportunities. Smith et al. (2009) noted that some opportunities were 
down to good luck but many opportunities arose as a result of the enthusiasm 
of either of the parties. The implication of this finding is that, for the most part, 
awarding of projects is rarely the result of the luck of the draw but is more often 
due to the enthusiastic way in which SMEs were sourcing opportunities for 
further contracts. 
6.7.3 Goal congruence 
Goal congruence between SMEs and large companies was found where the 
efforts of both partners were directed towards common goals. Smallbone et al. 
(2012) has commented on the importance of goal congruence in terms of 
shared understandings of the common goals and how such understandings 
were often a prerequisite for successful cooperation. These objectives were 
generally related to the successful completion of the public projects allocated 
in mandated business arrangements. Goal congruence was reported by the 
project manager and the site engineer of N1 as being one of the most critical 
factors for the success of N1 and the subcontracted SMEs. However, goal 
congruence does not mean that the objectives of both companies perfectly 
overlap.  
Very often in the findings of this study a commonly shared goal was the 
expansion of business activities of both companies and improving their 
efficiency and competitiveness. In such situations, high levels of trust were 
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found and, in reporting this trust, were often attributed to the similarity of the 
objectives of both companies. Goal congruence can lead to strategic and 
operational benefits which are beneficial for both partners (Samaddar et al. 
2006). The findings of this study also support the note made by Yang et al. 
(2014) who asserted that goal congruence between SMEs and large 
companies not only offered SMEs reputation and legitimacy, but also provided 
them with opportunities to complement their shortages in the market. 
Consequently, it would seem desirable that in setting up mandated business 
arrangements that the government should try to ensure that there is a fair 
degree of goal congruence. In contrast, focusing on goal incongruence where 
parties have different objectives in entering into the partnership was not likely 
to lead to a high trust level (Samaddar et al. 2006). Some representatives of 
large companies unintentionally let slip their self-centred motives and their 
unwillingness to work towards common objectives but rather to take advantage 
of the SMEs’ vulnerability. In IOR literature, self-interest refers to the situation 
where a partner enters into a relationship with another partner with the sole 
intention of furthering their own self-interest without caring for the interest of 
other business partner (Smith and Barclay 1997). However, self-interest is not, 
per se, contradictory to goal congruence. Every company acts in their own 
self-interest but, in goal congruence, each partner makes certain compromises 
in order that both companies meet common objectives. However, the findings 
of this study support those of Berg et al. (1995) who noted that the 
predominance of self-interest without any concession to the interest of the 
other party was doomed to result in a low state of trust. The case of JV2-SME1 
in the findings in which the larger company claimed credit for what was actually 
the achievement of the smaller company is a clear example how unbridled 
self-interest was destructive of trust.  
Furthermore, self-interest leading to low trust levels can also occur at the 
personal level where an employee attempts to exploit the vulnerability of a 
partner company by forcing them to pay a bribe. Although, some researchers 
concluded that in developing countries, bribery and fraud were perceived 
differently and that not everyone considered it as unethical practice (Tian 
2008), nevertheless, there is a consensus that trust cannot be built in a 
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business interaction which involves bribery (Schuttauf 2012). An example of 
bribery was reported by the owner of SME3 working with N2. The offer by an 
employee of N2 to release payments quickly to the owner of SME3 in return 
for the payment of a bribe had the effect of destroying any trust that might have 
existed between them. The comments made by owner of SME3 re-echo those 
of Eberl et al. (2015) who emphasised the role of governmental and 
organisational rules and regulations in preventing corruption and 
strengthening trust. 
6.7.4 Sharing risk 
Sharing risk in business relationships is a function of the readiness of the large 
partner to share the effect on the smaller partner of unpredictable situations. 
Often the outcomes of the risk are difficult to predict, and high trust is seen 
where the larger partner shares some of the risk encountered by the SME. The 
most outstanding example in this study was seen in the actions of N1 in 
dealing with SMEs who had been penalised by the government for 
commencing works without permissions. However, N1 intervened and offered 
to share the risk by compensating these SMEs by allocating additional work. 
Another example was the readiness of N1 to assist SME1 who was the victim 
of a sudden flood which destroyed much of his work. Both of these examples 
demonstrate magnanimity on the part of the larger partner. Such magnanimity 
led to a high level of trust between the large and smaller companies. The 
implication of this is that larger companies are better placed to absorb 
unpredictable setbacks which might ruin smaller companies. Clearly, it is not 
possible to legislate for such magnanimity but the government could have an 
advisory clause in the contracts reminding larger companies that the 
objectives of mandated business interactions was to encourage the growth of 
SMEs.  
In the literature, trust between business partners was considered to be 
influenced by unpredictable situations which could bring costs and risks to the 
weaker party (Dyer and Chu 2011). In such unpredictable risk situations, both 
partners engage in significant scanning for accurate, reliable and mutually 
satisfactory solutions (Lopez-Perez and Rodriguez-Ariza 2013). Responding 
to any unpredictable risk situations by partners that demands speed and 
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responsive decisions, not only leads to the development of trust, but makes 
SMEs put in their best efforts in return. This was a key finding of this study in 
which the willingness of the larger party to share risk incurred by the smaller 
partner, resulted in high trust between them. This supports Schoonjans et al. 
(2013) who asserted that sharing risk encouraged partners to put in their best 
effort and enhanced trust between them. Due to the influence and significance 
of sharing risk in the development of trust, some researchers such as Teece 
(2016) argued that researchers could indicate the levels of trust by 
investigating how managers of interacting companies were managing 
unpredictable risk situations.  
6.7.5 Tolerating shortcomings 
Tolerance is referred to in the literature as any scenario where one party is 
willing to be patient in order to give that partner the time and opportunity to 
prove their trustworthiness (Hamida et al. 2011). The project manager of N1 
reported the importance his company attached to showing tolerance towards 
the shortcomings of SMEs. He was actually critical of other large companies 
which tended to take unfair advantage of the shortcomings of smaller partners. 
In the current study, where tolerance was found, it was usually on the part of 
the larger companies who helped their smaller partners by advice or 
encouragement. By showing tolerance, it is implied that the larger partner has 
trust in the smaller partner and this trust is expected to be reciprocated. 
Schoorman et al. (2007) noted that tolerance of partners’ shortcomings gave 
scope for the repair of trust following some disappointment in which the 
offended party forgives the other for their shortcomings and that this action 
has potential to restore trust between them. Rothkegel et al. (2006) see 
tolerance of shortcomings as a trust factor but the owners and managers of 
SMEs should respond to such tolerance by considering themselves as trust 
developers in response. Thus, larger partners should consider a more tolerant 
approach to the shortcoming of SMEs due to their lack of experiences and 
resources and that such tolerance was frequently seen as a trust factor as 
shown in the two examples in the finding of this study. 
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6.7.6 Transparency 
This study found transparency to be a critical factor for the development of 
trust between SMEs and large companies. Informants from both large and 
small companies emphasised how important it was for both parties to openly 
discuss opportunities and challenges for the sake of the successful and timely 
completion of the project. According to Ayadi et al. (2013) being transparent 
with a partner by passing on accurate, credible and adequate information 
within the critical timeframe was an important issue influencing the 
development of trust. This also supports Schnackenberg and Tomlinson 
(2016) who found transparency to be an antecedent and essential factor for 
the development of trust. 
This study found that when the smaller partners were not overly scrupulous 
with the government officials or had not tried to maximise their profit by using 
less material than they were supposed to, but instead transparently discussed 
their problems, large partners could understand their positions and 
compensate them. Actually, owners of SMEs acknowledged the importance of 
transparency for the development of trust such as reporting their challenges 
and weakness and strengths which enabled the larger partner to plan the work 
with them until their SMEs were able to work independently. This supports the 
recommendation of Blomqvist et al. (2005) who stated that management of 
SMEs as well as large companies should carefully consider what issues 
relevant to the business interaction had to be discussed explicitly and 
transparently.  
6.8 Institutional based trust factors 
Institutional based trust factors in IORs are grounded in the external world and 
refer to the influence of institutions on the behaviour of the parties involved in 
the interaction (Schilke et al. 2016). In most previous IOR studies, institutions 
were detached parties which set explicit and implicit rules and regulations by 
which business actors oriented their actions and behaviour (e.g. Rus and Igli 
2005; Cheng and Yu 2012; Kroeger 2012; Fuglsang and Jagd 2015). 
However, in the current study, institutions were integral to the interactions and 
this changed the dynamic of trust. 
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In this section, institutional based trust factors are categorised into two main 
groups; the first is related to social institutions consisting of tribal norms and 
the second is related to public institutions.  
6.8.1 Institutional factors leading to high trust 
6.8.1.1 Tribal norms 
In this study, tribal norms emerged as a distinctive new social institutional 
factor. Tribal norms can be referred to as unwritten customs, tradition, and 
laws which influence and control the behaviour of its members.  
Although only a few informants reported experiences of the influence of tribal 
norms on the development of trust, this can be explained by the fact that tribal 
norms are so deeply embedded in Omani society that their influence often 
goes unrecognised. Nevertheless, those informants represented both large 
companies and SMEs. In fact, the project manager of S1 emphasised that it 
was important to know the tribal background of owners of SMEs as he had 
personally experienced that those who came from well-known family 
backgrounds tended to be more reliable and trustworthy because they feared 
that failing to honour agreements would bring insult to their families. This was 
confirmed by the owner of SME2 who stated that the project manager of S1 
understood the influence that tribal norms held over their behaviour. He 
continued by discussing the dishonour that his failure to fulfil agreements 
would bring to the whole tribe. Despite this fear, trusting relationships often 
developed in these mandated business interactions. 
The findings of this study also emphasised the importance of verbal 
agreements. Reference has already been made in the findings to the 
importance of the ritual hand shake which had more force among certain tribes 
than written legal documents. 
The implications of these findings stress the importance of tribal norms 
especially for developing societies where such norms are deeply embedded 
in the prevailing culture. The findings also argue in favour of mandated 
business interactions being based on tribal norms. However, this is not an 
argument in favour of xenophobic approaches in a country which must operate 
in a global context. The implication is not a restrictive one nor is it arguing for 
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the awarding of mandated business interactions only to companies which are 
led by nationals or by individuals who are familiar with tribal norms. Rather the 
implication is that in mandated business interactions that the players need to 
be educated in cultural anthropology especially in relation to the force of tribal 
norms. It could be useful to note the importance of tribal norms as factors 
leading to strong trusting relationships. The importance of certain protocols in 
interactions between people from diverse culture needs to be given greater 
prominence among managers and owners. For example, a non-national player 
in the mandated business interactions could be highly cautious of considering 
the role of verbal agreements supported by a hand shake, unaware that this 
sometimes had more force among certain Omani tribes than a written legal 
document.  
6.8.1.2 Public institutions 
Previous studies viewed institutions as arbitrators which checked on 
professional codes of conduct that were not legally binding, legal regulations, 
corporate reputation, contracts and other informal and formal behavioural 
norms (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). For this reason, some researchers such 
as Yeung and Wang (2011) saw institutional based trust as the weakest type 
of trust. Indeed, they considered the existence of legal institutions and 
predetermined procedures as signs of a distrustful business environment. 
However, some authors such as Smallbone et al. (2010) have noted that 
institutions can also play an important role in entrepreneurship development. 
This study revealed that institutions can work as mediators between trustor 
and trustee in IORs rather than being a detached third party simply concerned 
with orientation of behavioural actions of business partners. The inspection 
and supervision practices were the key roles of institutions in the mandated 
business interactions. Informants of both SMEs and large companies 
recognised the significance of these roles which actually led to the 
development of high levels of trust.  
6.8.1.2.1 The inspection practice 
The inspection practice took the form of unannounced field visits made by 
specific teams from the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to the sites where SMEs 
and large companies had commenced works. Inspections were carried out to 
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ensure that companies were implementing laws and ministerial decisions 
regarding the legal status of employees of interacting companies as well as 
ensuring their full compliance with health and safety in the workplace. The 
inspection practice arose as one of the bundle of rules of instructions which 
interacting companies had to follow. Interestingly, Kroeger (2012) actually 
asserted that trust could be institutionalised in the form of rules, regulations 
and routines which had to be enacted.  
The influence of inspection practice on the development of trust was reported 
by informants of large companies and SMEs. For instance, the site engineer 
of S1 reported how disappointed he and his company were when the 
inspection team had caught trusted labourers of some SMEs violating the 
labour law. The inspection practice has limited the choice of SMEs to engage 
their own employees instead of hiring unskilled labourers through unofficial 
channels. The inspection practices cleaned the market of any unfavourable 
and illegal practices. This can be clearly seen in the case of JV2-SME2. The 
owner of SME2 asserted that the inspection practices limited the choices of 
large companies to engage with SMEs with appropriate records and because 
of the inspection practices, he experienced JV2 dealing with his company 
because the large partner was confidently working with SME2 for 
appropriateness of employees records. Inspection practices actually operated 
as alternative options for the inadequacy of government database of SMEs, 
and led both SMEs and large companies to confidently interact with those who 
had been confirmed eligible by the government. 
Thus, inspection practices played an intermediary role, although an indirect 
one. The findings of this study imply the necessity of inspection practice at the 
site where large companies and SMEs had commenced work in public 
projects. The implications of these findings stress the importance of inspection 
practices. Their influence corresponds with Cheng and Yu (2012) who 
emphasised that companies needed to conform to rules and regulations set 
by the government if they wished to gain legitimacy within the institutions in 
which their businesses activities were rooted.   
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6.8.1.2.2 The supervision practice 
Government supervision was another institutional trust factor which was 
different from inspection practices. The inspection was mainly concerned with 
the maintenance and implementing of laws and ministerial decisions by 
interacting companies; whereas supervision practices were concerned with 
regulating and monitoring the interactions between SMEs and large 
companies. The purpose of such supervision practices was to ensure the 
attainment of efficient and productive business relationships.  
In relationships of choice, supervision is limited to monitoring of SMEs by large 
companies during the execution of subcontracting work. Such supervision was 
considered as a transactional process where both large companies and SMEs 
utilised opportunities to exchange knowledge and experience (Miller et al. 
2002).  
However, in mandated business interactions, supervision practice involved a 
third party namely the government. The regular visits made by the committees 
were intended to achieve certain objectives. These included checking on 
business opportunities, discussing obstacles that might hinder development of 
productive business relationships, fulfilling the needs of SMEs in terms of 
human and financial resources and clarifying any enquires related to 
payments. The supervision committees played a significant role in developing 
trusting business relationships between SMEs and large companies and 
operated as arbitrators when any misunderstanding occurred. Such practices 
have encouraged business partners to work with confidence and in an efficient 
manner. For example, from the perspectives of large companies, the project 
manager of S1 attributed the development of trusting business relationships 
with some SMEs to the supervision practices by the government. Interestingly, 
the role of supervision committee in development of trust was acknowledged 
by the owner of SME1 who worked with S1. He reported several constraints 
which, at the beginning of his business interaction led him to form a bad 
impression of S1. He reported two incidents to illustrate the role of supervision 
committees in the development of trust between him and S1. Once S1 rejected 
a delivery of certain materials made by SME1 and the second incident took 
place when the site engineer of S1 instructed the owner of SME1 to commence 
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some work in a nonsensical manner in the perception of the owner of SME1. 
In both incidents, the owner of SME1 referred to the supervision committee 
which acted as an impartial mediator and resolved matters in his favour.  
The implications of these findings stress the significant role that supervision 
practices played in the development of trust between SMEs and large 
companies. Large companies often viewed themselves as superior, and due 
to this, such business interactions with SMEs were often short-lived 
(Rothkegel et al. 2006). Sherry and Anton (2013) examined the innovative 
alliances between European SMEs and large companies although in a 
relationship of choice context and concluded that large companies were less 
likely to cooperate and coordinate than were SMEs. Additionally, some 
researchers, including Rus and Igli (2005), stressed the importance of 
institutions in protecting the interest of entrepreneurs and SMEs as they often 
found it difficult to form trusting business relationships with large companies. 
Thus, the implications of these findings stress the importance of supervision 
practice to enhance the position of SMEs in the relationship. Clearly, this does 
not imply defending SMEs even when they are wrong, but strengthening their 
position when they are right and assisting them to obtain human and financial 
resources. The implication of the finding also stresses importance of enforcing 
the confidence of SMEs when they are in the right. Fuglsang and Jagd(2015) 
noted that the regulatory and informative role of institutions often inspired the 
development of trust between business partners.  
6.8.2 Institutional factors leading to low trust 
Despite the significant influence of inspection and supervision practices on 
trust development, their work was often limited in terms of site visits. This was 
due to the large number of projects which were also allocated at different 
corners of the country. In addition, the informants perceived other institutional 
shortcomings factors which eventually led to low levels of trust. These 
included: inequality of treatment by the government, lack of an adequate 
government database, quality of the work allocated to SMEs in mandated 
business interactions and finally, labour market condition and labour laws. 
221 
 
6.8.2.1 Inequality of treatment by the government 
Most previous studies which investigated the failure of the interaction between 
large companies and SMEs recommended that governments should put in 
place appropriate policies if they wished to create productive business 
relationships (e.g. Mambula 2002; Okatch et al. 2011). Most of the 
recommended changes suggested by previous studies were mainly 
concerned with the policies which tended to put pressure on large companies, 
in indirect ways, to deal with SMEs. Such recommended changes had nothing 
to do with development of productive business relationships based on trust.  
In contrast, this study revealed that equality of treatment by the government 
was perceived to be essential for the development of productive business 
relationships based on trust. Informants from SMEs and large companies 
recognised that inequality of treatment by the government led to failure in 
developing trusting business relationships. The government had a preferential 
arrangement for SMEs in term of releasing their payments whilst neglecting 
the delay of payments to large partners. The PM of N2 clearly stressed that 
forcing his company to release SMEs’ payments in 28 days while the 
government in most public projects delayed payments to N2 for more than 12 
months had always been an irritating issue for N2. As a consequence, 
inequality of treatment by the government led some companies to act against 
development of productive business relationships. Owners of SMEs 
experienced most large companies attributing delay of payments to the 
government and not to themselves. Hence, repeated enquiries caused 
suspicions with SME owners about their larger partners which eventually led 
some of them, such as the owner of SME3, working with N2, to lose his temper 
and shout at the PM of N2. Due to this, trust was not given an opportunity to 
arise between the two companies. The implications of this finding stress the 
importance of the government being perceived to be fair and considerate of 
the interests of both companies. 
6.8.2.2 Lack of an adequate government database 
Lack of information about SMEs such as ownership, SMEs human and 
financial resources and history of SMEs experiences, meant that partnering 
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companies had little knowledge on which to base their decision to enter into a 
business relationship.  
In this study, due to lack of an accurate government database of SMEs, 
informants of both SMEs and large companies remained suspicious about 
each other. Large companies were found to be hesitant in contracting with 
SMEs. It was perceived by some informants of SMEs and large companies 
that large companies could use other SMEs who were keeping improper 
records and that the government might not easily detect this. Owners of SMEs 
were not confident about their large partners, as large companies were found 
to be interested in subcontracting with SMEs offering lower prices and these 
SMEs were working in illegal ways. Additionally, some owners of SMEs had 
been passing messages to the Ministry of Manpower requesting them to send 
the inspection team to the sites in order to check the legality of other SMEs 
engaged in subcontracting arrangements by their large partners. Thus, the 
lack of a reliable and accurate government database was often an impediment 
to the development of trust. 
6.8.2.3 Quality of the work allocated to SMEs 
The quality of the work allocated to SMEs was perceived by owners of SMEs 
as one of the critical issues which led to low trust levels. Large companies 
often offered SMEs opportunities with little value for no reason other than to 
ensure that SMEs did not become competitive with large companies (Nguyen 
et al. 2005). In this study, most SME owners related the low level of trust to 
the nature of the work assigned to them by the larger partner. In most cases, 
the works allotted to SMEs either had little potential to return a fair profit to the 
SME or were difficult in nature. Consequently, these SMEs either had to quit 
the business at an early stage as in the case of S2, or else they delivered poor 
quality works as was reported by the PM of S1. Kidalov (2013) noted that in 
order to encourage participation of SMEs in public project and to enhance their 
competitiveness, the share allotted to SMEs must be determined and reserved 
by the government. In fact, most owners of SMEs emphasised that it was the 
government which was supposed to determine the quality and nature of the 
work and not their large partners. The implication of this finding stresses that 
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the government, not the larger companies, should determine the work 
assigned to SMEs.  
6.8.2.4 Labour market condition and labour laws 
Labour market conditions and labour laws had some unintended 
consequences which hindered the development of trust. One of these 
unintended consequences of the Omanisation policy for example, effectively, 
meant “nationalisation”. This policy obliged large companies as well as SMEs 
to employ a minimum of 30% of Omani nationals in order to be considered by 
Tender Board of Oman in public projects. However, the government 
unintentionally did not consider the difference in capacities of large companies 
compared to that of SMEs. Large companies have a larger capacity in term of 
financial and human capital (Scheyvens and Russell 2012). On the contrary, 
most SME owners complained that they could not employ Omani nationals 
due to their expectations of high salaries which were unaffordable for most 
SMEs. Additionally, even when indigenous Omanis were employed by SMEs, 
their turnover was high as they tended to leave quickly in search of better paid 
jobs. Thus, large companies lacked confidence in their smaller counterpartns 
due to the instability of their workforce. The alternative for SMEs was to employ 
retired and unskilled indigenous labour. However, the attempt to employ low-
waged unskilled and retired citizens to fulfil the Omanisation obligation left a 
bad impression on large partners about the productivity and efficiency of their 
smaller counterparts which eventually led to low levels of trust.  
Thus, the implications of this study are that the government policies directed 
towards the development of SMEs had unintended consequences which 
impeded the growth of trust between large companies and SMEs. Auko et al. 
(2011) asserted that governments should revise their strategies and put 
applicable policies in place to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs and to 
encourage the development of productive business relationships between 
SMEs and large companies. 
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6.9 Summary of the chapter 
In this chapter, the key findings of the study have been discussed in the light 
of the literature or where novel findings emerged from the study, these were 
critically examined as contributing to the existing corpus of literature. The 
chapter commenced with a new conceptualisation and definition of trust within 
the context of mandated business interactions. The tripartite nature of the 
mandated business interactions had resulted in a novel conceptualisation of 
trust.  
This was followed by a discussion of those indicators which signified either 
high or low trust levels. Although these trust indicators were gleaned from the 
literature, they required some refinements and in some cases had to be 
extended in scope. These indicators included: recurrence of business 
interactions, degree of formality, interdependency and reciprocity of 
information exchange.  
The next section consisted of a critique of a threefold schema for analysing 
levels of trust. While this schema had merit for certain types of IOR 
assessment of trust, it was not found to be applicable in the context of 
mandated business interactions.  
This was followed by consideration of the factors influencing levels of trust in 
mandated business interactions. This study has contributed a model for 
identifying the various factors followings Zucker’s (1986) classification. New 
factors which emerged from the analysis of the data included the importance 
of national loyalty, a more subtle distinction between social similarity and social 
proximity, tribal and institutional norms. An important insight of this analysis 
was the potential for manipulation of the mandated business interactions 
which needed to be safeguarded by a more prudent approach by the 
government. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: Contributions, Recommendations 
and Limitations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at providing a summary of the study highlighting its main 
contributions and recommendations. The chapter begins by recalling the 
rationale for the research in section 7.2, and then presents the significant 
contributions that this study makes to theory in section 7.3. The implications 
of theoretical contributions for practice are outlined in section 7.4. Section 7.5 
presents the recommendations of the study based on the implications of its 
findings. The chapter then acknowledges the limitations of the study in section 
7.6, and provides pointers for future research in section 7.7. The final section 
7.8 summarises the conclusion chapter.   
7.2 Rationale for the research 
Owing to the significant contribution of the SME sector to most national 
economies, several countries have tried to promote their growth and to 
enhance entrepreneurial activities by the development of collaborative 
arrangements between large companies and SMEs. However, while some 
studies emphasise that the collaborative arrangements with large companies 
are vital for the survival and growth of SMEs, many collaborative arrangements 
between large companies and SMEs experience high failure rate. Among the 
many issues related to the failure of Inter-Organisational Relationships (IOR) 
is the lack of trust (Buchel 2003). Indeed, a number of authors, (e.g. Michalski 
et al. 2014), have drawn attention to the critical importance of such IORs being 
established on a firm foundation of trust between the business partners. Whilst 
much attention has been given to trust in collaborative arrangements of choice, 
relatively scant attention has been paid to trust in mandated business 
interactions. This study has addressed this research gap by investigating the 
state of trust between SMEs and large companies in mandated business 
interactions and by exploring the factors that influenced levels of trust between 
two companies.  
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To address this research gap, two research questions were investigated: 
I. How can trust be conceptualised and assessed in mandated business 
interactions? 
II. How do various factors influence trust levels between SMEs and large 
companies in mandated business interactions? 
These research questions were addressed by means of a qualitative study. 
This allowed the researcher to gain a more in-depth insight into trust, based 
on the perceptions of the key players involved in these interactions. The data 
were collected by means of semi-structured interviews with 25 key managers 
from the large companies and from SMEs. These data were analysed using a 
thematic approach. The findings of this study were presented in two 
interrelated chapters; chapter four presented the results related to the 
conceptualisation of trust in the context of mandated business interactions as 
well as the indicators used to signal trust levels that exist between two 
companies and, chapter five presented the factors which were found to 
influence high and low levels of trust.  
Based on the analysis of these findings, this research makes an important 
contribution, not only to the contextual concept of trust in mandated business 
interactions itself, but also to the means by which the presence of trust in IORs 
can be more appropriately detected and the identification of new factors which 
influence the development of trust in IORs. The following two sections present 
these major contributions. Section 7.3 presents the major theoretical 
contributions of this study, while section 7.4 outlines their practical 
implications.  
7.3 Principal contributions to theory 
This section outlines the main contributions to trust theory. Firstly, a new 
contextual concept of trust is presented in section 7.3.1. Secondly, indicators 
for assessing the presence and levels of trust are selected from the existing 
literature but these were greatly refined in this study in order that they would 
more appropriately assess levels of trust. These refinements are presented in 
section 7.3.2. Finally, new influential factors in the development of trust which 
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have not been previously identified are presented and a new model is 
developed outlining these factors in section 7.2.3. 
7.3.1 A new contextual concept of trust 
The theoretical contributions this study makes are built upon relatively 
neglected issues related to trust in mandated business interactions. Firstly, by 
exploring trust in in institutional contexts, a new concept of trust emerged. 
Trust in mandated nature of the business interaction; unlike the relationships 
of choice involved three agencies. In addition to the two partners, the integral 
role played by the government was found to have changed the dynamic of the 
business relationship and, consequently, the nature of trust. Thus, the 
following definition of trust was proposed:  
Trust in mandated business interactions is a psychological state which is 
characterised by a willingness of both partners to collaborate with each other 
confident that the relationship can work as the element of risk has been 
satisfactorily mitigated by the agency of a third party. 
The arrival of a new contextual concept of trust in institutional context was 
inspired by Bachmann and Inkpen (2011) who made a plea for more research 
into how institutions could make a real difference to understanding the 
development of trust.  
Previous studies conceptualised trust as based on actions and decisions of 
parties involved in the exchange being legitimised by rules and regulations or 
implicit expectations (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). Legal regulations which 
operated as the guarantor in trust development processes (Bachmann and 
Zaheer 2008) remained external to the relationship.  
In this study, a new contextual concept of trust emerged due to the tripartite 
nature of the interaction which changed the dynamic of trust. It is not simply a 
matter of two companies entering into a business relationship based on free 
choice, but rather a relationship in which three agents are directly involved, the 
large company, the SME and the government. Trust is not being primarily 
driven by the self-interest of each of the two companies, but by the mutual 
interest of both the large company and the SME which worked collaboratively 
in order to meet the requirements of the government.  
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Trust developed in mandated business interactions as either party was more 
disposed to trust the other, secure in the knowledge that the other partner was 
bound by the government’s regulations. For instance, the larger partner had 
greater confidence in their smaller counterpart who was obliged by the 
government to keep proper employee records which were subject to inspection 
at any time. But, it was also in the interest of either party to ensure that their 
partner met government expectations. This arrangement encouraged SMEs 
to be innovative and to work hard to fulfil the expectation of their large 
counterpart. At the same time, both companies aimed at impressing the 
government in such a way as to demonstrate that the relationship was working 
successfully and could be relied on for the award of future projects. Indeed, it 
should be noted that, in this study, 8 of the 14 embedded cases were seen to 
be successful representing a 57% success rate compared with other types of 
relationships where the success rate was as low as 30% (Munyon et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, even in the 6 embedded cases which were deemed to have 
failed, this failure was not perceived to be an ‘in principle’ defect in the 
mandated business interactions but rather as the failure of the government to 
fully discharge its role which allowed opportunistic behaviour to occur.   
7.3.2 Refinements of the indicators 
Despite the importance of trust for successful business relationships (e.g. 
Johnson and Cullen 2000; Francis and Mukherji 2009; Abosag and Lee 2013), 
studies relevant to assessing the presence and levels of trust in IORs are 
limited, and this could be due to the elusive and complex nature of trust 
(Seppänen et al. 2007). McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) noted that while the 
state of the art of trust measurement was still developing, there was a need 
for further investigation into appropriate methods for assessing the levels of 
trust. Assessing the presence of trust between interacting companies through 
various trust indicators has been recently acknowledged to be a useful 
approach for practitioners, decision and policy makers (Ayadi et al. 2016).   
The current study analysed four trust indicators which were particularly 
relevant to the assessment of trust in subcontracting business relationships: 
recurrence of business interactions, degree of formalities in contracts, level of 
interdependency and the level of reciprocity of information exchange. This 
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study highlighted their strengths and weaknesses based on contrasting 
perceptions of informants from both the large and SMEs. Based on the 
evidence of the findings of this study, these indicators were refined so that they 
more appropriately detected authentic trust between partners. These 
amendments have been thoroughly discussed in chapter six (see 6.3). 
With regards to recurrence of business interaction, it is not simply the 
recurrence per se, but the meanings attached to such recurrence by the 
partners which is the indicator of trust. Arising from the tripartite nature of 
mandated business interactions, recurrence could easily take place out of the 
motive of securing future projects rather than signalling trust. It is only by 
discovering the significance which recurrence holds for both partners that the 
level of trust can be appropriately assessed.  
Considering the degree of formality as a trust indicator, the contribution of this 
study is to assert that an over-simplistic reliance on this indicator should be 
avoided. More important for signalling trust is the discovery of the meaning 
that the degree of formality holds for the partners. More precisely, levels of 
trust can more appropriately be assessed by looking at what has been 
perceived by either of the partners in terms of degree of formality compared 
with the outcome and consequences of those limited formalities. 
Interdependency signalling high trust within the context of the tripartite nature 
of the mandated business interactions implies that this indicator is based on 
the fulfilment of the interest of the third partner, the government, in which both 
the large company and SMEs work collaboratively. In other words, high trust 
level was indicated when both partners collaborated to impress the 
government to ensure its approval for cost-effective sourcing of quality 
material to be used in the work. 
Finally, in the mandated business interactions, it is not simply reciprocity of 
information exchanged which is the trust indicator, but because of the 
involvement of the government in the interaction, it is the meaning that such 
sharing of information holds for both partners which signifies trust. This can 
only be discovered by inquiry of both partners as to their perceptions of such 
information exchanged and how it helps to fulfil the interest of the government.  
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In relationship of choice, it is important that the content of the information 
exchanged should be adequate, accurate, timely and credible (Li and Lin 
2006). Thus, sharing of inadequate information would not signal trust. In 
mandated business interactions, the sharing of information is still between two 
companies, but also has certain intentionality in terms of the third partner. In 
this case, the content of the information might not be as important as the 
reason why it is being shared in the first place and the meanings that the two 
companies attach to the sharing of that information. 
This analysis of four trust indicators stresses the difficulties of providing a 
reliable quantitative measure of trust. 
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7.3.3 A new model of factors influencing levels of trust 
The findings of this study revealed new factors which gave a more adequate 
account of how trust developed in mandated business interactions.  
An important contribution of this study is the development of a new model of 
trust factors. These factors were fully discussed in sections 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7. 
The categorisation of Zucker (1986) was followed to present a schema of all 
the factors, both new and old.  These are presented in figure 7 
Figure 7 The derived model of trust factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 7 Factors influencing levels of trust between SMEs and large companies in mandated 
business interaction: A theoretical model 
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The various factors are divided into characteristic based factors, process 
based factors and institutional based factors. The left-hand column contains 
the factors leading to high level of trust indicated by the upward arrow. The 
right-hand column contains the factors leading to low level of trust indicated 
by the downward arrow. The model contributes to the theory of trust by the 
addition of new factors not previously identified in the literature. Additionally, 
the model also has practical implications. 
7.3.3.1 Characteristic based factors 
The characteristic based factors refer to certain personal properties of people 
involved in the interaction which can either help or hinder the development of 
trusting relationships. Among the characteristic based factors which influenced 
high trust level were national loyalty and cognitive proximity.   
National loyalty is a new emerging factor in this study. It refers to the 
expectations that one party had of the other partner’s behaviour based on the 
belief that that partner would act in ways that displayed their dedication to their 
country. Because the other partner was believed to be a devoted citizen to 
their own country, trust developed as they were expected to behave in a 
manner consistent with that of a loyal citizen. This important influential factor 
has not been explored in previous studies.  
Cognitive proximity is a characteristic based trust factor which focuses on 
cultural and social similarities of partners which includes shared beliefs and 
outlooks. In IOR literature, similarities and proximity between partners have 
received significant attention as factors influencing trust, and this was, at least 
partly, due to globalisation and companies operating in different parts of the 
world. In this research, a distinction between social similarity and social 
proximity is underlined as important, even though both terms are frequently 
used interchangeably in the literature. This distinction explains how people 
who do not share identical social and cultural values may yet have a level of 
shared understanding based on similarities of culture such as dialects of the 
same language. This distinction was discussed in depth in the discussion 
chapter (6.5.2). The importance of this distinction is not simply of academic 
interest but also has practical implications. The appointment of personnel to 
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important roles in the context of mandated business interactions should take 
account of social proximity. Fazio and Lavecchia (2013) have made a similar 
distinction between “bonding social capital” which has the connotation of ties 
between people who are immediately close to each other for example family 
or friends, and “bridging social capital” which has the connotation of ties 
between people of similar cultural background but who are, however, not 
immediately close.  
A negative characteristic factor in the model is based not on national loyalty 
but on preference for partners founded on ethnicity rather than nationality. This 
was found to be influential in leading to low trust level in that the deal between 
the large company and subcontracted SMEs gave preferential treatment to 
SMEs managed by individuals from certain ethnic backgrounds. This unequal 
treatment caused resentment among SMEs which were not managed by 
people from the favoured ethnic background.  
7.3.3.2 Process based factors 
Process based trust factors consist of perceptions which arise either from 
direct experience of having worked with a partner in the past or else from the 
reputation that a potential partner has gained based on the reports of third 
parties. These types of factors are well established in the literature with the 
exception of manipulation which was a negative based trust factor found in this 
study. Manipulation refers to the use of power by one partner to circumvent 
the government mandated policy and thereby frustrate the government’s 
intention in the mandated business interactions. 
7.3.3.3 Institutional based factors 
Another important theoretical contribution to trust factors is related to the role 
of institutions in trust development between business partners. The factors 
underlying this type of trust are related to social and political institutions that 
surround business partners (Zucker 1986). This study contributes to 
institutional based trust in two respects. The first is the contribution of tribal 
norms in the context of mandated business interactions. The second is related 
to the intermediary role played by public institutions.  
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Whilst previous studies emphasised the influence of cultural issues in the 
development of trust in the context of developing countries, this study goes 
further in stressing the influence of tribal norms which were often found to have 
even greater force than legal norms. This was because failure to fulfil an 
agreement affected not only the individuals directly involved but the entire 
tribe. Companies were found to have placed greater trust and confidence in 
tribes which had strong norms governing behaviour than in any sort of external 
set of social norms or regulations. Thus, this study underlines the influence of 
tribal norms in the context of IORs in developing countries.  
The second contribution to institutional based trust is to emphasise the 
intermediary role played by the government. Previous studies, which were 
often based on relationships of choice, considered institutional based trust as 
involving a third party which was largely irrelevant to the development of trust 
directly. This study found that far from playing a secondary role, institutions 
were integral to the development of trust between business partners. The 
institution, in the form of government inspections and supervision, had the 
overall effect of lending greater transparency to the relationship and the 
development of trust (see discussion chapter: section 6.8.1.2). Child and 
Mollering (2003) have pointed out how institutional based trust was often 
perceived by the trustor to be less risky for the very reason that there was a 
given context which required no investment or increased vulnerability on the 
part of the trustor.  
However, a number of negative institutional based factors presented in the 
model were commented on in the discussion chapter (see discussion chapter: 
section 6.8.2). Generally, these negative aspects concerned failures of 
institutions through inadequate supervision, inequality of treatment by the 
government, the assignment of low quality works to SMEs, incomplete 
government databases and unfavourable conditions in the labour markets.  
The implications of these theoretical contributions for practice are presented 
in the following section. 
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7.4 Implications for practice 
This study offers several implications for practice. These are presented in the 
following sub-sections.  
7.4.1 Mandated business interactions as a successful strategy 
The mandated business arrangements between SMEs and large companies 
in public projects were found to be beneficial for the growth of SMEs and the 
development of entrepreneurship. The formation and development of trust in 
mandated business interactions were found to be of crucial importance for the 
government, SME sectors and large companies. SMEs operated in such a 
manner as to signal to their large partner that they were efficient and reliable. 
Large companies received from SMEs some of their products and services at 
a cheaper cost and with faster delivery. In return, the large partners trusted the 
SMEs with technical and financial support and accordingly succeeded in 
obtaining further public projects from the government. The growth of SMEs 
and development of entrepreneurship are considered sources of job 
opportunities which improve the quality of services, encourage innovation, 
encourage competition and lead to economic growth (Hisrich et al. 2007).  
However, since, in this study, trust was found to be critical for enhancing the 
productivity of SMEs and large companies, the use of the refined trust 
indicators in this study can enhance assessment of the presence and levels of 
trust and the derived model can be used to inform practitioners and policy 
makers of the important factors which influence the development of trust. 
The following two sub-sections outline the practical implications related to the 
four refined indicators used in this study. The second sub-section presents the 
practical implications related to the factors influencing levels of trust.  
7.4.2 Practical implications of the refined trust indicators 
Trust level is revealed in the literature as one of the most critical aspects that 
should be assessed in partnership relations (McEvily and Tortoriello 2011) 
because the success of any business relationship requires a high degree of 
trust (Nguyen et al. 2005). To ensure success and productive business 
relationships between SMEs and large companies in mandated business 
interactions requires the development of an instrument for assessing the levels 
of trust that exist between the two partners. 
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This study used four trust indicators which were derived from the literature: 
recurrence of business interactions, degree of formalities in contracts, level of 
interdependency and the level of reciprocity of information exchange. These 
trust indicators were found to require further refinement to be applicable and 
more appropriate for assessing trust in the context of mandated business 
interactions. These refinements have been thoroughly discussed in chapter 
six (section 6.3). However, in practical terms, they represent key indicators 
which practitioners and policy makers can use to assess the presence and 
levels of trust between companies. This is to ensure that there is a more 
efficient and productive business interaction between SMEs and large 
companies while engaging in public projects. 
7.4.3 The implication of the derived model for practitioners 
The derived model contains chains of interest between policy makers and 
practitioners (owners or managers of interacting companies). Policy makers, 
by taking into consideration factors influencing both high and low levels of 
trust, can create conducive business environments that encourage 
collaborative arrangements between companies.  
However, based on the findings of this study, new factors not previously 
commented on in the literature have been identified as important for policy 
makers and practitioners to consider. The model provides the actors with 
knowledge of certain new influential factors such as national loyalty and 
cognitive proximity. The contribution of this study is to identify and emphasise 
the importance of these factors.  
A new factor emerged from the finding of this study which has been assigned 
the name “national loyalty” by the researcher. This new characteristic based 
factor generated high levels of trust due to the shared expectations that both 
partners would discharge their responsibilities in the contracts driven by a 
sense of loyalty to the country (see section 6.6.1). Consequently, a practical 
implication of this study is that practitioners and policy makers should be aware 
of the importance of this factor which can often be difficult to identify as a 
characteristic based trust but which can be detected in the behaviour of 
various actors in the relationship. For example, if within a business 
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relationship, one of the partners displayed certain behaviours or attitudes 
which signified a strong sense of loyalty to their country this could also be 
perceived as increasing the likelihood that they were trustworthy in business 
interactions which were of crucial importance to the national economy. 
Examples of such behaviours or attitudes could include community social 
responsibility, positive attitudes towards government initiatives, memberships 
of chambers of commerce and any behaviour which signalled a commitment 
to the social and economic development of the country. Practically, companies 
which display these types of commitment to the local or national development 
can be expected to be trustworthy business partners also. In other words, if 
people or companies are seen to be loyal to their country, it is also perceived 
that they are likely to put in their best effort in a relationship directed towards 
the interests of the national economy.  
In relation to the practical implications of cognitive proximity, the subtle 
distinction between social proximity and social similarity is that shared values 
and beliefs are important for the development of trust. Where two key actors 
in business relationships shared identical values and beliefs, it is also highly 
likely that a trusting relationship can develop. However, even if the values and 
beliefs are not identical, if they reflect similarity of values a trusting relationship 
can develop. The practical implication is that where social proximity exists, it 
is also highly likely that trustworthy business interactions can take place. 
Nevertheless, the absence of social proximity or similarity need not necessarily 
imply that trust cannot exist as an intermediary can sometimes be found who 
shares social proximity and can enhance the development of trust between 
business partners who have different values and belief. 
The derived model also includes such process based factors as reputation of 
a partner as well as direct experience of the partner as influencing the level of 
trust between them. Reputation is based on second hand knowledge of a 
partner often based on the perceptions of that company in the market or else 
based on record keeping or innovativeness of that potential partner. Direct 
experience is based on previous working relationships with a partner and 
includes factors such as commitment, goal congruence, sharing risks, 
tolerance of partners’ mistake and transparency. If the previous experience 
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has been positive, then it is highly likely that future business relationships can 
also be positive. Both reputation and direct experience of a partner are 
influential for the development of trust. The implication for practitioners is to 
use the available information in decision-making regarding entering into 
business interactions and if necessary to make changes to government 
strategies of mandated business interactions.  
The most significant implication of this study is based on the negative effect of 
the findings of manipulation of the mandated business strategy by some large 
companies. This impeded the development of trust between those large 
companies and their SME counterparts, as the SME owners viewed such 
manipulations with suspicion. The government should be aware that such 
manipulation in the past can hardly inspire confidence in the success of future 
business interactions involving such a partner and should exercise caution in 
apportioning future contracts. 
The final category of trust factors in the derived model is the institutional based 
factors. This category includes public institutions such as legislation and social 
institutions such as tribal norms. Although some authors (e.g. Yeung and 
Wang 2011) have been critical of institutional based factors because trust, by 
its very nature, cannot be enforced, the findings of this study are in direct 
contradiction to this viewpoint. Consequently, an important practical 
implication of this study is that the practice of the government in implementing 
mandated business interactions should be continued and if possible expanded 
due to the high success rate that has been found with such ventures.  
The practical implications of the findings of this research lead to several 
recommendations which are presented in the following section. 
7.5 Recommendations  
The following recommendations are made in the light of the implications of this 
study and are divided into three sections namely, recommendations for 
governments, recommendations for the large partner and recommendations 
for the SME. 
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7.5.1 Recommendations for governments 
Firstly, in situations where the market is dominated by large companies, 
governments should consider mandated business interaction strategies as 
potential solutions for the encouragement of the development of SME sector, 
in view of its importance to national economies. In this research, such a 
government strategy was found to be effective when it encouraged the 
development of trust. However, this study also found that certain shortcomings 
of the government impeded the development of trust, and these shortcomings 
should be addressed in order to promote greater collaboration between large 
companies and SMEs. These are presented in the model 7.1 and include more 
effective supervision, the avoidance of inequality of treatment, the assignment 
of works of high and innovative quality to SMEs to encourage 
entrepreneurship, the maintenance of an accurate database of companies and 
appropriate legislation covering labour and the market.  
Another important recommendation is that governments should ensure that all 
actors involved in the interaction fully understand the purpose of the mandated 
business interaction and be committed to what is expected from them.  
Furthermore, governments need to pay greater attention to the contractual 
payments to large companies bearing in mind that delayed payments to large 
companies can result in misunderstandings on the part of the SME. Delays in 
receiving payments can be perceived as bad intention on the part of the large 
partner as was found in this study. Thus, the development of trust can be 
seriously impeded leading to a lack of willingness to engage further. It is 
recommended that there should be clarity concerning the release of payments 
and the timing of such payments. Whereas large companies may have 
resources to sustain them through long periods of delayed payments, SMEs 
can often lack such resources and may be dependent on timely payments for 
survival. If it is intended by the government that the larger company should be 
able to make regular payments to SMEs even though they are still awaiting 
government reimbursements, this should be explicitly stated in the policy and 
available to SMEs and large companies alike. The main issue is one of 
transparency. 
240 
 
Finally, governments should initiate programmes designed to give SME 
owners and managers the information about the mandated business 
interactions and to help them to acquire the requisite skills such as leadership 
and record keeping. Matlay et al. (2005) have drawn attention to the urgency 
of training programmes for smaller companies by the government or training 
institutes in order to enhance their efficiency and operation in the market. Such 
programmes should also stress the importance of the presence of SME 
owner/managers on site and their availability for consultation with the 
management of the large companies.  
7.5.2 Recommendations for managements of large companies 
Managers of large companies should have a greater understanding of SMEs’ 
lack of experience and resources and should adopt a more tolerant approach 
to their shortcomings which are often a consequence of lack of experience and 
resources. Tolerance was found to be influential factor in the development of 
trust in this study.  
Additionally, management of large companies should consider the impact of 
proximity in the development of trust between them and their smaller partners. 
People of diverse social backgrounds are frequently required to work with one 
another. This study found that an intermediary can play an important role in 
bridging the cultural divide and the development of trust between diverse 
partners and this is recommended to managers of large companies.  
Moreover, in many regions of the world, tribal norms are still important and 
may be even more influential than legislation or other social norms. Thus, this 
study recommends that management of large companies which operate in 
different countries should have an appreciation of the national culture and how 
various cultural norms influence trust.  
Another recommendation to management of large companies is to recognise 
of importance of timely payments and expense reimbursements to SMEs. 
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7.5.3 Recommendations for owners and management of SMEs 
Owners of SMEs should become dedicated to their ventures especially by their 
availability to discuss any issue with their larger partners. SME owner 
absenteeism was found, in this research, to have hindered the development 
of trust as the owners were not available for consultation. Absenteeism created 
a negative impression with their larger partners a low level of trust between 
them. 
Furthermore, owners of SMEs need to show greater enthusiasm to their larger 
partners to signal to them their commitment and reliability.  
Finally, where large partners have shown tolerance and understanding to 
owners of SMEs, in return such owners and managers of SMEs should 
respond in a positive way by improving their performance, considering 
themselves as trust developers (Rothkegel et al. 2006). 
7.6 Limitations of the study 
This study has some limitations which provide opportunities for further studies. 
One limitation of this study is its geographical context which is the Omani 
business environment. This could have implications for the generalisability of 
its findings in other geographical contexts. However, many issues are similar 
in different geographical contexts so that the findings of this study may have 
implications in other economies, particularly in developing economies.  
Another limitation is that this study was confined to government mandated 
business interaction and the generalisability of its findings to other forms of 
business interactions is not guaranteed. Similarly, this study was limited to the 
road construction industry and this sector may differ in terms of the needs of 
partners. However, this limitation can be overcome by future research into 
mandated business interactions in other sectors such as tourism and the oil 
and gas sector. 
The context of Oman and the focus on the construction industry provided a 
particularly rich and interesting context for the examination of mandated 
business interactions. However, it led to a focus only on men as interviewees. 
The men were also quite close in age.  Women or men from different age 
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groups may adopt different behaviours and have alternative perspectives on 
trust and business interactions.  
Finally, due to the qualitative nature of this research, its findings cannot be 
generalised to other situations. The aim of the study was to answer research 
questions which were exploratory in nature. Nevertheless, the study was 
useful in providing in-depth insights into the nature of trust resulting in a 
different contextual definition of trust. 
7.7 Pointers for future research 
This study offers several pointers for future research. First, the refined trust 
indicators of this study need to be empirically tested to establish their reliability.  
Further research is also required into mandated business interactions in other 
contexts to further validate the conceptualisation of trust which emerged from 
the finding of this study.  
Another fruitful area for future research could be to concentrate on one of the 
categories of Zucker’s classifications of trust factors. For example, a more in-
depth concentration on characteristic based factors could identify other sub-
factors that influence the development of trust and which could be useful for 
practitioners in IORs.  
The identified government shortcoming factors which appeared as 
antecedents hindering the development of trust are also worthy of future 
investigation to identify the appropriate roles and mechanisms for 
implementation which facilitates the development of trust.  
Finally, a comparative study of mandated business interactions between 
SMEs and large companies in a developed and a developing economy could 
provide useful findings for practitioners and policy makers interested in the 
development of trust for the success of such ventures. 
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7.8 Summary of the chapter 
The study aimed at exploring the phenomenon of trust between SMEs and 
large companies in the context of mandated business interactions. This was 
addressed by the formulation of two exploratory research questions which 
were answered by means of a qualitative method based on semi- structured 
interviews. An analysis of the findings led to a new contextual concept of trust. 
The findings of this study necessitated the refinement of the trust indicators so 
that they more appropriately signalled the presence and levels of trust. This 
called for a focus on the meanings that the various actors in the relationship 
attached to the indicators rather than a naïve reliance on the indicators 
themselves. Such meaning can only be accessed by means of qualitative 
methods. This implied a refinement to the four classical trust indicators: 
recurrence of business interactions, degree of formality, level of 
interdependency and reciprocity of information exchanged.  
A new model of trust factors emerged from the findings and this model which 
identified several trust factors not previously highlighted in the literature. The 
model was based on characteristic based, process based and institutional 
based trust factors following Zucker. Emerging from the data were several new 
factors which included the influence of national loyalty, a sharp distinction 
between social similarity and social proximity as cognitive trust factors, the 
influence of tribal norms and the mediating role of public institutions. Each of 
these factors was found to have a positive influence on the development of 
trust. On the other hand, manipulation and government shortcomings emerged 
from the findings as factors which impeded the development of trust.  
The implications of these findings led to several recommendations to the 
government, to the large companies and to the SMEs. Recommendations to 
government included the need for greater transparency especially with 
methods and times of payments, the need to address various shortcomings 
such as lack of government supervision, inequality of treatment, allocation of 
work reserved for SMEs, setting up and maintenance of comprehensive 
database of companies, improving labour laws and conditions and the 
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establishment of training programmes for personnel of SMEs to assist them to 
operate more efficiently (Johnson, 2005).  
Recommendations for managers of large companies included greater 
tolerance of the lack of resources and experience of SMEs, consideration of 
the impact of social proximity on the development of trust, an appreciation of 
the influence of tribal norms and the timely release of payments to SMEs in 
view of their importance for the survival of SMEs.  
Recommendations to SMEs included displaying greater dedication and 
enthusiasm for the project in hand particularly by the presence of the 
managers of the SMEs being available on sites. Additionally, SMEs which are 
shown tolerance by their larger partner should respond positively showing 
themselves to be creators of trust.  
Limitations of the study included being bound by its geographical context, 
being confined to mandated types of business interactions in the road 
construction sector and finally, due to the qualitative methodology, the findings 
were limited in their generalisability.   
Pointer for future research based on the findings of this study include the need 
for validation of its new contextual conceptualisation of trust, the empirical 
testing of the refined trust indicators, a more focused study confined to one of 
the Zucker’s categories of trust factors and comparative studies of mandated 
business interactions in a developed and a developing economy. 
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Appendix 1: Tender Board of Oman Mandated Business Instruction 
 
267 
 
Appendix 2 Instructions of Tender Board of Oman (TBO) 
The instruction of TBO to other government authorities to supervise the 
interaction between large companies and SMEs and to submit reports every 
three months to TBO which must contain performance and satisfaction ratings 
of large companies and SMEs. 
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Appendix 3 Consent form 
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Appendix 4 Survey given by the large partner to SME3 which perceived 
to have bad intention 
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Appendix 5 Evidence of high trust between S1 and SME2 
 
272 
 
 
 
273 
 
Appendix 6 Evidence of limited shared information and signal of low 
trust between JV2 and SME1 
 
